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I. INTRODUCTION
In rejecting a consent decree in the antitrust case United States v.
Microsoft Corp.,1 Judge Stanley Sporkin noted that "vaporware," the high-
technology industry's marketing ploy of preannouncing products that do
not exist at the time of the announcement and may never come into
existence in anything like their described form,2 "is a practice that is
deceitful on its face and everybody in the business community knows it." 3
In part because of his misgivings about Microsoft Corporation's alleged
* University Distinguished Teaching Professor and Ed and Molly Smith
Centennial Professor of Business Law, Graduate School of Business, University of
Texas, Austin, Texas.
1 159 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C. 1995), rev'dper curiam, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir.
1995). The original complaint charged Microsoft with violating sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act in the market for personal computer operating systems for the x86
class of microprocessors. The complaint attacked three of Microsoft's marketing
practices: (a) "per processor" licenses by which Microsoft required original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to pay a royalty for each computer the OEM
sold regardless of whether it contained a Microsoft operating system;
(b) "minimum commitments" distribution practices whereby Microsoft induced
OEMs to commit to buy a minimum number of units of Microsoft operating
systems under circumstances making it economically unattractive to install any
non-Microsoft system; and (c) use of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) to
discourage independent software developers (ISVs) from developing applications
for competing operating systems. The complaint did not mention vaporware
marketing practices. 159 F.R.D. at 322-24.
2 See ROBIN WILLIAMs, JARGON: AN INFORMAL DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER
TERMS 576 (1993) ("Vaporware is a product that the vendor keeps promising is
about to arrive any moment (real soon now)-but it goes so long past its shipment
date that no one really believes it will ever really ship. Sometimes it never does.");
see also David Churbuck, Vapordisk, FORBES, Oct. 28, 1991, at 188 (quoting
computer industry pundit Stewart Alsop who defines vaporware as "computer
products that exist chiefly in the minds of the people who announce them");
Deborah Russell, Geffen Tests Cyber Waters on New Frontline Sports Vid,
BILLBOAm, Apr. 30, 1994, at 50 (vaporware "means bull in computerland");
Harry Sommerfield, Technically Speaking: A Guide to the Brave New World of
Electronic Gadgets, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 1993, at ZI (vaporware is "a product
that is perpetually promised for tomorrow").
3 Microsoft, 159 F.R.D. at 337.
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use of the vaporware marketing technique,4 which was not addressed in the
consent decree presented to the court for approval in the Microsoft case,
Judge Sporkin refused to approve the consent decree.5
4 In criticizing the remedies provided by the consent decree, Judge Sporkin also noted:
The Court has been particularly concerned about the accusations of "vaporware."
Microsoft has a dominant position in the operating systems market, from which the
Government's expert concedes it would be very hard to dislodge it. Given this fact,
Microsoft could unfairly hold onto this position with aggressive preannouncements of
new products in the face of the introduction of possibly superior competitive products.
In other words, all participants concede, that consumers and OEMs will be reluctant to
shift to a new operating system, even a superior one, because it will mean not only
giving up on both its old operating systems and applications, but also risking the
possibility that there will not be adequate applications to run on the superior product. If
this is true, Microsoft can hold onto its market share gained allegedly illegally, even
with the introduction of a competitor's operating system superior to its own. By telling
the public, "we have developed a product that we are just about to introduce into the
market (when such is not the case) that is just as good and is compatible with all your
old applications," Microsoft can discourage consumers and OEMs from considering
switching to the new product.
Id. at 334-35.
In rejecting the government's position that "[p]roduct preannouncements do not violate
antitrust laws unless those preannouncements are knowingly lse and contribute to the
acquisition, maintenance, or exercise of market share," id. at 336, Sporkin took the
position:
Regardless of how narrow the Government's view is, it is incumbent on the
Government to address whether the defendant has been preannouncing products and
what effect, if any, such preannouncements have had in eliminating competition in an
increasing returns market where the market has clearly been tipped. Even if Microsoft's
current practice of "preannouncing" did not meet the Government's definition of
vaporware, shouldn't the Court be advised whether there is a basis for seeking to limit
the practice in fashioning an antitrust remedy?...
This Court cannot ignore the obvious. Here is the dominant firm in the software
industry admitting it "preannounces" products to freeze the current software market and
thereby defeat the marketing plans of competitors that have products ready for market.
Microsoft admits that the preannouncement is solely for the purpose of having an
adverse impact on a competitor's product. Its counsel states it has advised its client that
the practice is perfectly legal and it may continue the practice. This practice of an
alleged monopolist would seem to contribute to the acquisition, maintenance, or
exercise of market share.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit quickly reversed Judge
Sporkin's decision as beyond his power of review and remanded the case to
another district judge for entry of an order approving the settlement.6
Notwithstanding this abrupt reversal of Judge Sporkin's ruling, his
comments regarding the potential for vaporware marketing tactics to
constitute an antitrust violation animate this Article. The received wisdom
in antitrust scholarship rejects Judge Sporkin's apparent assumption that
vaporware marketing can indeed constitute such a violation.7 This Article
uses the Microsoft case as a springboard for a reexamination of that issue.
The Government has pressed for the adoption of its decree on the grounds that it
will open up competition. Given the Government's desire to open up competition why
does it not want to take on the vaporware issue?
When the Court gave Microsoft the opportunity to disavow this practice by an
undertaking it declined to do so. What is more, the Government told the Court that if it
conditioned its approval on Microsoft's undertaking no longer to engage in the practice,
the Government would withdraw its approval of the decree even if Microsoft agreed to
the undertaking.
The Court cannot sign off on a decree knowing that the defendant intends to
continue to engage in an anticompetitive practice without the Government providing a
full explanation as to its "no action" stance. It would almost be the equivalent of a Court
accepting a probationary plea from a defendant who has told the Court he will go out
and again engage in inappropriate conduct.
Id.
5 ld. at 338.
6 Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1449. Judge Sporkin's authority to review the consent decree
was authorized, but also limited, by the Tunney Act. The court of appeals did not believe
that the Tunney Act authorized Judge Sporkin to force the Department of Justice to make a
claim regarding vaporware that the Department did not believe to be true and that was not
necessarily related to the practices that the government had challenged. Id. at 1459-60.
The Microsoft case raised several interesting issues regarding the scope of a federal
district judge's review powers under the Tunney Act that are beyond the purview of this
Article. For general descriptions of the Tunney Act, see Maryellen Fullerton, Comment,
Fxploring the Reaches of Mandamus, 49 BROOK. L. REv. 1131 (1983); Justin Weaver Lilly,
Comment, A Judicial Role for Proceedings Involving Uncontested Modifications to Existing
Consent Decrees, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 665 (1992); James C. Noonan, Note, Judicial
Review of Antitust Consent Decrees: Reconciling Judicial Responsibility with Executive
Discretion, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 133 (1983); Note, The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent
Decrees Under the Antitust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 153
(1983).
7 See, e.g., FRANKLiN M. FISHER L" AL., FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MurILATED:
ECONOMIC ANALYsis AND U.S. v. IBM 289-90, 299 (1983) [hereinafter FISHER EL AL]
("There is no reason to inhibit the time when a firm announces or brings products to the
marketplace."); Robin C. Landis & Ronald S. Rolfe, Market Conduct Under Section 2:
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Part II describes in some detail the history, purposes, and important
characteristics of the use of vaporware marketing in high-tech industries in
the United States.8 Part III briefly summarizes the basic law of
monopolization and attempted monopolization, focusing on the types of
conduct that are generally deemed violative of the Sherman Act's section 2
prohibitions. 9
Parts IV and V tackle the central question of the Article: Under what
circumstances, if any, should vaporware marketing tactics be deemed an
antitrust violation? More specifically, when, if ever, should such tactics be
deemed to meet the conduct requirement of a section 2 Sherman Act
monopolization or attempt to monopolize violation? 10 Part IV attempts to
When Is It Anticompetitive?, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 131, 140 (Franklin M. Fisher
ed., .1985) ("Except under implausible assumptions, [use of vaporware] cannot, even in
principle, have any anticompetitive effect."); Ramsey Hanna, Note, Misud'ng Antitrust: The
Search for Functional Copyright Misuse Standards, 46 STAN. L. REV. 401, 443 (1994)
("A[n antitrust] basis for liability based on [Microsoft's] product preannouncements would
also appear to be lacking."); John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Microsoft,
Monopolization, and Network Eternalities Sone Uses and Abuses of Economic Theory in
Antitrust Decision Making, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 317, 356-61 (1995) [hereinafter Lopatka
& Page, Microsoft] (arguing that accurate product preannouncements should be per se legal,
that innocent but inaccurate preannouncements should be legal, and that even fraudulent
inaccurate preannouncements are the stuff of tort law rather than antitrust law); Janusz A.
Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Piidng and Product
Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8, 53 (1981) ("[A]ny timing of a product preannouncement should
be presumed legal."); Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Tripping Up the Titan, TIME, Feb. 27, 1995, at
31, 33 [hereinafter Elmer-DeWitt, Tripping] (quoting Professor William Kovacic at
Washington College of Law at American University for the proposition that Judge Sporkin
does not seem to realize these issues, including product preannouncements, were litigated in
the 1970s against companies like Kodak and IBM and "'with very few exceptions,
[defendants] beat those plaintiffs into the ground'").
On the other hand, Areeda and Turner seem to agree that vaporware marketing can be
illegal if it is fraudulent. PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 738i, at
284(1978).
8 See infra notes 18-113 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 114-33 and accompanying text.
10 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The statute reads:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $10,000,000 dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding
three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
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answer these questions regarding fraudulent vaporware marketing-cases
where product preannouncements are made by firms that have no
reasonable belief that they can produce the promised products at the
promised times.11 Part V attempts to answer the above questions
regarding innocent vaporware marketing-situations where product
preannouncements are made by firms that do reasonably believe that they
can produce the promised products at the promised times but fail to do
so.
12
In substantial part, this Article will attempt to determine whether
vaporware marketing should take its place among several recently
articulated theories of nonprice predation, such as raising rivals' costs
(RRC), predatory product innovation, and predatory brand proliferation,
that populate the "post-Chicago" world of antitrust commentary.
This Article does not constitute a legal brief attacking Microsoft. 13
Rather, it simply uses the Microsoft litigation to provide background and
I1 See infra notes 134-315 and accompanying text. Until Part IV, this Article has no
strong reason to distinguish, and therefore does not, between the fraudulent and innocent
forms of vaporware marketing.
12 See infra notes 316-75 and accompanying text.
13 Nor does this Article pretend to reexamine fundamental issues such as whether
antitrust law is, on balance, good or bad, or to enter the protracted debate as to the proper
focus of the antitrust laws (protection of consumer welfare versus promotion of small,
competitive business, versus protecting individuals from massive aggregations of capital,
and the like).
Rather, this Article simply assumes that antitrust law has a valid role to play in today's
economy and that the Sherman Act should not be implicitly repealed on the basis of various
economic theories that were unknown to its framers and that have not convinced subsequent
Congresses to repeal it. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rhetoic and Skepticism in Anfitn=
Argument, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1721, 1728 (1986) ("[A]ny such confession in a democratic
country must make some attempt to acknowledge that the legislature has a hand in making
policy, and that this requires deference to the legislature even if its policy is inconsistent
with the economic model espoused by the judge.").
The Article therefore implicitly rejects the strictest versions of the Chicago School
antitrust analysis that dominated the 1980s. That view, of course, is that there is only the
smallest role for antitrust law to play in modem economies. This viewpoint is spelled out
cogently in a series of articles by Judge Easterbrok. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook,
Allocating Anttrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.. 305 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ignorance and Antitrust, in A =rrrRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPwETrE 119 (Thomas
M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds., 1992) [hereinafter Fasterbrook, Ignorance and Anitrust];
Frank IL Easterbrook, The Lirntr of Andta, 63 Tax. L. REv. 1 (1984); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Monopolization.: Past, Present, Future, 61 ANTrrRUsT L. 99 (1992); Frank
H. Easterbrook, On Identifng Excldsionwy Conduct, 61 NoTM DAME L. REV. 972, 974
(1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook, On Identifng]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
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context for examination of a compelling and fascinating issue. Microsoft's
strong market power, 14 aggressive pursuit of market dominance, 15 and
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. ClI. L. REv. 263 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitnst Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv.
1696 (1986).
Although the Chicago School has made an invaluable contribution to antitrust analysis,
this Article's underlying premise is more attuned to those who still believe that there is an
important role for antitrust law to play that is currently underappreciated but becoming
more recognized in what some call the "post-Chicago" era. See, e.g., Walter Adams &
James W. Brock, Antitrust, Ideology, and the Arabesques of Economic Theory, 66 COLO. L.
REV. 257 (1995) (issuing a broadside attack on Chicago School economic theory's
restrictive impact on antitrust law); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antibust's Protected C7asses, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that ascendant Chicago School approach ignores
legitimate classes of plaintiffs such as competitors and potential competitors that the
Sherman Act was passed to protect); William B. Tye, Market Imperfections, Equity, and
Efficiency in Antitruat, 37 ANTrrRUST BULL. 1 (1992) (pointing out flaws and contradictions
in the Chicago School view of antitrust law); Oliver E. Williamson, Deliriting Anttrust, 76
GEO. L.J. 271 (1987) [hereinafter Williamson, Delidting Antirut] (expressing concern that
efforts to limit the scope of antitrust law may overshoot the mark); Michael Porter, Japan
Isn't Playing by Different Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at F13 (Because key to strong
international economic performance is intense competition in home markets, "[w]hat is
needed today in American industry is not less competition but more. Instead of relaxing
antitrust enforcement, we should be tightening it.").
14 Nearly half the total PC software revenue in the world goes directly to Microsoft,
see James Gleick, The Microsoft Monopoly, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 5, 1995, at 50, 51,
helping Microsoft to be valued as highly as IBM or General Motors on just a fraction of the
sales, see The Future of Microsoft: Today Windows, Tomorrow the World, THE ECONOMIST,
May 22, 1993, at 25, 25, and making Bill Gates the world's richest man. See I-iroko Asami
et al., The Superrich, FORBES, July 15, 1996, at 124 ($18 billion).
This success springs largely from the fact that Microsoft's operating systems software
run 85% of the world's personal computers. See Elizabeth Corcoran, Long-Delayed Apple
Cones May Bear Fruit: Search Is Underway for License Partners, WASH. POST, Sept. 19,
1994, at F21. The successively greater market acceptance of Microsoft's MS-DOS,
Windows, and Windows 95 operating systems have assured Microsoft's paramount status.
Apple Computer is clearly floundering with but a relatively tiny market share, see Peter
Burrows, The Fall of an American Icon, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 1996, at 34, 34, while IBM's
OS/2, Microsoft's only serious competitor for the non-Macintosh operating systems market,
has sold only half the copies in its entire six-year history that Microsoft's Windows 95 sold
in its first five months. See Microsoft Reports Earnings Jump, THE REurER Bus. REP., Jan.
17, 1996 (Windows 95 sold 18 million units by January 1996, five months after it was
released on the market); Jim Erickson, IBM Hopes OCdna Picks Warp Over Windows,
AUSTIN AM.-STATEsMAN, May 15, 1995, at D1 (stating that OS/2 had fewer than 10 million
users worldwide).
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Windows 95 has become the fastest selling software product in history at forty million
copies in its first year. See James Eng, Windows 95 Marks h Year in Shadow of a Power
Struggle, AUSTmn AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 24, 1996, at D5. Yet, Windows 95 may ultimately
pale in comparison to the importance of Microsoft's Windows NT. See Don Clark, A Dud
at Its Birth, Windows NTis Back As Networldng Force, WALL ST. I., July 29, 1996, at A1.
In recent years, Microsoft has leveraged its dominate position in operating systems
software into tremendous success in applications software by bundling applications with the
operating systems in such a fashion as to make them seem like part of the operating system.
See Andrew Schulman, Microsoft's Gnip on Software Tightened by Antitrust Deal, DR.
DoBB's . SoFTWARE ToOLs, Oct. 1994, at 143. Microsoft has thereby taken leadership in
the word-processing market away from WordPerfect, see Judy Fahys & Steven Oberbeck,
Utahns High on Hgh-Tech Merger But Way Wall Street Gves Low Marks Initially to
Novell-WordPerfect Deal, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 23, 1994, at Al, gobbled up 87% of the
market for suites, see Jeffrey Henning, Dominant Microsoft Here to Stay,
CoMPUTRawoRLD, Feb. 27, 1995, at 49, taken control of the scheduling and filing markets
with Project and Access, see Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Mine, All Mine, TIME, June 5, 1995, at
46, 50 [hereinafter Elmer-DeWitt, Mine], challenged Lotus for dominance in the
spreadsheet market, see id., challenged Borland in the database market, see The Future of
Microsoft: Today Windows, Tomorrow the World, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 25,
25, and set in motion its plan to dominate the Internet as well, see John M. Morgan,
Microsoft Challenges Nescapefor Market Dominance, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 30, 1996, at
8E.
Several histories of Bill Gates and Microsoft provide substantial detail regarding its
dazzling success. See, e.g., DANIEL ICmBLAH & SUSAN L. KNEPPER, THE MAKING OF
MIcROSOr (1991); STEPHEN MANEs & PAUL ANDREWS, GATES: How MiCRosoFr's
MOGUL RENVENTED AN INDUSTRY AND MADE HIMSELF THE RICHmST MAN IN AMERICA
(1994); JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING OF
THE MICROSOFt EMPIRE (1992); James Gleick, supra at 50 (presenting a post-Windows 95
update of Microsofts monopolistic successes and goals).
For a more academic look at Microsoft's product development and management style,
see MICHAEL A. CuSUMANO & RICHAD W. SELBY, MICROSOFt SECRETs (1995) and FRED
MOODY, I SING THE BODY ELECTRONIC (1995).
15 Bill Gates has long been dubbed "The Silicon Bully." Phil Reeves, Hardball in the
Software League, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 26, 1993, at 14. He has frequently threatened or
promised to put competitors out of business. See generally WALLAE & ERICKSON, supra
note 14, at 211-12 (Bill Crates quoted as saying, "We're going to put Digital Research out
of business."); l at 278 (Gates vowed to put Lotus Development out of business.); id. at
382 (Gates "declared war" on Adobe Systems.).
Competitors allege that Microsoft's primary strategy for achieving dominance is to use
its position in one market to enter new markets and "[tihen they make it unprofitable long
enough [to shake out] the other players so that they end up gaining massive amounts of
[market] share." Computers & Technology, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Dec. 7, 1994, at A8
(quoting Philippe Kahn, chairman of Borland International, Inc.) (first alteration in
original). Furthermore, Microsoft has made clear its goal is 100% of market share. See
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alleged use of vaporware marketing tactics all provide a factual framework
to highlight the plausibility and practical importance of the issues
discussed. However, the reader must keep in mind that Microsoft denies
any improper use of vaporware, that the Department of Justice, after
substantial investigation, refused to pursue any vaporware claims against
Microsoft, and that Microsoft has had no opportunity to present evidence
in a court of law to defend its marketing practices in this regard. Indeed,
Microsoft has also been a victim of apparent vaporware marketing
tactics, 16 and given its penchant for attacking new markets with established
players, might just as likely be a plaintiff as a defendant in some future suit
over the issue.17
Stuart Taylor, Jr., What to Do with the Microsoft Monster, AM. LAw., Nov. 1993, at 72, 78
(quoting Michael Maples of Microsoft: "My job is to get a fair share of the software
applications market, and to me that's one hundred percent."). Gates has predicted that
Microsoft could double in size in the foreseeable future. See James Eng, Gates: Microsoft
Could More Than Double in Size, AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 16, 1995, at C5.
16 Examples include the following:
9 Ann Arbor Softworks ran an advertisement telling customers not to buy a new
Microsoft word processing program but to wait instead for Ann Arbor's Fullwrite program
which was, it turned out, still months away from being commercially available. See Lindsy
Van Gelder, Vaporwvarefor Sale, LOTUS, Feb. 1988, at 140.
e To counteract a Microsoft product announcement, Lotus preannounced a version of
its 1-2-3 spreadsheet for Apple's Macintosh that did not ship for three years. See Stephen
Kreider Yoder, Computer Makers Defend 'Vaporware,'WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 1995, at B1.
* In 1994, Apple preannounced its next-generation operating system, Copland, though
it was still at least two years away from the market in order "to blunt Chicago's [Windows
95's] momentum .... " G. Pascal Zachary & Jim Carlton, Software Rivals 5ng to Define
How PCs Work, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, atB1.
e In November, 1995, after Windows 95 had already shipped, Apple Computer again
began hyping Copland as a method of blunting Windows 95's impact, even though it was
unlikely that the product would ship before 1997. See Peter Burrows, New! Irproved! Not
Here Yet!, Bus. WK., Dec. 18, 1995, at 80, 80.17 Especially since IBM acquired Lotus, Microsoft is not the only 800-pound gorilla in
the software industry. See Laurie Hays & Steven Lipin, Lotus Gives In and Accepts IBM
Offer of $3.52 Billion, a Sweetened $64 a Share, WALL ST. J., June 12, 1995, at A3 (the
largest software acquisition on record).
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II. VAPORWARE IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY
A. Vaporware and the Challenges of High-Tech Marketing
Marketing efforts are critical to the success of virtually every
product,18 but marketing is especially essential to the success of high-tech
products. 19 In substantial part, this is true because of the exceedingly rapid
evolution of high technology and the need of companies that wish to stay
competitive to constantly introduce new products. Launching new
products, 80% of which fail, 20 typically requires elaborate advertising and
a coordinated marketing effort. Misguided marketing plans can doom a
product,21 and indeed, an entire company. 22
Computer and other high-tech companies have recognized the
importance of marketing in several ways, including by spending large sums
to hire package-goods marketing experts away from low-tech companies
such as Procter & Gamble, Nabisco, and Kraft General Foods.23 The
18 See DAvID J. LUCK & O.C. FERRELL, MARKETING STRATEGY AND PLANS 312 (2d
ed. 1985) ("Promotion is the second most critical functional area [besides the product itself]
in probably all new products."); R.G. Cooper, The Dimensions of Indastrial New Product
Success and Failure, 43 J. MARnING 93, 103 (1979) (stating that the product is the most
important, but marketing factors are "critical").
19 See WILLIAM H. DAVIDOW, MARKETING HIGH TECHNOLOGY xviii (1986)
("Increasingly, marketing will determine the fate of [high-tech firms.]"); WILLIAM L.
SHANKLIN & JOHN K. RYANS, JR., ESSENTIALS OF MARKETING HIGH TECHNOLOGY 40
(1987) ("Marketing knowledge and expertise is vital to the success of high-tech firms."); see
also Dennis L Cahill & Robert M. Warshawsky, The Marketing Concept: A Forgotten Aid
for Marketing High Technology Products, 10 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 17 (1993) (arguing
that marketers should take back control of high-tech product development from engineers to
ensure that companies develop products that consumers really will want to buy).
20 See GERHARD ROSSEGER, THE EcoNOMICS OF PRODUCrION AND INNOvATION: AN
INDUSTRiAL PERSPEcrivE 10 (2d ed. 1986); see also Dee M. Wellan & A.S.C. Ehrenberg,
A Successfid New Brand: Shield, I. MARKETING RES. SOC'Y, Jan. 1988, at 35 ("Ihe
failure rate of new brands remains high."). There is wide variation from industry to industry
in new product success rates.
21 See Nico Krohn, Not As Easy as 1-2-3, INFOWORLD, Apr. 1, 1991, at 40, 41 (citing
examples, including Ovation Technologies' integrated software package which became
permanent vaporware).
22 See DAVIDOW, supra note 19, at xvii.
23 See Kenneth Traynor & Susan C. Traynor, Marketing Approaches Used by High
Tech Fims, 18 INDUS. MARKETING MGMT. 281, 286 (1989) ("It is clear that the marketing
efforts of high tech firms are as important, if not more important, than the reliance on state-
of-the-art technology."); Kyle Pope, New Job Path From Cookies to Computers, WALL ST.
I., May 9, 1994, atB1.
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means and methods of high-tech marketing have been explicated in detail
elsewhere.24 However, it is worth emphasizing here that prelaunch
marketing programs must generally be aimed not just at consumers, but at
vendors, providers of needed support products (such as applications
software), government and regulatory agencies, independent computer
consulting firms, financial analysts, investors, the media, and other types
of stakeholders.25 Because of the complex and interrelated nature of the
modem world of technology, a marketing campaign, including one with a
vaporware component, that does not include all of these constituencies may
well fail. For example, consumers often rely upon the media to provide
guidance as to reliable products. 26 A company that does not win favorable
media attention may never win many customers either.
Given the intense pressure to promote high-tech products, it is not
surprising, perhaps, that the practice of product preannouncing was
devised. Present from the very beginnings of the computer industry, 27 such
preannouncements are currently common in high-tech industries. 28 Indeed,
an entire vocabulary has been developed for the practice, which is
variously called "vaporware," "preannouncing," "ambush marketing," and
"FUD-factor marketing"-FUD standing for the "fear, uncertainty and
Indeed, Microsoft launched its fabulously successful word processing program,
Microsoft Word, much as though it were a bar of soap by sending out free samples. The
Microsoft employee behind the plan, Rowland Hansen, had been a vice-president of
marketing for Neutrogena Corporation and a marketing manager for General Mills. See
WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 242-43.
24 See Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype
and the Securities Fraud Liability of igh-Tech Companies, 8 HARV. 1.L. & TECH. 1, 4-8
(1994); see also GEOFFREY A. MOORE, INSIDE THE TORNADO (1995) (discussing consultant's
recent view of high-tech marketing strategies in general).
25 See Jerry Wind & Vijay Mahajan, Marketing Hype: A New Perspective for New
Product Research and Introduction, 4 1. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 43, 44 (1987).
26 See MANEs & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 241 (noting that "influential core users
relyl far more heavily on editorial coverage in computer magazines than on
advertisements").
2 7 See Philip Elmer-DeWitt, Hardware, Software, Vaporware: Tardy Technology
Bedev'ls an Adolescent Industry, TIME, Feb. 3, 1986, at 51 ("Delays and broken promises
have bedeviled the computer business since its birth some 35 years ago.").
28 See Dean Takahashi, Computer Show Features Wares That Don't Exist, L.A. TIMES
(Orange Co. ed.), Oct. 22, 1991, at D8 (quoting AST Research, Inc. cochairman Thomas
Yuen as saying "[tihis has become a vaporware industry"); Van Gelder, supra note 16, at
140 (stating that vaporware "is rampant in the computer industry").
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doubt" meant to be created in the minds of the competition's potential
customers. 29
B. Legitimate Uses of Vaporware Announcements
Vaporware announcements have often played a role in the success of
high-tech companies offering innovative and useful products. Where a new
architecture is at stake, using marketing to create the impression that a
product is winning the battle for market supremacy may be sufficient to
enable the announcing company to actually do so.30 Preannouncing paves
the way for consumer acceptance by creating a "prior subconscious sense
of familiarity or acceptance" that diminishes consumer resistance to the
unknown and unfamiliar. 31 Thus, vaporware preannouncements can be an
essential element in a small company's strategy for breaking into a high-
tech market and setting standards. 32
In addition to enabling innovative companies to bring their products
successfully to market, vaporware announcements may also provide
valuable information to consumers who are then better able to plan for
their future product needs.33 Vaporware announcements can reassure
consumers as to the stability of a company and assure them that the
2 9 See Wayne Eckerson, Users Want Network Vendors to Stop Using "Vaporware"
Tactics, NETWORK WORLD, July 10, 1989, at 4 (quoting network analyst Mary Modahl as
saying that "[tihe one legitimate use of vaporware is that it reassures customers of a
vendor's direction" so that the customers can plan their long-term purchasing strategies);
Vaporware Wins No Laughs at Microsoft Now, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 21, 1995, at
1.
3 0 See Michael R. Leibowitz, The Microprocessor Marketing Wars, ELECrRONIC Bus.,
July 10, 1989, at 28, 31 (quoting TJ. Rogers, CEO of Cypress Semiconductor Corp., as
saying that "[tihere's enough ambiguity that it is really a marketing pitch that will win or
lose this war" for the RISC (reduced instruction set computing) chip market).
31 See LEO BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 72 (1967).
32 See Stephane St-Onge, General Magic Aims to Set Standard for Ti-ny Computers,
FIN. POsT, July 10, 1993, at C16.
33 See Donald J. Boudreaux, Microsoft's Great Buiness Secret, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
3, 1995, at A21; Laurie Flynn, The Executive Computer, N.Y. TPAEs, Apr. 24, 1995, at
D4 (citing Microsoft "white paper" on vaporware); Systematics Offers Peek at Product,
AM. BANKER, June 14, 1989, at 10, 10 (reporting that Systematics commenced
preannouncing products so that customers would know what the company's future plans
were).
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company is at the forefront of technological developments 34 and that its
products will continue to meet their needs.
Vaporware announcements can carry useful information for vendors of
high-tech products as well. Preannouncing gives vendors an opportunity to
plan for their inventory and marketing needs before new products hit retail
shelves.3 5
Another practical benefit of vaporware preannouncements is that they
can be used to stimulate complementary activity by third parties, such as
when IBM noted in the 1986 preannouncement of its professional work
station that software was limited, thereby creating an incentive for third
parties to produce such software. 36 By providing information about
operating systems in development, Microsoft often gives software
developers the tools they need to create new software.37 This point cannot
be overemphasized-the extensive software industry that is based upon
creating applications for Microsoft operating systems depends heavily upon
advance information supplied by Microsoft.
Vaporware announcements can also be aimed at investors and creditors
of high-tech companies, demonstrating to them that the announcing
companies are in the vanguard of technological trends. 38 Corporate
managers and professional investors often like to know where research and
development money is being spent, and vaporware announcements can
provide that information. 39
Citing all these beneficial effects of vaporware, many have argued that
preannouncements of products, so long as they are generally truthful,
increase consumer welfare4°  and promote rather than depress
competition. 41 These benefits of product preannouncements flow from
"vaporware" as that term is used in its least pejorative sense. These
benefits flow from honest predictions of the features and availability dates
34 See Samuel Rabino & Thomas E. Moore, Managing New-Product Announcements
in the Computer Industry, 18 INDUS. MARKETiNG MGMr. 35, 39 (1989).
35 See Mark Lacter, Judge Went Beyond the Andrust Spirit in His Microsoft Ruling,
SACRAMENToBEE, Feb. 21, 1995, atB7.
36 See Rabino & Moore, supra note 34, at 40.
37 See Bill Gates, Th7ey're Talking, We're Selling, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1995, at
A22.
38 See Grace Casselman, Vaporware: Vile or Valid?, COMPuriNG CANADA, Dec. 19,
1991, at 1.
39 See Linda Bridges, The Sweet Smell of Vaporware Starts to Turn Sour for Many
Micro Managers, PC WK., Nov. 17, 1987, at 19 (quoting Ray Paul, manager of sales and
information planning for Nabisco Brands).
40 See Landis & Rolfe, supra note 7, at 140.
41 See FISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 289.
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of products that are in development but not yet ready for market. Of
course, not all of the products will meet projected release dates. Others
may not carry all the promised features. Others may never see the light of
day. After all, the design, testing, and manufacturing of high-tech products
is a very complicated business. Many projects are so very complex that it
is nearly impossible to know when all the glitches will be worked out. Not
all delays are foreseeable. 42 Not all broken promises are broken
intentionally.
C. Illicit Uses of Vaporware
Unfortunately, the term "vaporware" sometimes carries a darker
connotation. Often, product preannouncements are not made for the
purpose of providing consumers and others with valuable information
about the announcing company's good faith plans for completion of
products currently in development. Instead, the vaporware announcements
are made recklessly or in bad faith by companies who know with
substantial certainty that their promised deadlines will not be met, that their
products will not carry the promised features, or that their promised
products most likely will never reach the market. Sometimes the products
exist only in the minds of their developers. 43 Frequently, manufacturers'
hype is so disingenuous that their imagined products do not "even qualify
as vapor."44 Distinguishing between "good faith" vaporware
announcements and fraudulent vaporware announcements is therefore
important. The former announcements can be useful to customers and
others. The latter announcements can only confuse and cause damage. 45
Fraudulent vaporware announcements injure customers who cannot
make an informed decision regarding whether to buy a currently available
product that meets their needs or to wait for a product that might be better,
42 See Lori Hawkins, High-Tech Mirages, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Mar. 6, 1995, at
Cl [hereinafter Hawkins, High-Tech Mirages] (quoting industry analysts Jo Ann Stahel and
Cheryl Currid).
43 See generaly Takahashi, supra note 28, at D8 (noting that 30 companies were
preannouncing pen-based computers at the 1991 Comdex computer convention).
44 John Schwartz, The NextRevolution, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1992, at 42,45 (complaining
that John Sculley appeared on the cover of Fortune magazine holding a molded, plastic prop of
a product that did not yet exist).
45 See Bridges, supra note 39, at 19.
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but that also might make it onto the market only after a great delay, if
ever.
46
Inaccurate vaporware announcements also injure vendors who cannot
make accurate plans for future marketing and inventory efforts. These
announcements can also infuriate vendors who may have difficulty selling
competitors' products because of a vaporware announcement, but cannot
sell the announcing company's products because those products are not yet
ready and may not be for some time, if ever.47
Vaporware can even injure the announcing company in several ways.
Product preannouncements can slow down the sales of the announcer's
existing products that will be outmoded if and when the promised products
reach the market.48 Additionally, product preannouncements can inform
competitors of a company's plans, allowing the competitors to meet or beat
the announcer to its goal.49 Furthermore, small companies can vaporize
themselves by repeatedly disappointing customers. 50
Given the substantial "down side" to fraudulent vaporware
announcements, why is the practice so widespread? One very plausible
explanation lies in the anticompetitive uses of vaporware announcements.
New product announcements-whether made when the products are to be
launched or substantially in advance of that date-are usually made not just
to inform consumers of the arrival of new products. Instead, they are also
usually made to advance management's strategic objectives, 51 which can be
anticompetitive in nature. According to Professors Rabino and Moore,
among the specific goals management may have in mind in preannouncing
a product are: "(1) to preempt the competition by encouraging buyers to
await the firm's new product rather than purchase a competitor's;
46 See Eckerson, supra note 29, at 4; Sam Whitmore, Buyers Beware Perils of Product
Preannouncements, PC WK., June 24, 1991, at 62 ("Buyers can be left precariously
wondering which capabilities are real, and what recourse they have if vendors strategic to
them happen to change their minds.").
4 7 See REGIS MCKENNA, WHO'S AFRAID OF BIG BLUE? 118-19 (1989) (giving as an
example IBM's preannouncement of its PCjr before the 1983 Christmas season).
4 8 This phenomenon is sometimes called the "Osborne effect" because the demise of
the Osborne Computer Co. is traced in substantial part to this phenomenon. Casselman,
supra note 38, at 1.
49 See id. at 1 (quoting computer consultant Amy Wohl).
5 0 See Hawkins, High-Tech Mirages, supra note 42, at C1 (citing as examples
VisiCorp and Gavilan Computer Corp.).
Wang Laboratories' downfall has been traced in large part to a reckless vaporware
announcement of 14 new products which did not exist and mostly never came into
existence. See CHARLES C. KENNEY, RIDING THE RUNAWAY HORSE 125-47 (1992).
51 See generally MICAE, E. PORTER, COtemmwPIvE STRATEGY 75-78 (1980).
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(2) communicate plans for a retaliatory move against a competitor; (3) test
a competitor's reaction; or (4) redefine a competitive industry position
"52
All four of these goals may be accomplished with fraudulent product
preannouncements as well as with legitimate, good faith
preannouncements. Whether the goal is to slow down purchases of
competitors' products53 or to buy time for the announcing company to get
its own act together, 54 Professors Parks, Pharr, and Lockeman conclude
that vaporware announcements are often used to "deflect[] an opponent's
momentum by the announcement of new products, whether or not they
exist."55
For example, when Intel introduced its model 8086 16-bit
microprocessor in 1978, Zilog and Motorola immediately announced their
competing vaporware products, 56 hoping that consumers would refrain
from purchasing Intel's product until they could complete and bring their
own to market. In early 1994, as the market began to lavish attention upon
Microsoft's then-unfinished Windows 95 (then code-named "Chicago")
operating system software, Apple announced its System 7 upgrade of
Macintosh software in order "to blunt Chicago's momentum." 57 Apple
made this announcement despite the fact that the improvements were at
least two years away from being available to consumers, even in the
unlikely event they hit their target date. On the same day, "in hopes of
stealing some fire" from Apple Computer's launch of its Macintosh line
using the new, speedy PowerPC chip, several PC makers preannounced
plans to begin marketing units incorporating Intel's Pentium Chip.58
52 Rubino & Moore, supra note 34, at 35, 36.
53 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 408 (1988);
Casselman, supra note 38, at 1 (quoting Ian Fraser, vice-president of marketing for Merisel
Canada).
5 4 See Whitmore, supra note 46, at 62.
55 Bill Parks et al., A Marketer's Guide to Clausewitz Lessons for Winning Market
Share, Bus. HoRizoNs, July 1994, at 68, 71 (emphasis added); see also Hawkins, High-
Tech Mirages, supra note 42, at Cl (quoting computer market analyst Cheryl Currid as
saying, "Your competitor announces a new product, you announce a competing product-
whether there is a product or not.") (emphasis added).
56 See DAVIDOW, supra note 19, at 3 (using the term "paper tiger" to also indicate a
product that does not yet exist).
57 G. Pascal Zachary & Jim Carlton, Software Rivals Vying to Define How PCs Work,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, atB1.
58 Jim Carlton & Don Clark, PC Makers to Launch Machines Using New Version of
Intel's Pentium Chip, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at B6.
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Whether legitimate or illegitimate, whether done in good faith or bad
faith, vaporware practices are becoming increasingly extravagant.
"[C]ompetitive pressure and the public's growing tolerance for hype
prompts more companies to announce what they're hoping to do well
before they've even figured out how to do it." 59 Judge Sporkin's opinion
in the Microsoft case reignited a long-standing debate in the high-tech
industry itself about the ethics of these increasingly prevalent vaporware
marketing tactics. 60
D. Microsoft's Use of Vaporware
Microsoft is widely alleged to be an accomplished player in the
vaporware game. It has often stood atop a list of vaporware practitioners
that is published regularly by PC Letter.61 Microsoft finished first (by a
wide margin) in a 1995 poll of information systems professionals asked to
name the most aggressive preannouncer of products in the computer
industry. 62 Microsoft allegedly has been aggressive and successful in using
such preannouncements not only to promote its own products, but also to
freeze the markets for competitors' products, perhaps unfairly. 63 There are
many examples of Microsoft's alleged vaporware marketing:
5 9 Bob Donath, Roadkill in the Backroom, MARKEING NEWS, Apr. 25, 1994, at 13,
13. 6 0 See Stuart j. Johnston & Mitch Betts, Industry Debates U.S. Vaporware Probe,
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 13, 1995, at 2.
61 See Vaporware Wins No Laughs at Microsoft Now, supra note 29, at 1 (quoting
P.C Letter publisher David Coursey).
6 2 See Stuart J. Johnston, Vaporware Tactics Elicit Mixed Views, COMPUTERWORLD,
May 1, 1995, at 1, 47. Among other findings of the poll were (a) that IS professionals do
not want the federal government involved in regulating product preanmouncements, (b) that
Microsoft is viewed as using vaporware announcements to "freeze the market" for
competitors' goods, but may be no more aggressive in doing so than some other companies,
and (c) that information coming from preannouncements is useful to these professional
consumers, but they feel they generally do not need to know about products that are more
than three to six months away from the market. Id.
63 See Andrew Schulman, The United States Versus Bill Gates, NEwsWEEK, July 11,
1994, at43, 43.
[C]ompetitors say that Microsoft, like IBM in its heyday, specializes in spreading
FUD-"fear, uncertainty and doubt"-with deliberately unrealistic or premature
announcements of products it says it will release. The idea, say critics, is to make
customers reluctant to buy from a competitor until they see what Microsoft has coming.
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* Although no one accuses Bill Gates of having invented vaporware, he
seems to have been one of its earliest practitioners. 64 The story of how
Microsoft founders Bill Gates and Paul Allen got into the computer
business by writing software for the earliest personal computer-MITS's
Altair in Albuquerque-is legend. Several competitors were promising
MITS's president Ed Roberts that they could write BASIC software for the
Altair. Gates got his foot in the door by promising Roberts that he and
Allen could deliver a working BASIC to MITS within three weeks; it took
seven.65 According to Allen, Gates told Roberts that they had the BASIC
program when, in fact, they had not yet written it.66
a One of the key developments that lifted Microsoft from a shoestring
operation to a big league player involved a bit of vaporware. In 1977,
Microsoft was selling its version of programming languages like BASIC
and FORTRAN which, coincidentally, meshed well with CP/M, the
standard operating system on the Intel 8080 microprocessor. Because the
8080 was becoming an industry leader, Microsoft's products were doing
well. But in 1978, Intel released a new 16-bit microprocessor called the
8086, which Microsoft's products could not work with. IBM approached
Gates about developing BASIC for the 8086 (soon changed to the 8088),
and Gates cemented Microsoft's successful future by promising delivery of
a new BASIC program. Microsoft missed virtually every production
deadline set in its agreement with IBM. 67 In fact, in its early days,
Microsoft "would always underestimate" time of completion, according to
Microsoft insider Steve Wood. 68
e In the early 1980s, Microsoft made substantial inroads into Japanese
markets. Microsoft succeeded, in large part, by providing products that
were not available elsewhere. But, typically, Microsoft also repeatedly
6 4 Not only was Bill Gates one of the earliest practitioners of vaporware marketing
tactics, it seems likely that the term "vaporware" itself was coined in Microsoft's own labs
in 1982. Ann Winblad, cofounder of Open Systems who actually dated Bill Gates at one
time, is credited with popularizing the term. She claims that she first heard it from
Microsoft engineers John Ulett and Mark Ursino when she asked them about an operating
system they were working on. They used the term to indicate that the project had run out of
steam. Later, the term came to have broader connotations. See generally Flynn, supra note
33, atD4.
65 See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 78.
66 See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 71 (quoting Paul Allen).
67 See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 192.
68 k. at 120-21, 135-36; see also id. at 152 (In Microsoft's early years, "[d]eadlines
were often missed, products weren't always well designed, and contracts had to be revised
due to unforeseen obstacles or delays.").
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missed product delivery dates, imbuing its products with a strong vaporous
quality. 69
0 In 1982, Microsoft began working on a graphical user interface
("GUI") technology similar to what eventually became the basis for the
very popular Apple Macintosh. Originally approved as a 6 work-year
investment of programmer time, it ultimately took more than 80 work-
years before it was issued in 1985-two years behind schedule-as
Windows.
After VisiCorp announced at the fall 1982 Comdex trade show that it
was working on something similar called VisiOn, Gates implied at a
January 1983 press conference that Microsoft would ship its product before
VisiOn could reach the market, even though Microsoft had yet to even run
a prototype of the program on an IBM PC.70
In October 1983, VisiCorp announced that it planned to begin shipping
VisiOn.71 Within two weeks, Microsoft made what was at that time the
most elaborate product introduction in industry history for Windows and
Gates, boldly predicting that Windows would be on 90% of all IBM
compatible computers by the end of 1984.72 According to Erickson and
Wallace, Gates's motives behind the vaporware preannouncement were
anticompetitive:
[Gates] had learned that one way to prevent potential customers from
flocking to a competitor's product was to announce that your company
was working on something even better. It was a tried-and-true IBM gambit
that worked well when customers looked to your firm to set standards;
they usually would gladly wait for the market leader's product to come
out.
"There seemed to be this notion that since all of our competitors were
announcing products that were vaporware, we had to have one too,"
recalled one Microsoft manager of the decision to announce Windows.
Gates had other motives as well. He knew the still-secret Macintosh
with its graphical user interface and mouse was going to shake up the
industry when it was released early in 1984, and by announcing Windows
69 See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 211 (quoting Microsoft employee Scott
Old as saying, "The number of undeliverables to Japanese customers in the early days-I
mean, boy, that's a real long list. The number of missed product dates: It's incredible. We
missed everything.").
7 0 See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 251-52. For a similar version of the
same story, see generally MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 219-21, 226.
71 See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 256.
72 See id. at 258.
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now Microsoft could make a preemptive strike .... The announcement
would also help to neutralize not just competing software publishers but
also IBM [which had recently decided to proceed with its own GUI]. 73
Key Microsoft employee Scott McGregor has been quoted as saying
that Microsoft "basically announced the product when we hadn't even
designed it yet." 74 Furthermore, despite repeated promises to vendors,
suppliers, and customers, Microsoft continued to miss numerous predicted
release dates in 1984 and 1985. During this time, the vaporware version of
Windows was competing with "every other windowing product on the PC-
compatible market..., damaging potential competitors from VisiOn to
GEM."75 Not until November 21, 1985, after more than two years of
"overblown promises," was Windows officially released. 76
Microsoft's repeated inaccurate preannouncements of Windows are
widely given credit for popularizing the term "vaporware." 77 Indeed, in
1985, Bill Gates received the "Golden Vaporware Award," given in
recognition of the fact that Microsoft's new Windows system had been
announced two years earlier and still was not ready to ship. 78 When asked
in 1984 if Microsoft's software is almost always completed later than the
promised date, the product marketing manager for Windows answered: "I
hate to say yes, but yes." 79
The first commercial iteration of Windows was perceived as slow, and
Microsoft's "GUI" technology80 did not start to truly realize earlier
promises until the 1987 introduction of Windows 2.0.81 Not until the 1990
introduction of Windows 3.0 did Microsoft have a runaway commercial
success on its hands.82
@ In early 1984, Microsoft's internal price lists described a
multitasking DOS product, DOS 4.0, but the product did not appear until
73 1d. at 257.
74 MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 241.
75 Id. at 421.
76 See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 313.
77 See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 7, 274.
78 See Vaporvare Wins No Laughs at Microsoft Now, supra note 29, at 1.
79 Tom Shea, Developers Unveil "Vaporware," INFoWORLD, May 7, 1986, at 48
(Microsoft product manager for Windows, Leo Nikora, went on to argue that "Ly]ou're
talking about the toughest part of software engineering.").80 The term "GUI" stands for graphical user interface. This system was initially
developed by Apple Computer, but Bill Gates quickly recognized its value.
8 1 See Nicolas P. Terry, GUI Wars: The Windows Litigation and the Continuing
Decline of "Look and Feel," 47 ARK. L. REV. 93, 100 (1994).82 See WALLACE & ERICKSON, supra note 14, at 314.
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late 1986. In the interim, the vaporware version competed directly against
products that competitors had in the market that Microsoft wanted to
enter.83
e In the hearing Judge Sporkin held on the consent decree, there was
evidence that in November of 1986 Microsoft had preannounced Quick
Basic 3.0 in order to "hold off Turbo buyers"-buyers of Borland
Corporation's Turbo Basic software.8 4 In the hearing, Judge Sporkin
referred to an internal Microsoft document that appeared to indicate that a
Microsoft employee was praised for issuing the vaporware
preannouncement.8 5 Judge Sporkin characterized the document as a
"smoking gun" that contradicted Microsoft's assertions that it did not use
vaporware announcements in an anticompetitive manner.8 6
* In 1989, Microsoft sent a "tornado" ripping through the industry by
announcing that it had joined with Apple Computer to develop the first
challenger to Adobe Systems, Inc.'s popular Postscript page description
language. A year later, Microsoft announced that the promised product
might be yet another year off.87
* In early 1990, DR-DOS, an operating systems software product of
DRI, which was soon purchased by Novell (and therefore DR-DOS is also
called "Novell DOS"), surpassed MS-DOS in retail sales and was the clear
winner in a customer satisfaction poll later published in PC Magazine.
However, in less than a year, DR-DOS was a "dead duck" due to several
Microsoft competitive attacks upon it, including vaporware
preannouncements of an upgrade to MS-DOS. 88 Announcement of the
upgrade flattened sales of DR-DOS, yet the upgrade did not appear on the
market until more than a year after DR-DOS's release and more than six
months after the upgrade's promised release date. Although Microsoft's
press releases claimed that its new upgrade would contain nearly all of the
innovative features of DR-DOS, many of them were curiously absent when
83 See MANEs & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 421.
84 See Edmund L. Andrews, Microsoft Settlement Challenged, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
1995, at 37, 46. The evidence came from Microsoft internal memos. Id.
85 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 159 F.R.D. 318, 335 (D.D.C. 1995),
rev'd per curiam, 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See generally MANEs & ANDREWS,
supra note 14, at 327-28 (discussing Microsoft's response to Borland).
86 0. Casey Corr, How Things Went Bad for Microsoft, SEATTLE TIMEs, Feb. 19,
1995, at J1.
871 james Daly, Postscript Calenger Fades: Microsoft's Page Description Language
Not Expected Until Mid-1991, COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 15, 1990, at 48.
88 See Paul M. Sherer, Microsoft Outlines DOS 5.0 to Ward Off DR-DOS, PC WK.,
Oct. 22, 1990, at 4.
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the product was finally released.89 DR-DOS has now been withdrawn from
the market by Novell. 90
* In 1993, Microsoft launched its Windows NT operating system for
computer networks. The system was shipped more than six months late
without many promised key applications, 91 and it used up twice the
memory as had been originally represented. 92
e In early 1994, it appeared that Lotus Development Corp. was close to
establishing a dominant position in the groupware market. This turn of
events made Microsoft investors jittery, but Bill Gates responded in a
speech to the Electronic Messaging Association by outlining plans to
market a new client-server system before the end of 1994. The system was
being developed under a program, code-named "Touchdown," designed to
surpass the capability of the Lotus system, which also was not yet
completely developed. "At this point it's sort of dueling vaporware," noted
one expert.93
e Windows 95 ("Chicago"), Microsoft's next generation operating
system, was first announced in early 1994, with an expected delivery date
of late that year. Some commentators predicted that the system was mere
vaporware being announced for the purpose of "sandbagging the
competition." 94 When Microsoft announced its first six-month delay in
Windows 95's shipping date, the entire hardware and software industry
suffered an unexpected slump, 95 indicating that Microsoft had successfully
"frozen the market" by its preannouncement. 96 The product was finally
released on August 24, 1995 and differed in several particulars from what
had been earlier promised. 97
89 See Kenneth C. Baseman et al., Microsoft Plays Hardball: The Use of Exclusionary
Pricing and Technical Incompatibility to Maintain Monopoly Power in Markets for
Operating Systems Software, 40 ANITRUST BuLL. 265, 272 (1995). For a lengthy
discussion of the demise of DR-DOS, see Taylor, supra note 15, at 72.
90 See Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at 348.
91 See Richard Morochove, Lies My Computer Maker Told Me, TORONTO STAR, May
12, 1994, at G2.
92 See MANES & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 461.
93 Martin Wolk, Microsoft to Outline Messaging Strategy, REurS FIN. SERVICE,
Apr. 19, 1994 (quoting less Berst, executive editor of Windows Watcher, an industry
newsletter).
94 Morochove, supra note 91, at G2.
95 See Jeff Rose, Wat's on the Table When Shark Is Finished Dining?, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRiB., Nov. 8, 1994, Computer Link, at 3.
96 See Charles Bruno, Playing Fair, NETWORK WORLD, July 25, 1994, at 44.
97 See Jason Aycock, Windows Development Saga: That Was Then, This Is 95, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 19, 1995, at D6 (explaining differences between vaporware
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* In mid-1994, Compaq and Microsoft worked together to tout the
benefits of Plug and Play, a feature to be available on the Windows 95
operating system. In the words of one observer, Microsoft had induced a
major computer maker to aid it in promoting a vaporware operating
system. 98
e By preannouncing software that would supposedly be packaged with
operating systems that had not yet been released, Microsoft was arguably
able to discourage software purchasers from buying competitors' products
even in markets in which Microsoft did not yet compete. 99
* Microsoft's Exchange Server, preannounced to counter Lotus
Development Corp.'s popular Notes program, lagged more than a year past
its promised shipping date. 1°0
e An upgrade to Microsoft's NT operating system for business
computers, called Cairo when Bill Gates announced it in 1992, was
originally promised for 1994. At this writing, Microsoft expects to ship it
sometime in 1997.101
* Microsoft's belated jump onto the Internet bandwagon was
accompanied in 1996 by announcements of many vaporous products. 102
* Microsoft's vaporous Blackbird software "vanished like a puff of
smoke" after it allegedly served its purpose of preventing "investors, the
media and users from declaring Java the standard for software of its
kind.o10 3
promises and final product); Stephen H. Wildstrom, What Windows 95 Left Out, Bus. WK.,
May 29, 1995, at 11 (same).
98 According to one computer expert, "[clonvincing a major computer producer to
promote features in a vaporware operating system takes style. Microsoft's side benefit is
that such deals prevent its new partners from joining the ever-popular Microsoft-bashing
refrain echoing around the industry." John Blackford, Microsoft Uber Alles? Software
Tan's Marketing Savvy Overcomes Its OIdish Posture, COMPUTER SHOPPER, July 1994, at
62.
99 See Hanna, supra note 7, at 440.
100 See Don Clark, Microsoft's Windows 95 is Just a Sideshow, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
1995, at B8.
101 See Amy Cortese, Windows 95, Bus. WK., July 10, 1995, at 94, 104.
102 See Thomas Mace & Neil J. Rubenking, Inside the ActiveX Platform, PC
MAGAZNwE, Sept. 24, 1996, at 207 ("Microsoft got Web religion late in the game, and it
heralded its conversion with a barrage of vaporware announcements."); Dan Miller, Netting
Microsoft, PC WORLD, Feb. 1996, at 45, 45 ("These technologies [announced by
Microsoft] aren't new, and many of the announced products are still vaporware.").
103 Dave McCombs, The Emperor's New Software, DALLY YoMIuUm, Apr. 8, 1996, at
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E. Summary
No trial has taken place. Allegations by Microsoft's competitors and
Bill Gates's biographers have not been put to the test. Nor has Microsoft
been given a chance to defend itself and its business practices in an actual
trial where factual issues were at stake. Even with that point being made
and firmly kept in mind, it is still clear that there is substantial evidence to
support Judge Sporkin's musings about the use of vaporware in high-tech
marketing.
The framers of the Sherman Act did not wish to condemn someone
"who merely by superior skill and intelligence.., got the whole business
because nobody could do it as well as he could." 104 Yet, Microsoft has
succeeded in numerous markets, despite not always having the best
product. Moreover, many observers believe that because of Microsoft's
dominant position, consumers often choose its products over technically
superior competing products.10 5 For example, despite the fact that "many
experts argue that Apple's Macintosh operating system is easier to use,
even superior to Microsoft's," 1°6 Microsoft's operating system runs 80%
to 85% of the world's computers, while Apple's operating system runs less
than 10%. Despite the fact that many experts believe that DR-DOS is a
better operating system than any pre-Windows 95 systems supplied by
Microsoft, 107 it was a nonfactor in the commercial world before the
Government-Microsoft antitrust settlement accord and was not revived by
that accord. IBM's OS/2 operating system is also widely viewed by experts
10421 CONG. REc. 3151-53 (1890), quoted in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTrrRusT POLICY § 6.3, at 246 (1994).
105 See Kathy Rebello et al., Is Microsoft Too Powerfid?, Bus. WK., Mar. 1, 1993, at
82, 87 (quoting Borland, Inc.'s CEO Philippe Kahn as complaining that customers in the
future will choose software packages not on the basis of quality but on the basis of whether
they carry the Microsoft logo).
106 Steve Lohr, Ground Rules for the Great Global Connection, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1995, at El; see also Walter S. Mossberg, Windows 95 Offers Big Improvements: It's More
Like a Mac, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1995, at B1 (reporting that Windows 95's best new
features are lifted from 10-year-old Macintosh and from OS/2); Phillip Robinson, Window
Pains, AusTIN AM.-STATEsMAN, Aug. 20, 1995, at Hl (comparing Windows 95 to Apple's
Macintosh system and IBM's OS/2 and finding that too many of the improvements of
Windows 95 over Windows 3.1 "aren't a big deal, aren't complete, or just cost ... too
much").
10 7 See JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON TRIAL: ImrELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INERoPERABiL.TY INTHE GLOBAL SoFTwARE INDusTRY 9 (1995).
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as superior to any of Microsoft's pre-Windows 95 systems,108 yet IBM, it
appears, is about ready to concede defeat in most markets. 10 9
Of the numerous incidents of Microsoft vaporware outlined above,
some no doubt were caused in part, perhaps in large part, by Microsoft's
officials simply being overly optimistic and underestimating programming
difficulties that would be encountered. However, there is also evidence
from which Judge Sporkin apparently concluded that at times Microsoft has
deliberately used vaporware marketing tactics to deflect consumers away
from competitors' products, even when Microsoft's own products had no
hope of being on the market by the time promised by Microsoft. In recent
years, Microsoft has "manifest[ed] an almost enchanted inability to meet its
ship dates." 110 Some of Microsoft's strongest defenders admit that
Microsoft engages in vaporware marketing, but simply rationalize that its
competitors do also."'
At the same time, virtually no one in the computer industry would
want Microsoft to wait to announce its products on the day they are ready
to ship. 112 Customers, suppliers, and software developers, among others,
want to know what a dominant company like Microsoft is doing and where
it is going. In a "white paper" on vaporware that Microsoft circulated in
response to Judge Sporkin's ruling, Microsoft argued: "The widespread,
market-driven practice the industry has been discussing is not in fact
vaporware, but predisclosure. Its purpose is to engage customers and the
industry in a useful dialogue about products that help customers make
better decisions and developers make better products."113
108 See Lori Hawkins, Will OS/2 Wither in Wndows'Heat?, AuSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Aug. 14, 1995, at D1 ("OS/2 has always been considered to be technologically superior,
and even its strongest critics concede it has the edge on Windows 95."); Laurence
Zuckerman, Head of IBM Says Company Has Lost Desktop Battle, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 1, 1995, at F1 (reporting that IBM's operating system OS/2 never
"caught on" although many analysts say that it is superior to either Windows 95 or previous
versions of Windows).
109 See Zuckerman, supra note 108, at Fl.
110 M NS & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 461.
111 See, e.g., Paul Somerson, Spork You, PC-COMPurTNG, May 1995, at 51, 51 ("OK,
[Microsoft]'s guilty of vaporware. So is half the industry.").
112 See Dean Takahashi, Conputer Giants Slowly Unveil New Technologies, AUST]N
AM.-STATEsMAN, Mar. 11, 1996, at C1 ("Software and hardware companies... are
screaming for [Microsoft and Intel] to take it all off [i.e., reveal standards and technologies
they have created for new multimedia personal computers] so they can create new, faster
multimedia software based on what the two giants have created.").
113 Flynn, supra note 33, at D4 (quoting Microsoft's white paper).
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Everyone wants that type of information to continue to be disclosed.
But evidence indicates that many companies, including Microsoft, have
often used vaporware in its negative sense. They were not engaging
customers in a useful dialogue. They were deceiving customers in order to
hurt their competitors. The difficult questions are (a) can "bad" vaporware
violate the antitrust laws, (b) can "innocent" vaporware violate the antitrust
laws, and (c) can juries distinguish factually between the two?
H. MONOPOLIZATION AND ATTEMPTS TO MONOPOLIZE
UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
This Article cannot address the entire cornucopia of antitrust issues
raised by the combination of Microsoft's dominant market position,
ambitious marketing goals, and aggressive marketing philosophy. Instead,
this Article is concerned with one limited question: Should vaporware
announcements, especially when made by a company with Microsoft's
market power, be deemed to violate the proscriptions of section 2 of the
Sherman Act against monopolization and attempted monopolization? 1 4 The
discussion in this Part quickly summarizes the basic legal standards for
determining whether such violations have occurred.
A. Elements of a Section 2 Monopolization Violation
The Supreme Court construes section 2's offense of monopolization as
consisting of two elements: "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition and maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."115
The Court has provided further guidance by defining "monopoly
power" as "the power to control prices or exclude competition" within a
114 Section 2 of the Sherman Act also prohibits conspiracies to monopolize, but there
is little evidence that Microsoft-generally a lone wolf in a highly competitive world-has
conspired with other companies to monopolize. Nor is there any evidence that vaporware
marketing practices have been used by any companies as part of a conspiracy to
monopolize. Therefore, this Article does not address conspiracy to monopolize.
Nor, of course, does it address collusion, which is the essence of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, notwithstanding the fact that "[m]odem antitrust law.., is concerned
primarily with the problem of collusion." Douglas H. Ginsburg, Nonprice Competition, 38
ANTrRUST BULL. 83, 84 (1993). In other words, anticompetitive activity by single firms
has been given relatively short shrift by both courts and academics in recent years.
115 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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relevant market. 116 In order to measure this power in a given case, the
relevant market must first be isolated. 117
Although consideration of defendant's market share must be
supplemented by analysis of many other factors that can bear upon a firm's
power in a relevant market,118 as a crude rule of thumb, market shares of
70% to 100%-percentages that Microsoft enjoys in some of its markets
(most importantly, the worldwide market for operating systems)-typically
indicate the existence of market power. 1 9 Thus, in a future section 2 claim
brought against Microsoft, this element might well be established.
116 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992)
(quoting United States v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
Hovenkamp has criticized this definition, suggesting that market power be defined,
instead, as "the ability of a firm to increase its profits by reducing output and charging more
than a competitive price for its product." HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, § 3.1, at 79.
"Monopoly power," according to Hovenkamp, is a high degree of market power. See id.
117 The relevant market is generally defined as the "area of effective competition." See
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961) (quoting Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299 n.5 (1949)). It is deemed to consist of two
components-(1) relevant product market, and (2) relevant geographic market. See National
Reporting Co. v. Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945).
The relevant product market includes those products that are "reasonably
interchangeable" with the product allegedly monopolized. See Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at
571. The relevant geographic market is the geographic area in which the firms selling the
relevant products compete for customers. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294,336-37 (1962).
118 See Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker, Attempted Monopolization. Reuniting
a Docti'ne Divorced from Its Criminal Law Roots and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 73
MARQ. L. REv. 355, 359 (1990). These other factors include barriers to entry, number and
size of other competitors, and degree of competition in the market. See id.; cf 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992); 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 13,104.
119 See HOVENKAWP, supra note 104, § 6.2a, at 244-45. Judge Learned Hand's 1945
observation in United States v. Alwninwn Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945), that a 90% share of a market was "enough" to establish market power, but 60% to
64% was doubtful, retains substantial currency. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United
v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1411 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Fifty percent is below any
accepted benchmark for inferring monopoly power from market share.").
Nonetheless, monopoly power has been found in some cases involving even lower
percentages of market share. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951
(10th Cir. 1990) (47% to 62%); Broadway Delivery Corp. v. United Parcel Serv., 651
F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (50%). Microsoft is certainly "within striking distance of
commercial dominance" in many applications software markets, supplementing its
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Because it is illegal neither to enjoy a monopoly nor to achieve one
through superior products, business acumen, or historic accident (all three
of which Microsoft has enjoyed in full measure), the offense of
monopolization requires that the alleged wrongdoer have willfully engaged
in conduct that helped the monopolist to acquire or maintain monopoly
power, and which goes beyond simply winning the competitive struggle
"fair and square."120 That is to say, monopolization requires conduct that
is anticompetitive or exclusionary.121
The focus of this Article is upon this conduct element. The fact that the
conduct must be "willful" gives rise to an implicit intent element-the
intent to maintain monopoly power by anticompetitive means. 122
B. Elements of a Section 2 Attempt to Monopolize Violation
According to the Supreme Court, an attempted monopolization
violation occurs when "(1)... the defendant has engaged in predatory or
anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power."123
To briefly address these elements in reverse order, courts must
consider both the relevant market and the defendant's ability to lessen or
destroy competition in that market in order to assess the existence of a
"dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power." 124 Assuming
overwhelming dominance of the operating systems market. Jay Dratler, Jr., Microsoft As an
Antidu= Target: IBM in Software?, 25 Sw. U.L. REv. 671, 675 (1996).
12 0 The wI/id maintenance requirement clearly creates an intent element to the
offense of monopolization.
121 Importantly, some conduct that might be considered harmless if done by a small
company can be illegal when done by a monopolist "because it tends to destroy
competition." See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir.
1979).
122 See Illinois ex rel. Burris v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 935 F.2d 1469, 1481
(7th Cir. 1991).
123 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (emphasis added).
Additionally, if a private suit for damages is brought, plaintiff must show a particular injury
caused by defendant's attempt to monopolize. See Multiflex, Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co.,
709 F.2d 980, 990 (5th Cir. 1983).
124 See Spectrwn Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 456. Although many argued that requiring a
section 2 plaintiff to show a "dangerous probability of success" would create a huge gap in
Sherman Act coverage by "allowling] scrutiny of single-firm anticompetitive conduct only if
the defendant possesses market power dangerously close to monopoly," Roszkowski &
Brubaker, supra note 118, at 395, in Spectrum Sports, Inc. the Supreme Court opted for a
restrictive view of the section 2 attempt cause of action.
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Microsoft's alleged ability to dominate markets' 25  and destroy
competitors, 126 it is certainly plausible that this element of an attempt to
monopolize claim might well be established should a full trial be held in a
given case.
While monopolization requires only the general intent to do the acts
that constitute the offense, attempt to monopolize requires specific intent
both to do the prohibited acts and to achieve the prohibited result of
monopolization.127 That specific intent must include more than the intent of
any reasonable business to prevail over its rivals. 128
Again, given Microsoft's track record of establishing monopoly and
near-monopoly positions in numerous markets, as well as the public
statements of its officers that it aims to seize 100% of the markets it
enters, 129 it is certainly reasonable to assume that this element of the
attempt to monopolize offense might also be established factually in some
125 Market shares of 40% to 60% prior to commencement of the anticompetitive or
competitive acts have generally been required to indicate a dangerous probability of success
in attempt to monopolize cases. Conpare Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255,
271 (7th Cir. 1981) (30% is generally inadequate) with Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668
F. Supp. 861, 890-91 (D. Del. 1987) (43% to 50% may be sufficient).
However, Hovenkamp has pointed out that many types of anticompetitive conduct can
advance an attempt to monopolize even where the wrongdoer lacks substantial market
power. As an extreme example, a small competitor could attempt to dynamite the plants of
all other competitors in its market. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, § 6.5b2, at 256.
126 See supra note 14.
127 See Times Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953).
128 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 7, 822a.
129 See supra note 15. Most courts are reluctant to accord much significance to the
rhetorical flourishes of the employees of an alleged predator. See, e.g., Dahl, Inc. v. Roy
Cooper Co., 448 F.2d 17, 19 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that allegation that one of defendant's
employees told one of plaintiffs employees that defendant would drive plaintiff out of
business if plaintiff chose to compete "in the absence of evidence of unfair, anticompetitive
or predatory conduct is not enough to establish a violation of § 2"); Scott Publ'g Co. v.
Columbia Basin Publ'g, Inc., 293 F.2d 15, 21 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding defendant's CEO's
statement that he would drive plaintiff "to the wall" as insufficient evidence of specific
intent); see also HovENKAM,, supra note 104, § 6.5a, at 251 ("Memoranda are written by
careless people, and they often contain puffing about competitive prowess that far exceeds a
firm's actual planning and policy."); J. Thomas Rosch, Future FTC Enforcement of Section
2, 59 ANTrrRUST L.J. 543, 544 (1991) ("[Llocker room language is frequently misleading
as an indication of whether or not a firm is engaging in hard competition or predatory
conduct.").
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future litigation against Microsoft. 130 And, given (a) Microsoft's penchant
for entering new markets and making enemies and (b) the evidence noted
earlier that Microsoft has been the target of vaporware marketing, it might
have an opportunity as a plaintiff in some future litigation to establish this
element against its competitors.
Implicit in both the monopolizing and attempting to monopolize
offenses is the requirement of causation-that there be some evidence that
the illicit conduct actually assists substantially in the maintenance or
acquisition of monopoly power. 131
Intent to monopolize is not a violation of the Sherman Act absent
conduct taken to advance that intent. 132 For purposes of this Article, the
important feature of an attempted monopoly claim is the requirement of
"predatory, exclusionary, or anticompetitive" conduct. 133 Parts IV and V
analyze this element.
IV. FRAUDULENT VAPORWARE MARKETING AS ANTICOMPETITIVE,
EXCLUSIONARY, OR PREDATORY CONDUCT
In the first three parts of this Article, no scrupulous distinction was
drawn between fraudulent vaporware marketing (where companies
announce product release deadlines and features that they know they cannot
and will not meet) and innocent vaporware marketing (where companies
announce product release deadlines and features in good faith, but
13 0 This analysis is tricky business, of course, for one must be careful not to punish a
mere "intent to compete vigorously." Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447,
459 (1993).
131 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 7, 626c, at 78-79; see, e.g., International
Travel Arrangers, Inc. v. Western Airlines, Inc., 623 F.2d 1255, 1270 (8th Cir. 1980)
(holding that causal antitrust injury is an element of a section 2 violation); Van Dyk
Research Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 631 F.2d 251, 255 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that section 2
plaintiff must show that alleged antitrust violation was a material cause of its injury).
132 See, e.g., Conoco, Inc. v. Inman Oil Co., 774 F.2d 895, 905 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985)
("Evidence of intent alone can be ambiguous and misleading.").
133 The Supreme Court stressed in Spectrm Sports, Inc., 506 U.S. at 459, that the
requirement of a "dangerous probability of monopolization" served to distinguish mere
vigorous competition from an attempt to monopolize. The requirement of predatory or
anticompetitive conduct serves the same purpose. The desire and intent to squash one's
competitors like bugs are natural in a free enterprise economy and do not implicate the
antitrust laws until they are acted upon by use of unreasonably anticompetitive means. See
Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 883 F.2d 1101,
1109-13 (1st Cir. 1989); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d
1396, 1404 (7th Cir. 1989).
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ultimately fail to meet their announced goals). Now it is time to make that
distinction and to separately analyze each form of vaporware marketing.
This Part analyzes fraudulent vaporware marketing, taking as its starting
point the following scenario.
Scenario #1: Fraudulent Vaporware Marketing
Assume that a computer software maker has monopoly in a relevant
market. Assume firther that a small competitor in that market, say with a
five percent market share, begins to market a new product with features
well beyond those of the dominant firm's current product. Assume also that
the dominant firm immediately issues a press release and announces at a
computer trade show that it is currently developing and will market within
three months a product that will do everything that the small competitor's
product will do. Assume, finally, that the press release is entirely false and
issued in bad faith. The dominant firm has no such product in production.
It hopes to reverse engineer or in some other fashion to match the small
competitor's product, but it has no realistic hope of being able to do so in
less than a year.
Should the fraudulent vaporware marketing practice described in this
hypothetical example be deemed to fulfill the conduct element of a
monopolization or attempt to monopolize offense?
A. Evolution of Nonprice Predation Theory
1. The Chicago School's Ascendancy
After the heyday of activist antitrust law in the 1960s and 1970s,
Chicago School economic analysis had a profound (and generally
beneficial) restrictive effect upon the entire antitrust body of law. That
point of view is very suspicious of antitrust enforcement in all of its
particulars. 134 Take, for example, the concept of predatory pricing.
Predatory pricing is one of the most examined acts of monopolizing
conduct, yet its very existence remains in dispute. Chicago School
economists doubt that there are very many situations in which a would-be
monopolist could recoup in the long run what is lost in the short run by
13 4 See Easterbrook, Ignorance and Antitrust, supra note 13, at 119 ("The hallmark of
the Chicago approach to antitrust is skepticism.").
1192 [Vol. 57:1163
VAPORWARE
predatory pricing, 135 and the Supreme Court appears to have been won
over to that point of view. 136
2. The Post-Chicago School Era
The Supreme Court's acceptance of Chicago School reasoning
regarding predatory pricing notwithstanding, 137 some recent studies do
indicate that recoupment of losses caused by predatory underpricing is
possible in some circumstances, making this a potentially rational
predatory activity. 138
More importantly, the post-Chicago School trend is toward a
conclusion that predatory activities, in general, are more widespread than
Chicago School economists have conceded. 139 For example, it has been
135 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BoRiK, THE ANTITRUST PARADoX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 144-60 (1978); RICHARD A. POsNER, ANTrrRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEcnVE
92-93 (1976); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 113-18 (1968); Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of
the Shman Act, 88 HARv. L. REv. 697 (1975); John E. Lopatka & Andre N. Kleit, The
Mystery of Lorain Journal and the Quest for Foreclosure in Antitmst Law, 73 TEX. L. REv.
1255 (1995); John McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980).
136 See, e.g., Brook Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson, 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2590
(1993) (noting "general implausibility of predatory pricing"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986) ("[T]here is a consensus among
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely
successful.").
137 The Court certainly has not accepted all Chicago School views on antitrust law.
For example, the decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S.
585 (1985), that a monopolist's refusal to do business with a competitor constituted a
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act is scarcely consonant with Chicago School
principles.
138 See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Predation, "Rationality,- and Judicial
Somnambulance, 4 U. CIN. L. REv. 811, 816-24 (1996) [hereinafter Adams & Brock,
Somnambulance] (giving details of several examples of successful price predation in tobacco
industry alone); Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics that Challenge
Chicago School Views, 58 ANTrrRUST L.J. 645, 649 (1989) (citing studies); Malcolm R.
Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Cost of Competitors, 94 . POL. ECON. 266
(1986) (empirical study of tobacco industry); Thomas Campbell, Predation and Competition
in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1648 (1987).
139 See, e.g., ABA ANTrTRUsT SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 18, NONPRiCE PREDATION
UNDER SECrMN 2 OF THE SHERMAN Acr (1991) [hereinafter ABA, NONPRiCE PREDATION];
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private
Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REv. 1, 53-55 (1995); Campbell,
supra note 138 (showing how an established firm may use predatory pricing to force an
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plausibly, but controversially, argued that what appear to be legitimate,
competitive decisions regarding strategic investment, 140 research and
development, 141 product differentiation, 142 product innovation, 143 and
equally efficient competitor out of the market); William S. Comanor & H.E. Frech III,
Predatory Pricing and the Meaning of Intent, 38 ANTrrRusT BULL. 293 (1993); Drew
Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, A SignJamming Theory of Predation, 17 RAND J. ECON. 366
(1986); David Harbord & Tom Hoehn, Barriers to Entry and Fit in European Conpetition
Policy, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 411, 420 (1994) ("IThe presumption that predation is
not a rational strategy has been shown to be false in the recent literature, at least if one
believes that the sorts of informational asymmetries modeled there are present in real
markets."); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory
Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979); F.M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the
Sherman Act: A Comnent, 89 HARv. L. REV. 869 (1976); Oliver Williamson, Predatory
Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 213 (1977). See generally OLIVER
WILLAMSON, ANTrrRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, CONTRACrING, AND STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR 320-43 (1987) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, ANTIrRUST ECONOMICS] (describing
the evolution of antitrust law through the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and noting "the diehard-
Chicago approach to the study of strategic behavior is myopic and simplistic"); Charles A.
Holt & David T. Scheffinan, Strategic Behavior and Antitrust, in ECONOMICS AND
ANrrrRUST POLICY 39 (Robert J. Lamer & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989) (analyzing
with a critical eye various nonprice predatory strategies); William G. Shepherd, Theories of
Industrial Organization, in REVrrALZNG ANurrRUST IN ITS SEcoND CENTURY 37-57 (Harry
First et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Shepherd, Theories] (giving history of rise and
modifications of Chicago School views of antitrust).
Despite Brodley's confident statement that "modem economic theory shows that
dominant firm predation is rational and plausible; empirical evidence confirms the existence
of predatory conduct, as theory predicts; and business people make decisions based on
predatory strategies," Brodley, supra, at 55, the case for the post-Chicago school is far
from airtight. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Posner's Program for the Antitrust
Division: A Twenty-Five Year Perspective, 48 SMU L. REv. 1713, 1730-47 (1995).
Nonetheless, this Article will demonstrate that the case for post-Chicago theories is very
strong and that the support for the vaporware theory advanced in this Article is stronger
than that supporting any other post-Chicago theory thus far advanced.
140 See, e.g., A. Michael Spence, Investment Strategy and Growth in a New Market,
10 BELL. EcoN. 1 (1979).
141 See JOHN SUrTON, SUNK COSTS AND MARKET STRUCrURE 313 (1991).
142 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 138 (building on spatial oligopoly theory); James
T. Halverson, The Relationship of Antitrust Policy and Technological Progress, 1975
WASH. U. L.Q. 409, 419 (arguing that product modification predation can seriously
threaten competition).
Campbell's work has been directly challenged. See Eric Rasmussen & John Shepard
Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Spatial Predation: A Response to Thomas J. Campbell, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1015 (1989).
143 See, e.g., Ordover & Willig, supra note 7.
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contracting'" can actually be exclusionary. These and other comparable
theories, 145 such as the broader category of raising rivals' costs (RRC)146
and a subset of RRC known as vexatious litigation, 147 comprise this new
body of nonprice predation theory. These theories have in common the
belief that the Chicago School economic analysis fundamentally ignores
strategic competitive decisions by managers.1 48 Many believe that when
these strategic considerations are taken into account, nonprice predation in
various forms becomes not only a plausible form of competition,149 but one
that requires vigilant antitrust restraint.
144 See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties,
Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policies, 45 STAN. L. REy. 1161 (1993) (discussing
how exclusionary contract penalties can impede new entry and innovation, thereby severely
constraining the competitive process). Brodley and Ma's theory is based substantially upon
the work of economists Aghion and Bolton. See Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton,
Contracts As Barriers to Entry, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 388 (1987).
145 According to the ABA, specific nonprice predation strategies arguably include
exclusive dealing contracts; exclusive licensing; exclusive dealing; tying vertical
mergers; refusals to deal; filing administrative or judicial proceedings to prevent, delay,
or raise the cost of a rival's entry into the market; raising the victim's administrative or
production costs by securing exclusive control of needed inputs or limiting access to
competitively priced inputs; product promotion; marketing programs such as calendar
marketing agreements; brand proliferation; product differentiation; capacity expansion;
innovation; product preemption; burning down a rival's plant; or cutting a rival's
transmission lines.
ABA, NONPRICE PREDATiON, supra note 139, at 4.
146 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffinan, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J.
INDUS. ECON. 19 (1987).
147 See generally Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Practice, 80 KY. L.. 565
(1991-1992).
14 8 See Michael 0. Wise, Antitrust's Newest 'New Learning' Returns the Law to Its
Roots: Cuas and Adaptation as New Metaphors for Competitive Policy, 40 ANTrrRUST
BULL. 713, 765-66 & n.91 (1995) (citing fifteen articles embodying game theory models
that help to show why anticompetitive strategies dismissed by the Chicago School as "at
worst foolish, and more likely efficient, could at least in theory be both individually sensible
and socially destructive").
149 The most prominent business strategist assumes the existence of predatory
strategies. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETrIVE ADVAwrAGE 582-86 (1985); see also
Adams & Brock, Somnambulance, supra note 138, at 864 ) ("[E]conomists themselves are
increasingly recognizing that human behavior is not universally and eternally conducted in
accordance with theoretical canons of economic rationality" underlying the Chicago School
models.).
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Commentators have suggested a four-step analysis for determining
whether particular nonprice behavior is predatory:
(1) identification of an exclusionary device, (2) determination as to
whether the exclusionary device injures competitors by materially raising
their costs, (3) determination as to whether the injury to competitors has
resulted in injury to competition and an increase in the market power of
the predator, and (4) assessment of any overriding efficiencies identified
by the putative predator as justifying its behavior. 150
Critics of these theories of nonprice predation offer five major
criticisms: (1) that the new body of nonprice predation theories do not
represent a genuine departure from current analytical approaches; (2) that
the theories have failed to define condemnable conduct with sufficient
specificity to avoid impinging upon truly efficient conduct; (3) that many
nonprice predation theories hinge on the existence of market power, which
means that they will be applicable in only a limited set of circumstances;
(4) that the instances of nonprice predation are so limited as to be
insignificant for purposes of charting a course for competition policy; and
(5) that targets of nonprice predation can defeat the attempted predation by
counterstrategies without the intervention of antitrust laws. 151
Sections IV.B and IV.C examine fraudulent vaporware marketing in
light of these four suggested constructive criteria and the five criticisms in
order to evaluate its viability as an addition to the body of nonprice
predation theory and to answer the broader and more important question of
whether it should be deemed to satisfy the conduct element of a section 2
Sherman Act violation.
B. Analysis to Determine Whether Fraudulent Vaporware Marketing
Is Predatory
1. Identification of an Exclusionary Device
Fraudulent vaporware marketing is the exclusionary device examined
in this Section. Its mechanisms and applications were described in detail in
Part 1J.152
15 0 ABA, NoNPRicE PREDATION, supra note 139, at 3-4.
151 See id. at 33. One other criticism is mentioned in this treatise as well. It relates
only to theories that "posit exclusion by means of the acquisition of supply inputs," and is
therefore irrelevant to fraudulent vaporware marketing. See id.
152 See supra notes 18-113 and accompanying text.
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There is substantial anecdotal evidence that fraudulent vaporware
marketing is being used as an anticompetitive tactic. Competitors in the
computer industry agree that vaporware marketing occurs. Virtually all
industry observers conclude that vaporware marketing is frequently
used.153 In a recent survey published in the International Journal of
Industrial Organization, many companies admitted using vaporware
marketing as a strategic competitive tool.' 54 In another recent survey, 68%
of information systems professionals agreed that Microsoft's vaporware
announcements have an anticompetitive impact in that they freeze the
market for products of its smaller competitors. 155
Being first to the market with a product is extremely important in high-
tech marketing. This type of innovation is one of the few ways that new
companies can establish their products. 156 Unfortunately, powerful firms
can use fraudulent vaporware marketing to defeat these innovators. For
example, a competitor with substantial market share can completely
neutralize the new entrant's innovation and speed advantage by simply
announcing that it will soon have a competing product, even if this
announcement eventually turns out to be bogus. 157
Indeed, a large company with Microsoft's economic power can not
only preserve existing domination, it can also enter a new product market
via a vaporware marketing announcement. In so doing, it can severely
damage or even eliminate an existing market leader when that leader is a
smaller company overall. 158
153 See, e.g., Donath, supra note 59, at 13 (Companies "keep ratcheting the
technology and software hyperbole to stratospheric levels where no press agentry previously
dared to tread.").
154 See Robert Smiley, Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence, 6 INT'L 1.
INDus. ORG. 167, 175 (1988).
155 See Johnston, supra note 62, at 1 (However, 80% of those surveyed felt that such
information was useful for decision-making purposes.). See id
156 Most successful high-tech companies are first to the market with a useful,
functional product that becomes the industry leader and forces competitors to imitate it. See
MANS & ANDREWS, supra note 14, at 261 (stating that in the competitive world of
software, the rule is "[b]e first, or play catch up").
157 Microsofts alleged vaporware attack on VisiCorp is an example. See supra notes
70-82 and accompanying text.
158 For example, IBM's preannouncement of its disk array drive system for mainframe
computers not only flattened the sales of industry leader E.M.C. Corp., it also caused a
sharp drop in E.M.C.'s share price, even though IBM was still several months away from
introducing its product and actually entering the market. See Steve Lohr, Product
Prognostication, and Then the Unveiling, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, at F9 [hereinafter
Lohr, Product Prognostication].
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Even if the predator does not force the target from the market and
thereby become the "only game in town," fraudulent vaporware marketing
can have significant anticompetitive effects. Assume that the smaller
competitor does not go out of business, but its product sales stall during
the time that consumers are waiting for the larger competitor's vaporous
product to appear. The vaporware announcement allows the larger
competitor to unjustifiably capture a "mind share" of the market for its
product that does not yet exist. 159 By using contracts for future delivery,
the predator can build up an "installed base" for its product. 160 If that
product does finally appear, so long as it carries approximately the same
features as the smaller competitor's product for roughly the same price, it
will likely do very well. Once the vaporware announcement has destroyed
the smaller competitor's advantage of being first to the market, the larger
competitor can easily grind out a market victory by exercising its
marketing muscle in the form of a firmly established brand name, 161 a
Although potential competition is generally a peripheral matter, in "[e]xceptional cases,
such as a small market overshadowed by a known very large and powerful competitor," it
can play a significant role. See Shepherd, Theories, supra note 139, at 42.
159 A "mind share" is consumer acceptance of a product that is nonexistent or has not
yet been introduced. See Avery Jenkins, Long Overdue: The Reasons Behind Vaponware,
COMPTrERWORLD Focus, Oct. 5, 1988, at 10.160 See TIROLE, supra note 53, at 408.
161 Courts are leery of assuming that goodwill raises entry barriers. See HOVENKAMP,
supra note 104, § 12.43, at 472. However, risk-averse consumers are often reluctant to try
new brands even when they are superior to brands with established reputations. See Howard
Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consw'ner Information, 24 J.L. & ECON., 491, 510
n.65 (1981). In many industries, consumers value the brand name of a product, independent
of its other characteristics. See Campbell, supra note 138, at 1640. This valuation is
definitely the case in the computer industry, given that Microsoft's brand name has been
valued at $9.8 billion. See Coca-Cola Tops Magazine's Rankings of Brands' Value: IBM,
Hit by PC Cones, Slips to No. 290, WAsH. POST, July 12, 1994, at C4. It would seem
foolish to ignore the barrier raising potential of Microsoft, IBM, Intel, and other computer
powerhouses.
Goodwill in the form of consumer brand loyalty has been deemed an entry barrier in
appropriate cases. See, e.g., FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D.D.C.
1986), vacated mem., 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Borden, Inc. v. FTC, 674 F.2d 498,
512 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 461 U.S. 940 (1983) ("When a seller possesses
an overwhelmingly dominant share of the market, however, and differentiates its product
from others through a recognized and extensively advertised brand name, thereby enabling
the seller to control prices or unreasonably restrict competition, then monopoly power may
be found to exist.").
Brand identification and loyalty can be built up by developing a track record of
superior product performance, but also by heavy and effective advertising. See Richard
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large advertising budget, 162 more and better distribution channels, 163
"bundling" of software and hardware packages, 164 and the like. The
smaller company's hard-earned advantage of being first to the market is
Schmalensee, Envy Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakjfst Cereal Industy, 9 BELL J.
ECON. 305 (1978) [hereinafter Schmalensee, Breakfast Cereal].162 Advertising is extremely important in most high-tech markets, and especially for
the introduction of new computer products. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 24, at 8-
9. As Windows 95 was rolled out, it was reported that Microsoft intended to spend up to
$200 million to advertise its introduction to the marketplace and that the makers of
compatible products would spend another $550 million touting their connection to Windows
95. See Mike Langberg, Microsoft to Unleash Hype to Open Windows 95, AUsTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 1995, at Cl.
Although this area remains very controversial, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 104,
§ 12.43, at 472, there is substantial basis for the conclusion that significant advertising,
especially if it has a cumulative effect over time, can raise entry barriers. See Hunt-Wesson
Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 1980); FTC v. Coca-Cola
Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D.D.C. 1986), vacated mer., 829 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir.
1987); In re General Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 423 (1966), aft'd, 386 F.2d 936, 945 (3d
Cir. 1967); In re Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1581 (1963), qftd, 386 U.S.
568, 575 (1967). For discussions supporting the view that advertising can heighten brand
loyalty and thereby raise entry barriers, see, for example, Joskow & Klevorick, supra note
139, at 229 ("[C]ourts should recognize that because generic names and premium brand
images induced by advertising change the conditions of entry in such a way that potential
competition is a less effective constraint on prices than it otherwise might be, dominant firm
behavior in such markets may be worthy of closer scrutiny.") and F.M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERRMANCE 381 (2d ed. 1980)
("[Aidvertising and other forms of image differentiation can confer monopoly power upon
the firms using them."). For two very informative discussions of the controversy regarding
advertising's role as an entry barrier, see Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, Effidency
and Image: Advertising as an Antitrust lssue, 1990 DuKE L.. 321, 341-53, and William S.
Comanor & Thomas A. Wilson, The Effect of Advertis'ng on Competition: A Survey, 17 J.
ECON. LIr. 453, 473 (1979) ("IThe primary conclusion to be drawn from the empirical
literature is that heavy advertising does contribute to high levels of market power in some
industries.").
163 See Hanna, supra note 7, at 428 ("[Alccess to scarce retail shelf space has been
described as the real source of market power in the computer industry.... Thus, a single
producer may be able to lock up available shelf space for a particular product niche and
prevent rivals from breaking into the market.").
164 Microsoft has allegedly perfected this technique. For example, Microsoft
established MS-DOS and Windows as dominant operating systems in the PC-compatible
industry in large part by offering deep discounts to computer makers who agreed to
preinstall Microsoft's operating systems. See Julia Pitta, Microsoft's Dark Shadow, FORBES,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 106. Once Microsoft's operating systems software became dominant, it
began bundling applications software as well.
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easily neutralized by the larger competitor's strategic vaporware
announcements. 6
5
Thus, in either maintaining a monopoly position or attempting to gain a
monopoly position, large companies can and allegedly do use fraudulent
vaporware marketing tactics to damage the competitive efforts of small
challengers and even of established market leaders.
The worn-out joke about economists who see things occur and then
wonder whether they could happen in theory seems apt at this point. The
theoretical mechanism by which fraudulent vaporware marketing works
needs no complicated mathematical modeling. According to two leading
nonprice predation theorists, Professors Ordover and Willig, by use of
fraudulent vaporware marketing, a predator can target a competitor and
flatten its sales, reduce its cash flows, increase its advertising costs, and
perhaps, threaten its viability and induce it to exit the market. 166
2. Determination As to Whether the Exclusionary Device Injured
Competitors by Materially Raising Their Costs
Because not all nonprice predations are varieties of RRC, a test that
looks only at whether a suspect practice raises rivals' costs is unduly
narrow. If a nonprice strategy unfairly injures competitors in a manner
comparable to raising their costs, it should be equally condemnable.
Fraudulent vaporware marketing has this comparable impact by curtailing
rivals' sales and revenues unfairly, as explained in the previous section. As
it turns out, however, it also raises rivals' costs in the form of advertising
and other marketing expenses and is a very plausible form of RRC. 167
165 Stiglitz has said that the first firm in an industry gains an advantage that
competitors can never completely eliminate. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Technological Change,
Sunk Costs, and Competition, 3 BRooKIN~s PAPmS ON ECON. Acrivfy 883, 910 (1987)
[hereinafter Stiglitz, Technological Change]. However, by use of a fraudulent vaporware
announcement, a powerful entrant can quickly do exactly that.
166 See Ordover & Willig, supra note 7, at 52-53 (explaining the theoretical
mechanism for vaporware marketing, but ultimately rejecting its classification as a
condemnable form of predation).
167 Vaporware, unlike predatory pricing, does not require its user to make short-run
sacrifices in hopes of long-term gain. It shares this advantage and others with similar RRC
measures. The advantages that RRC has over other forms of exclusion have been deemed to
include the following:
First, whereas predation is successful only if the rival exits the market, raising a rival's
costs is effective even if the smaller rival does not exit the market because competing
against a high-cost finm is preferable to competing against a low-cost firm. Second, the
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Professors Krattenmaker and Salop, among others, have argued that
"raising rivals' costs sometimes can be an effective means of acquiring
power over price." 168 Vaporware marketing may not be the prototypical
RRC activity, 169 but it satisfies the criteria for RRC activity, especially in
that it is an action taken against a competitor, rather than an exercise of
market power against upstream suppliers or downstream customers.
Proponents of the RRC theory have given advertising as an example of
such activity, 170 and Professor Gerla has noted that "[t]he nature of human
information processing makes the dissemination of false information an
almost ideal strategic tool for raising rivals' costs." 171 Vaporware
predator must sacrifice short-run profits in exchange for speculative and indeterminate
long-rn profits, but a cost-raiser may enjoy higher profits even in the short run. A firm
whose costs have risen either reduces output or raises prices, permitting the dominant
firm to raise its prices or increase its relevant market share. Third, although successful
predation requires that the predator have a "deep pocket" or easy access to financing,
raising rivals' costs may be relatively inexpensive for the firm engaging in this strategy.
Alon Y. Kapen, Duty to Cooperate Under Section 2 of the Shernan Act: Aspen Skiing's
Slippery Slope, 72 CORNELLL. REV. 1047, 1068-69 n.142 (1987).
168 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion. Raising
Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.. 209, 292 (1986). For a good
summary of RRC literature, see Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the
AntitM Laws: The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REV. 551,561-63 (1991).
169 Krattenmaker and Salop's focus is upon vertical integration. Their prototypical
example of RRC activity is a manufacturing firm locking up a favorable arrangement with a
supplier or suppliers that would place the firm's competitors at a long-term cost
disadvantage. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 168, at 214. Perhaps by locking up
the sole source of widgets, a firm can relegate all its competitors to use of the more
expensive substitute product, gidgets.
Nonetheless, other commentators have explored nonvertical forms of RRC, and
numerous cases fitting the RRC mold were brought before Krattenmaker and Salop put a
formal name to the practice. For example, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head,
Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988), is an RRC case in which current producers of metal electrical
conduit were threatened by development of a new product, plastic electrical conduit, that
would lower the demand for their output, effectively lowering the market price for their
product. These current producers strangled the market for the new product by packing a
meeting of the National Fire Protection Association in order to prevent passage of new rules
that would allow widespread use of the new product in code-restricted buildings. Vaporware
marketers allegedly accomplish the same strangulation of the market by use of false product
pronouncements.170 See Salop & Scheffman, supra note 146, at 32.
17 1 Harry S. Gerla, Federal Antitrust Law and the Flow of Consuner Information, 42
SYRACUSEL. REV. 1029, 1063 (1991) [hereinafter Gerla, Federal Antitrust].
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marketing does indeed raise rivals' costs by making them spend more
money on marketing and promotion than they otherwise would. 172
There is evidence that Microsoft's vaporware announcements, whether
intentional or innocent, have forced competitors to invest substantial funds
to assure customers that their products would remain viable in light of a
promised, but not yet existing, Microsoft challenge. 173 To a similar effect,
IBM preannouncements have apparently forced competitors to cut prices in
order to compete with "soon-to-be-released" products. 174
Perhaps the most widely accepted form of nonprice predation is the use
of vexatious litigation and petitioning. Although much of such activity is
protected from antitrust scrutiny by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine' 75 on
First Amendment grounds, there is an exception for "sham" litigation, 176
which can fulfill the "conduct" element of a section 2 violation.
17 2 See MiacH L L. ROTHSCHILD, ADVERTISING: FROM FUNDAMENTAL TO STRATEGIES
619 (1987) ("The intensity of competition will probably be the greatest marketplace
influence on budget. More competition will mean more noise in the market and the need for
a larger budget in order to be heard.") (emphasis added).
Thus, by introducing noise into the market, vaporware marketing is a classic example
of RRC activity. It also has the anticompetitive effect of raising consumers' search costs.
See Robert H. Lande, Beyond COdcago: Will Activist Antitrust Arise Again?, 39 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Lande, Beyond Odcago], citing In re Detroit Auto Dealers
Ass'n, 111 F.T.C. 417 (1989), afid in part and remanded, 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992)
(by restricting hours of operation, auto dealers increased consumers' search costs).
173 See Rebello et al., supra note 105, at 86. These announcements have also caused
sharp drops in rivals' stock prices, which could raise costs of obtaining financing. Id.
17 4 See GERALD BROCK, THE UNITED STATES COMPTrER INDUSTRY 170 (1975).
Control Data Corporation was forced by IBM's vaporware announcement to cut prices in
order to compete with a computer that was not actually marketed until three years later. See
id.
175 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which grants First Amendment protection from
antitrust scrutiny to competitors' acts of petitioning governmental bodies and filing
litigation, arose from two Supreme Court cases: Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-38 (1961) and United Mine Workers v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
176 The sham litigation exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine denies First
Amendment protection from antitrust scrutiny for many unworthy actions that have more to
do with curbing competition than communicating ideas. See, e.g., California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972) (perjury of witnesses);
Walker Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-77 (1965) (use
of patent obtained by fraud); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370
U.S. 690, 707 (1962) (conspiracy with licensing authority to eliminate competitor); Rangen,
Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 1965) (bribery of a public
purchasing agent).
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Predatory litigation can serve several possible anticompetitive
functions, including eliminating competitors, disciplining competitors,
raising rivals' costs, and delaying or deterring entry into a market. When a
litigant brings suit for one of these reasons, rather than to prevail in the
courtroom, the suit is predatory and threatens competition. Litigation can
be as effective as any other strategy of predation, and it may be less costly
and harder to penalize than other forms of price or nonprice predation. In
particular, a dominant firm may be able to impose asymmetrical costs on
its target because litigation can be costly to defend and difficult to
resolve. 17
7
Like sham litigation, fraudulent vaporware marketing can also
eliminate competitors, 178 raise rivals' costs, 179 delay or deter entry into a
market,180 and inflict other anticompetitive injuries. It enables a predator to
177 See Myers, supra note 147, at 630. For a discussion of cases illustrating these
various injuries to competition caused by predatory litigation, see id. at 586-96.
178 A powerful vaporware marketer can flatten out a smaller competitor's sales by
promising, falsely, to quickly market a superior product. Such a marketer can also deter
adoption of a smaller competitor's new product by the same means. Some customers may
refrain from buying the smaller competitor's existing product, preferring to examine the
predator's competing product before making a choice between the two products.
Additionally, some customers may refrain from buying the smaller competitor's existing
product, preferring to buy the promised product of the predator because of the predator's
existing reputation or the predator's large market share, which improves the chances of
compatibility with a wider range of complementary products. Finally, some customers may
refrain from buying the smaller competitor's existing product on the assumption that the
predator's soon-to-be-introduced product will destroy the smaller competitor. No one wants
to buy a product from an innovative company that will not long be in business to service the
product, honor guarantees, or issue updated versions. This rational consumer behavior is
subverted if it is based on fraudulent vaporware promises.
179 As noted, a large vaporware marketer can raise a competitor's advertising and
other promotional expenses by forcing them to overcome competition from a nonexistent
product. By making the market for the smaller competitor's product less promising, the
vaporware announcement can also raise smaller rivals' costs for obtaining financing, or
perhaps block it altogether. Experts in the field of raising rivals' costs (RRC) theory have
used increasing competitors' costs of promotion as a prototypical example of such a tactic.
See David T. Scheffnan, The Application of Raising Rivals' Costs Theory to Antitrust, 37
ANrrrRUsT BULL. 187, 205 (1992).
180 A competitor who is just about to enter a market with an advanced product with
features not currently available may well decide not to do so in light of an announcement
from a vaporware marketer with substantial market power that it is about to market just
such a product. Even though the vaporous product does not exist, the smaller competitor
might well decide to withhold its product from the market in order to add features that the
larger predator does not yet even claim before introducing it.
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achieve the anticompetitive results of perhaps the most widely
acknowledged form of predatory behavior without incurring the costs of
litigation.
Thus, fraudulent vaporware marketing is arguably one of the more
plausible forms of predation yet theorized. It has been observed in nature,
and its theoretical underpinnings provide much less reason to be skeptical
than those of many other supposedly predatory practices that have been
scrutinized so carefully by economists.181
3. Determination As to Whether the Injury to Competitors Has
Resulted in Injury to Competition and an Increase in the Market
Power of the Predator
Critics who oppose application of antitrust law to fraudulent vaporware
marketing do so based in part on their doubts about the viability of the
practice as a competitive strategy. First, critics doubt that fraudulent
vaporware marketing can be an effective strategy in light of the long-term
injury vaporware inflicts upon the predator's reputation as a reliable source
of products. Second, they doubt that fraudulent vaporware marketing can
create gains that can be preserved in the long term in competitive markets.
These two issues, though closely related, will be discussed separately.
a. Viability of Fraudulent Vaporware Marketing as a Strategy for
Injuring Competitors and Competition
Critics are probably correct in asserting that a fraudulent vaporware
marketer will likely suffer some injury in the market as a result of its
failure to live up to its promises regarding when its products will reach the
market and the features those products will carry.' 8 2 Nonetheless, even
181 Myers has argued that reasons to doubt the validity of predatory pricing claims "do
not apply as persuasively to claims of anticompetitive litigation," supra note 147, at 596, for
several reasons, including (a) predatory litigation does not have a direct effect on price
levels, and (b) litigation may not be as costly for the dominant firm as predatory pricing.
See id. at 596-99. Obviously, predatory vaporware announcements do not have a direct
effect on price levels and not only are not as costly to the dominant firm as predatory
pricing, but are almost cost free to the predator.
182 Perhaps vaporware marketers can be punished by investors more effectively than
by consumers. Following one announcement by Microsoft that it would not be able to fulfill
its earlier vaporware announcements regarding the delivery date of Windows 95, the
company's stock price dropped by 4.5%. See Boudreaux, supra note 33, at A21 (according
to the author, this 4.5% drop in share price caused a $78 million drop in Microsoft's value).
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assuming that the predator will ultimately suffer injury to its reputation
from an inaccurate vaporware announcement, effective predation remains
possible so long as the injury to the predator is less than the injury to the
victim.183
The substantial competitive advantages stemming from fraudulent
vaporware predation that were described earlier can outweigh any injury to
credibility, as the following discussion illustrates.
i. Vaporware Marketing Is a More Viable Predatory Strategy
Than Predatory Pricing
Those in the Chicago School who doubt the viability of predatory
pricing as an anticompetitive strategy entertain similar doubts about
fraudulent vaporware marketing. However, vaporware is simply a more
plausible anticompetitive tool than predatory pricing. Therefore, economic
theory and empirical evidence undermining the theory of predatory pricing
do not necessarily show that fraudulent vaporware marketing could not be
an effective tool of predation.
Because it costs virtually nothing to issue a fraudulent vaporware
marketing release,' 8 4 the vaporware predator, unlike the price predator,
Of course, such a stock drop punishes Microsoft's shareholders, including Bill Gates, but
not particularly the company (unless it is planning a stock offering) and certainly not the
company's market share.
183 See Campbell, supra note 138, at 1629-30.
184 Product press releases are an efficient, yet relatively inexpensive means of
promoting a new product. See JORDAN GOLDMAN, PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE MARKING
Mix 225 (1984); ROMAN HIEBING & SCOTT COOPER, How TO WRITE A SUCCESSFUL
MARKETING PLAN 15 (1990).
Once a company with Microsoft's high profile decides to tout a product-in-
development, the trade press, which is extremely important in the high-tech industry, see
Stan Veit, Stan Veit's History: Computer Magazines Created the Channels, COMPUTER
SHOPPER, Oct. 1991, at 693 (describing importance of computer magazines to evolution of
the computer industry), will typically provide tremendous amounts of free publicity.
Microsoft is masterful at garnering such free publicity, and its constant stream of vaporware
announcements are an important part of that strategy. See Jayson Aycock, Windows
Development Saga. That Was Then, This Is 95, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 19, 1995, at
D6 ("While industry trade publications have been following every detail of the saga,
Miecrosoft's delays have had consumer PC publications hitching and starting, running an
endless series of big preview stories for an operating system that kept teasing them with new
release dates."); Mike Langberg, Microsoft to Unleash Hype to Open Windows 95, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 1995, at Cl ("Microsoft also has reaped huge benefits from free
publicity in the form of numerous stories in computer magazines and the general news
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need not incur short-run losses that must be made up via long-run
monopoly pricing. "The costs the rivals incur in countering the false
information will, in almost all cases, exceed the costs of producing and
disseminating that information. " 185 Any increase in market share and
subsequent market power is simply "gravy" for the vaporware marketer.
Furthermore, when economists evaluate predatory pricing and related
tactics, they often unduly minimize the benefits a predator derives from
gaining a reputation among rivals as a fierce competitor. 186 Even predatory
activity which carries costs for the predator in one market may achieve
similar benefits costlessly in other markets where competitors fear the
predator's reputation as a vicious competitor. This matter will be explored
in more detail in the next Section, 187 but vaporware is obviously an easy
way to send a signal that a company is a vigorous competitor and is not to
be trifled with.
ii. Consumer Backlash and the Self-Correcting Market
The main argument 188 used by those who doubt the utility of fraudulent
vaporware marketing as an anticompetitive tool is based on the assumption
that vaporware marketing would, in the long run, cause unacceptable
media. Reporters and editors don't want their publications to appear technologically
backward, so they are flocking to write about Windows 95...
185 Gerla, Federal Antitrust, supra note 171, at 1063.
186 See Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, in REVrTALIZING ANTrTRUST IN ITS
SECoND CENTURY, supra note 139, at 217 (Because of reputational factors, "the purported
irrationality of predatory pricing has been discredited.").187 See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
188 Injury to reputation is just about the only disadvantage to fraudulent vaporware
marketing that is addressed by those who oppose bringing that activity within the sphere of
antitrust law. One other disadvantage that was noted above is that when a predator
preannounces a new product, it may freeze not only the target's product sales, but also the
sales of its own existing product. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. This freezing
effect is possible, but may not impede vaporware marketing for at least three reasons. First,
the vaporware marketer may not currently have a product in the market to freeze. Second,
if the vaporware marketer does have a current product and is preannouncing an upgrade, it
can avoid the freezing effect by promising consumers that if they buy the current version
they will be given a discount rate on the upgrade when it is delivered. See Stanley M. Besen
& Joseph Farrell, Chwosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J.
ECoN. PERSP. 117, 124 (1994) (calling this a tactic to avoid the "Osborne effect" because
Osborne Computers sealed its own doom with a vaporware announcement). Third, if the
vaporware marketer, like Microsoft, has many products in many markets, it will not be
seriously damaged by a freeze in the market that might cripple a smaller competitor.
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damage to any predator's reputation. 189 This traditional view argues that
disappointed consumers will punish the predator by refusing to buy its
goods. This "consumer backlash," so the argument goes, prevents
vaporware marketing from being a viable predatory tactic. However, there
is strong evidence that the traditional view is based upon an overly
optimistic assessment of the efficiency of the marketplace. There are
several reasons why a fraudulent vaporware strategy might succeed despite
the threat of loss of credibility with consumers.
To facilitate examination of this issue, assume hypothetically that
Microsoft's critics are correct in charging that Microsoft intentionally
misrepresented both when it would bring its original Windows operating
system software to the market and the features that the software would
contain when marketed. 190  Assume further that, absent the
misrepresentations, many customers would have chosen Apple's Macintosh
operating system software for their first purchase or that consumers using
MS/DOS software but desiring the features of a GUI system would have
switched to Apple immediately rather than wait three years in order to buy
Windows, which most experts believe to be inferior to Apple's
Macintosh. 191 Misled by Microsoft's repeated promises, the customers
ultimately buy Windows software and complementary applications
software. Over time some of them learn that Windows, in addition to being
189 For example, economist Franklin M. Fisher, IBM's key expert witness in its
famous 1967-1981 antitrust case, argued that a product preannouncement could not be
anticompetitive unless it was made in bad faith. See Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists
Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND I. ECON. 113, 118 (1989). Perhaps, then, Fisher
agrees with this Article that fraudulent vaporware marketing can constitute condemnable
conduct under section 2. However, he believes that "with rational customers, it [is] unlikely
to represent a practice that [can] be successfully repeated." Id.; see also FISHER ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 290 ("Only deliberate falsehood could possibly be anticompetitive here, and
that is highly improbable since a firm that practiced such tactics would acquire a tarnished
reputation that would ill serve it in the future.").
Regarding false advertising in general, see generally RIcHARD A. POSNER,
REGULATION OF ADVERTISING BY THE FTC 4-9 (1973) (arguing that the market itself
adequately deters false advertising in large part because of cost to seller of developing a
reputation for dishonesty).
190 These charges were discussed supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
191 See Steve Lohr, Business Often Goes to the Swift, Not the Best, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
6, 1995, at E3 [hereinafter Lohr, Business to Swift] (reporting that reviewers agree that
Windows 95 is such an improvement on the original Windows that it is almost as good as
Apple's 10-year-old Macintosh system).
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three years late to the market, is inferior to Apple in terms of its GUI
features.'92
Clearly, Microsoft's failure-whether intentional or otherwise-to
deliver on its vaporware promises did not prevent it from dominating the
world market for operating systems software or leveraging itself into a
leading position in many markets for applications software. 193 The very
fact of this success undermines the traditional reasoning, as does the very
existence of vaporware marketing (or of false advertising in general, for
that matter).
Why do the facts not fit the traditional theory? Microsoft was, no
doubt, punished somewhat by consumers for breaching its vaporware
promises, but why was it not punished sufficiently to discourage the
practice? There are several reasons. First, if competitors are destroyed by
the vaporware strategy, consumers may have no choice but to buy from the
predator whenever the product finally arrives and in whatever form it
takes. Microsoft is accused of using vaporware marketing, in conjunction
with other tactics, to successfully eliminate DR-DOS from the United
States market.194 Whether or not this particular accusation is accurate, it is
certainly conceivable that in a given case such an injury could be inflicted
by fraudulent vaporware marketing. When such injury leads to creation or
maintenance of a monopoly position, the dominant firm has little to worry
about in terms of consumer backlash.19 5
Second, a single incident of false representation seldom justifies an
inference regarding the seller's future behavior and therefore seldom
justifies a consumer's decision to boycott that seller's goods in the
future. 196 Any disappointment with the seller might well be overcome by
192 This situation fits into Nelson's taxonomy as an "experience quality" (one that can
be detected only after buying the product) rather than a "search quality" (which can be
detected before buying the product). See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J.
POL. ECON. 729, 730 (1974). Nelson believes that most false advertising will relate to
experience qualities. Id. at 730.
193 See supra note 14.
194 As noted earlier, supra note 90 and accompanying text, despite being touted by
many experts as superior to Microsoft's competing products, DR-DOS has been withdrawn
from the United States market.
195 See Robert B. Reich, Toward a New Conswner Protection, 128 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1,
29 (1979) (In cases of "excessive concentration, goodwill may cease to be an important
factor, since patronage can often be guaranteed without it.").
196 See Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 658,
723 (1985) ("A single false inference tells little about the likelihood of drawing false
inferences from that seller in the future, or about how that likelihood compares to the risk of
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additional promises of new and improved products. 197 Furthermore, major
market players typically have strong credibility and a reservoir of goodwill
that can withstand one (and sometimes several) vaporware episodes. For
example, even with its extensive track record of vaporware
announcements, Microsoft is so widely viewed as a successful company
that its preannouncements are given credence where similar announcements
by other companies would be ignored. 198
While a vaporware announcement that fails to pan out can destroy a
small company, a market powerhouse such as Microsoft or IBM can
survive such failures. A decade ago, IBM apologists argued that IBM
would never intentionally issue false vaporware statements because of the
damage to its reputation that would follow. 199 The following response from
Professor Dennis is equally applicable to Microsoft today:
The problem [with this argument] is that the risk of unjustified
preannouncement by IBM is different for IBM and for its customers.
IBM's size allows it to make mistakes, even substantial ones, and to
correct those mistakes over time (if not for specific customers, then for the
community of customers). For other firms, a single major error with
respect to product development may be fatal. Other firms may not have a
variety of different products that allows IBM to diversify its risk.
being deceived by sellers of competing brands, so a rational consumer should not
necessarily respond to deception by never buying that product again.").197 See Reich, supra note 195, at 28.
198 See James Coates, Beware the Bearer of Hype, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 18,
1994, at Fl.
199 The lengthy government investigation of Microsoft has often been analogized to
the even lengthier 13-year proceeding against IBM that was filed in 1969 and ran until
President Reagan's assistant attorney general for antitrust, William Baxter, dismissed the
suit after seven years of trial, in 1982. The analogy is strengthened by the fact that, like
Microsoft, IBM was often accused of an elaborate strategy to use vaporware announcements
in an anticompetitive fashion-the so-called FUD tactics referred to earlier. See Ion B.
Streeter, Antust Redux: Microsoft Litigation, NAT'L L.., Apr. 7, 1995, at C19; see also
Frederic G. Withington, Microsoft's Troubles Wll Fade Away, COMPUTERWORLD, Apr. 17,
1995, at 37 (noting numerous similarities, including vaporware claims, between IBM and
Microsoft cases).
Like Microsoft, IBM issued blanket denials. As with Microsoft, there existed
substantial evidence that IBM did, indeed, engage in vaporware marketing. See, e.g.,
MCKENNA, supra note 47, at 23-24 (giving, as one example, the demise of Amdahl
Corporation in the wake of an IBM vaporware announcement).
Even some IBM executives appeared to believe that the Government's antitrust case
had merit. See RIcHARD T. DELAMARTER, BIG BLUE: IBM's USE AND ABUSE OF POWER 177
(1986).
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Customers may believe that IBM's superior size will allow it to
experiment with and support marginal products that a smaller firm would
be forced to abandon. Thus, IBM does not stand to lose as much in
customer support as would other firms as a consequence of faulty
preannouncement. Moreover, the adverse effect on smaller rivals of
holding a relatively small percentage of its customers by preannouncement
might outweigh any potential loss to IBM. 20 0
A large company such as Microsoft or IBM that constantly announces
new products can build up a track record of relatively accurate
announcements and then strategically and cynically use fraudulent
vaporware marketing to damage competition in a particularly important
market without destroying its overall reputation.
Third, if Microsoft can induce a customer to buy its product rather
than that of a competitor when, in the absence of the vaporware
announcement, the customer would have purchased the competitor's
product, Microsoft may win a permanent convert for several reasons:
9 Many consumers may never realize they were misled as to the quality
of the product. Although they will surely know that they had to wait longer
than promised to buy the vaporware announcer's product, because of the
technical nature of the product they bought, they may never learn that the
competing product was of a higher quality and had more useful features. 20'
They may well assume that any problems they have with the system they
bought are due to their own technical limitations, rather than to problems
inherent in the product. 20 2 As GUI systems go, Windows was certainly
serviceable, and most consumers are probably unaware of the fact that
most experts believed the Apple system to be superior. Therefore, these
customers will not desire to retaliate against Microsoft.
* The customer may never replace the product. A seller who is not
particularly concerned with repeat purchases by the same consumer is
200 Roger I. Dennis, Book Review: Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated, 70 CORNELL L.
REv. 580,593 n.48 (1985).
20 1 See Lee Goldman, The World's Best Article on Corpettor Suits for False
Advertising, 45 FLA. L. REv. 487, 499 (1993) (stating that after purchase, the consumer is
either happy with the seller's product and never discovers that the competitor's product is
superior, or unhappy with the seller's product, but assumes that the competitor's product is
even worse).
20 2 Professor Reich refers to this behavior as the consumer's "difficulty in detecting
hidden costs." See Reich, supra note 195, at 27; see also Michele Matassa Flores, Windows
95 Is Equipped with Plenty of Glitches, AUsTIN AM.-STATESMAN, July 1, 1995, at C8
(technical writer blamed her problems with Windows on hersel).
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nearly immune to retaliation by that consumer. 20 3 Operating systems
software (and applications software) can last for a long time and be
expensive to replace. They may never be replaced, or more frequently,
may be replaced only long after memories of earlier disappointments have
faded. The disappointed consumer of a soda has substantially more power
to punish the false advertiser than does the consumer of expensive and
durable consumer products. 20 4
e Cognitive dissonance-the tendency of people to selectively look for
facts and reasons that support decisions they have already made20 5-may
induce even consumers who know they were misled to rationalize and
convince themselves that they made the right decision.
e The endowment effect-the tendency of people to value what they
have (the Microsoft system) more highly than what they do not have (a
203 See Reich, supra note 195, at 28-29.
204 See Ross D. Petty, Supplanting Government Regulation with Competitor Lawsuits:
The Case of Controlling False Advertising, 25 IND. L. REV. 351, 355 (1991) (arguing if
goods are infrequently purchased and evaluation of experience factors takes a long time,
businesses have stronger incentives to advertise falsely because of reduced ability of
consumers to retaliate); Roger E. Schechter, The Death of the Gullible Consuwer: Towards
a More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 571, 615
[hereinafter Schechter, Gullible Consuner] (same).
205 In other words, had they been told the truth, the customers would not have bought
the Microsoft product in the first place. However, once they have done so, psychological
forces induce them to convince themselves that they have done the right thing. Due to
cognitive dissonance, persons often accommodate their preferences to what they can have
or what they do have. Regarding the concept of cognitive dissonance, see generally JON
ELTrs, SOUR GRAPES: STruDmEs IN THE SuBvE-SION oFRATIONALrrY 109-40 (1983) (stating
that cognitive dissonance forces preferences that may themselves be shaped by outcomes);
LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DIsSONANCE 128-34 (1957); Deborah L.
Rhode, The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. REs. L.
REv. 665, 685 (1994) (arguing that because of cognitive dissonance, persons are more
likely to register and retain information compatible with earlier decisions).
Once they have made this decision, a second phenomenon works in favor of the
vaporware predator-the fact that "most individuals change their minds only rather slowly,
except, of course, in the face of overwhelming evidence." Yehudah Kotowitz, Commentary
on Papers Presented by Phillip Nelson and Sherwin Rosen, in ISSUES IN ADvERTISING: THE
ECONOMIcs OF PERSUASION 197 (David Tuerck ed., 1978). Therefore, if the process of
cognitive dissonance induces consumers to conclude that they made the correct decision in
buying the predator's product, they will not easily be disabused of that notion, even if it is
wrong.
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rival's system)-complements cognitive dissonance in reducing consumer
resentment over broken promises. 206
* The installed base phenomenon also inhibits customer backlash.
Having desired a GUI operating system, consumers have purchased
Windows. Even if it does not live up to its promises and does not function
as well as Apple's Macintosh, it is a workable system for which they have
bought much software (for example, the MS/Word word processing
software) that will not work with Apple's operating system. Even if the
consumers would like to punish Microsoft, they will rationally feel
constrained from doing so by switching costs. 20 7 Among those switching
costs are search costs-the time and expense of looking for a
replacement. 208
* Consider sunk costs. Not only have the consumers spent a lot of
money on software that is compatible with Windows, they have also
invested time (and possibly money) in learning how the Windows system
works. To switch to the Apple system (or that of another competitor)
would require them to forfeit a large investment of both time20 9 and
2 06 See Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle: Some
Reactions to Professor BeVier, 78 VA. L. REv. 57, 71-72 (1992) [hereinafter Schechter,
Additional Pieces]; Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1151 (1986) (suggesting that the endowment effect complements
cognitive dissonance).
The endowment effect can be bolstered by the tendency of people, for no rational
economic reason, to repeat purchase out of simple habit or loyalty. See Paul Klemperer,
Markets with Consumer Switching Costs, 102 Q. 1. EcoN. 375, 376 n.2 (1987) [hereinafter
Klemperer, Markets with Switching Costs].
207 See Klemperer, Markets with Switching Costs, at 375 ("[1]f a consumer has learned
to use one [computer] firm's product line and has invested in the appropriate software, he
has a strong incentive to continue both to buy machines from the same firm and to buy
software compatible with them."); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1045, 1070 (1989) (stating that the
installed base problem can create excess inertia, making it troublesome for buyers to switch,
even to superior products).
208 See Goldman, supra note 201, at 500-01 (suggesting that McDonald's and Holiday
Inn know well that consumers like to stick to a known quantity (and quality) even if they
know it may not be the best on the market); Klemperer, Markets with Switching Costs,
supra note 206, at 376 n.1 (noting that costs of switching arise from the mere fact that a
consumer, in order to switch brands, may have to buy the new brand in order to discover
whether it is suitable).
209 Steve Wozniak, cofounder of Apple, has recently noted that it is very difficult for
consumers to switch from an Apple operating system to a Microsoft operating system (and
presumably vice-versa). See David Einstein, Wozniak Lamnents Apple's Blunders, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 4, 1995, at C5; see also Dratler, supra note 119, at 706 (Having
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money. Therefore, if Apple offers a comparable advance to Windows 95,
consumers that already own Windows products will rationally choose
Windows 95, even if they realize that they have been misled in the past by
Microsoft. 2 10 Both the courts2 11 and the Department of Justice2 12 have
recognized that "the realities of the computer marketplace often constrain
consumers' freedom to choose.., because expensive hardware purchases
'lock in' customers, limiting their reasonable choices." 213
Relatedly, consumers may naturally assume that fraudulent vaporware
marketing is illegal and that the law will punish such marketing. 214
Therefore, they may well believe that even though Microsoft or some other
company has been unreliable in the past, surely it is not lying now. To the
extent that the law of false advertising (and perhaps antitrust) is not
learned a particular word processing program, "I would no more think of converting to
[another], and thereby losing all of my investment in macros and training, than I would
consider doing all my professional writing henceforth in Swahili.").
210 For these reasons, consumers may not have the normal weapon of withholding
their business in order to punish false advertisers. The touted "discipline of continuous
dealings" is missing. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term
Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005, 2009 (1987) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 700 (1776) (E. Cannon ed., 1937)). However, consumers can tell their friends and
relatives about their experience, see Robert B. Reich, Preventing Deception in Conmercial
Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 775, 794 (1979), if the friends and relatives do not have the
same constraints.
Professor Gifford argues that because the seller must compete for new customers, the
old customers, even if they are locked in, will not be gouged price-wise. See Daniel J.
Gifford, The Damaging Impact of the Eastman Kodak Precedent Upon Product
Conpetition: Anttw Law in Need of Correction, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1507, 1520 (1994).
One hopes this proposition is correct, but it does not defeat the point made here-that the
lock-in effect inhibits the ability of consumers to punish vaporware marketers. The
establishment of an installed base coupled with network externalities may give those new
customers a very strong reason to buy the established seller's product, even in favor of a
technically superior model.
211 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 476
(1992); Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1984).
2 12 See U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and
Acquisition of Intellectual Property, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCI) 50,141 (1994).
2 13 BAND & KATOH, supra note 107, at 20-21; see Kelly A. O'Connor, Emerging
Antitrust Issues Affecting the Computer Industy, 17 HASTiNGS COmm. & ENT. L.J. 819, 821
(1995).2 14 See Nelson, supra note 192, at 749-51.
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enforced, as it generally has not been in these vaporware cases,2 15 a trap is
set for unwary consumers.
If vaporware marketing becomes so bad that it becomes apparent even
to relatively undiscerning customers that the laws against false advertising
are not being enforced, they may react with blanket disgust and punish
high-tech companies indiscriminately. In some instances, it appears that
innocent marketers with spotless on-time records have suffered for the sins
of their less scrupulous competitors. 216
To reiterate, a consumer who is misled about the taste of a fifty cent
soda or the effectiveness of a three dollar bottle of pain reliever can easily
punish the firm that markets that product by never buying it again.217 The
consumer of an operating system or applications software is seldom
similarly empowered. 218
215 The FTC has occasionally sought to punish vaporware marketing. See, e.g., In re
Coleco Indus., Inc., 1989 FTC LEXIS 43 (1989) (reporting complaint filed against Coleco
for advertising features of a product when it did not plan to market the modules necessary
for those features for 12 to 18 months and had, indeed, already decided to abandon plans
for one of the advertised features); In re NEC Home Electronics, 110 F.T.C. 501 (1988)
(reporting complaint filed against computer company for falsely claiming that the memory
capacity of one of its microprocessors could easily be expanded in the future when the
software necessary to do so had never been available in the United States). See generally
Lewis Rose, Vaporware Rules: The Limits on Dr -Testing, MARKETING COMPUTERS, Mar.
1995, at 18.
216 See Joyce Lane, Promotion Peddlers Tug on the Reins, SAN JOSE BUS. I., Apr. 28,
1986, § 2, at 6 ("Vaporware and otherwise late products have created disappointed and
angered customers, dealers and editors, and hurt the reputations of companies with histories
of on-time delivery as much as the tardy ones.").
This result is not surprising, for widespread false advertising naturally causes consumer
distrust. See Jean Wegman Burns, The Paradox of Antitrust and Lanhan Act Standing, 42
UCLA L. REV. 47, 85 n.157 (1994) [hereinafter Burns, Paradox].
217 Even the purchaser of a soda or a bottle of pain reliever might not punish false
advertisers because (a) cognitive dissonance convinces her that she is using the best product,
(b) she never tries the competition and therefore assumes that it does not taste or work any
better, or (c) having been misled by one false advertisement, she now disbelieves all
advertising in the industry.
218 Belatedly, Professor BeVier has argued that consumers can protect themselves
from false advertising ex ante by use of skepticism. See Lillian R. BeVier, Coanetitor Suits
for False Advertsing Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: A Puzzle in the Law of
Deception, 78 VA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1992). Certainly there is truth to this contention, and
many high-tech professionals have become extremely skeptical of vaporware
announcements. However, as Professor Schechter has answered, there is substantial ground
for refusing to invest too much faith in this mechanism for consumer self protection because
(a) advertisers often resort to explicit credence claims (claims that cannot be factually
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Even if buyers do resent having been misled and do not purchase the
seller's product again, they probably would not have made the purchase
absent the misrepresentation, so the predator may benefit anyway. 219 A
consumer who, absent Microsoft's vaporware announcements, would have
bought the Apple operating system software would likely have become
ensconced in that technical milieu. The difficulty of switching would have
made it difficult for Microsoft to obtain that customer's loyalty later. Given
these considerations, Microsoft or other firms in a similar position may
well enjoy anticompetitive benefits that can outweigh the damage their
reputations will sustain through fraudulent vaporware marketing.
b. Fraudulent Vaporware Marketing's Contribution to Long-Term
Market Power
Even unfair and generally anticompetitive activity is not conduct
violative of section 2 of the Sherman Act unless it contributes to
establishment or maintenance of a durable monopoly position.220
A fraudulent vaporware announcement may deter customers from
purchasing a small competitor's product, injuring that competitor in the
substantiated and therefore rely upon the naked credibility of the advertiser), belying any
substantial level of consumer skepticism; (b) even prominent and reputable firms engage in
falsified advertising for credence traits; (c) consumers, knowing that the law generally
condemns false advertising, tend to believe such claims on grounds that the law would not
let the advertiser lie; and (d) increased wariness or skepticism is not the same thing as
disregarding the advertising. See Schechter, Additional Pieces, supra note 206, at 76-79;
see also Gerla, Federal Antitrust, supra note 171, at 1075 (stating that consumers are more
likely to believe false information when it pertains to infrequently purchased goods that are
technically complex); Goldman, supra note 201, at 497, 498, 501-03 (giving examples of
clearly false claims made by prominent companies and noting difficulties consumers have in
detecting falsehoods); Robert Pitofsky, Advertising Regulation and the Conswner
Movement, in ISSUES IN ADVERTISING, supra note 205, at 33 (arguing that empirical data
indicates that consumers are frequently influenced by the content of experience quality
advertising).
Nelson has argued that consumers will not pay attention to advertising claims about
infrequently purchased experience goods (such as computers and operating systems
software, presumably). See Nelson, supra note 192, at 749-51. However, empirical
evidence on the effects of advertising contradict Nelson's surmise. See Mark F. Grady,
Regulating Infonmadon: Advertising Overview, in THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE
1970: ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BuREAucATIc BEHAVIOR 222, 224 (K. Clarkson & T.
Muris eds., 1981), citedin Craswell, supra note 196, at 721 n.200.
219 See Craswell, supra note 196, at 722-.
2 20 See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shielt, 899 F.2d 951, 968 (10th Cir. 1990).
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short run. However, if the long-run impact of this tactic is simply to open
the door for other competitors to enter the fray, no lasting step toward
maintaining or attempting a monopoly has been taken. The act may be grist
for an unfair trade practices or other business tort suit, but it is not the
stuff of which a Sherman Act section 2 violation is made.
Areeda and Turner, who emphasize this important aspect of a section 2
violation, 221 illustrate with reference to false advertising. Because
fraudulent vaporware marketing tactics are a particularly odious form of
false advertising, the Areeda-Turner discussion is particularly instructive:
In a perfectly competitive market, a seller could sell all he wished at the
going market price, and there would be no need to engage in false
advertising. But deception does not imply market power, and only rarely
will it make a significant contribution to power. Such practices, while
presumably leading to a short-run increase in sales, are typically transitory
or insubstantial in nature and make no contribution to a durable market
share, even in many instances where practiced by a dominant firm. This is
not to say that unfair competition may never have a significant effect; it is
only to say that it must be shown that such an effect probably did result or
would have resulted. 22 2
Areeda and Turner are obviously skeptical that a false advertising
practice like vaporware will typically sustain an existing monopoly position
or help to create one. On the other hand, as the highlighted portion of their
statement illustrates, even they concede that in some circumstances false
advertising wielded by a dominant firm might well have the required
221 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 7, 828b, at 322-23.
222 Id. § 828b, at 322 (emphasis added); see also Gerla, Federal Antitrust, supra note
171, at 1038-39 (expressing concern that Areeda and Turner's suggested presumption that
false advertising has only a de nrnimis effect on defendant's market power is too restrictive
and presents danger that legitimate cases of predation will go unpunished).
Dean Arthur also argues that information gaps (including false advertising and
presumably vaporware) create only nonstructural market power which is limited by the
buyer's search costs. He argues that buyers can rely on their own search efforts, on those of
consumer organizations and specialty magazines, on the advertising of competitors, and on
consumer protection regulations, and therefore, "[i]nformation gaps are in little need of
antitrust regulation." Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak
and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 36-38 (1994). However, when
such nonstructural market power is used to supplement existing structural market power, a
more foreboding situation arises. When a firm that has structural market power or the
present ability to acquire it uses nonstructural marketing power arising from techniques such
as fraudulent vaporware marketing, then the antitrust laws must surely be implicated.
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significant impact. 223 Scenario #1 assumes that a dominant player is the
vaporware marketer.
i. Contestable Markets and Entry Barriers
Because entry barriers are the most important factors in determining
the durability of a monopolist's market power224 and the likelihood of
success of a would-be monopolist, 225 their existence is a key factor in
evaluating the long-term impact of fraudulent vaporware marketing. If the
particular market has substantial entry barriers, then the elimination of a
key competitor by a dominant firm may well contribute to retention or
attainment of a durable monopoly position. On the other hand, if there are
no substantial entry barriers, the knockout of one competitor will likely
lead to its replacement by others. 226
Some economists assume that most markets are "contestable" and that
entry barriers are usually low, providing evidence of the irrelevancy of
antitrust law.227 Indeed, this assumption informed much of the Reagan-
223 Areeda and Turner would presume that false advertising does not cause monopoly
harms, and require plaintiffs to overcome the presumption by "proof that the representations
were clearly false, clearly material, clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, made to
buyers without knowledge of the subject matter, continued for prolonged periods, and not
readily susceptible of neutralization or other offset by rivals." AREEDA & TumNER, supra
note 7, 738a, at 279.
224 See James W. Meehan, Jr. & Robert J. Lamer, The Structural School, Its Critics,
and Its Progeny: An Assessment, in ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 139, at
179, 201 ("[I]t is generally accepted that without barriers to entry there can be no persisting
monopoly power.").
225 See Bacchus Indus. v. Arvin Indus., 939 F.2d 887, 894 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that even though defendant had 55% of market share, lack of barriers to entry prevented
defendant from achieving monopoly power for any significant period of time); Metro
Mobile CTS, Inc. v. NewVector Communications, Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding even 100% market share inadequate to indicate dangerous probability of success in
a market where virtually no barriers to entry exist).
226 In the absence of entry barriers, it is generally assumed that potential competition
from would-be entrants restrains monopolists from abusing their power. It is often ignored
that potential competition can also act as a barrier to entry, for potential entrants will enter
only if they believe that they can capture profits and may not enter if they fear that other
entrants will follow them and take their profits away. "Entry is motivated by the search for
monopoly rents." Stiglitz, supra note 165, at 901, 924.
227 There have been numerous criticisms of the contestability theory, in addition to
those discussed later in this Section. See, e.g., Marius Schwartz & Robert I. Reynolds,
Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure: Comment, 73 AM.
ECON. REv. 488 (1983) (arguing that theory of perfect contestability rests on implausible
1996] 1217
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
Bush era antitrust policy. For example, those administrations approved
every single proposed merger in the airline industry on the assumption that
the easy transportability from market to market of the major physical assets
of the industry (airplanes) ensured contestability. 228
In practice, however, entry barriers inconsistent with theory seem to
have led to a dramatic concentration of the airline industry. 229 Indeed,
there are several industries with large concentrations of economic power in
the United States where contestability must be questioned, 230 and empirical
evidence seems to show that prices are higher where direct competition is
absent even in theoretically contestable markets.231 Contestability theory is
inconsistent with this real world experience because it is based upon a
number of unrealistic conditions, including the absence of market
imperfections, 232 and ignores strategic interaction between incumbent and
entrant firms. 233
While some economists theorize that entry barriers are generally
insubstantial, real firms in the real world report that deterring the entry of
conditions); Stiglitz, supra note 165, at 887 ("ITlhe contestability doctrine is particularly
inapplicable to industries in which technological change is important ... ").22 8 See generally Elizabeth Bailey, Contestability and the Design of Regulatory and
Antitrust Policy, 71 AM. ECON. REv., May 1981, at 178, 181 (papers and proceedings)
(discussing the effects of contestability on the Civil Aeronautics Board's approval of airline
mergers).
22 9 See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Revitalizing a Structural Antitrust Policy,
39 ANTIrrRusT BULL. 235, 260-62 (1994) ("[Flifteen independent airlines operating at the
beginning of 1986 had by 1988 been consolidated into six carriers .... At twenty-two of
the nation's major airports, a single carrier came to control half or more of all air traffic.");
Andrew S. Joskow et al., Entry, Exit, and Performance in Airline Markets, 12 INT'L 1.
INDUS. 457 (1994) (casting doubt on market contestability's effectiveness to prevent
increases in fares and decreases in outputs following anticompetitive mergers in airline
industry).
230 See Baker, supra note 138, at 653-54 (citing numerous studies); Timothy F.
Bresnahan, Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1011, 1051-53 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Wfillig eds.,
1989).
231 See Gregory D. Call & Theodore E. Keeler, Antitrust Deregulation, Fares, and
Market Behavior: Some Empirical Evidence, in ANALYrICAL STUDIES IN TRANSPORT
ECONOMIcs 221,244-46 (Andrew F. Daughety ed., 1985).232 See William G. Shepherd, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust Enforcement:
Prospects for Section 2, 35 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 917, 922, 925 (1990) [hereinafter
Shepherd, Economic Analysis]; W'lliam G. Shepherd, llogic and Unreality: The Odd Case
of Ultra-Free Entry and Inert Markets, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, supra note 139, at
232 [hereinafter Shepherd, llogic].
233 See Harbord & Hoehn, supra note 139, at 412.
1218 [V/ol. 57:1163
VAPORWARE
competitors is a very important part of their marketing strategy and that
vaporware announcements are a frequently used means of accomplishing
that strategy.23 4 For these reasons, this Article applies a broader definition
of entry barrier than would be accepted by Chicago School economists.235
Still, intense competition has curbed and destroyed many of the early
kingpins of high-tech industry. High technology fields change continuously
234 See Smiley, supra note 154, at 175.
235 The proper definition of an entry barrier is, of course, hotly disputed in current
antitrust literature. A narrow view is that an entry barrier "is a cost of producing which
must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already
in the industry and which implies a distortion in the allocation of resources from the social
point of view." C.C. von Weisacker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 BELL 1.
ECON. 399, 400 (1990). Weizsacker notes that entry barriers can also be defined as
"socially undesirable limitations on entry, which are attributable to the protection of
resource owners already in the industry." Id. The former definition is more apt to be used
by those who would restrict antitrust law because of its emphasis on the differential between
costs imposed on incumbents and costs imposed on would-be entrants. However, the second
definition, which derives from the work of Joe Bain, is used here because it is a more
practical description and, according to Hovenkamp, "[ifn all antitrust decisions except a few
in the FTC, tribunals have relied on the Bainian definition." HOVENKAMP, supra note 104,
§ 1.6, at 40.
Fox and Sullivan describe this "Bainian" (as opposed to "Stiglerian") view of entry
barriers as the "Realist/Traditionalist Approach," explaining that under it:
[A]ny fact or condition that makes entry on an efficient scale less likely or more difficult
is relevant. For example, scale economies combined with significant sunk costs, and
strategic entry deterrence behavior, can create barriers.
In most markets, barriers to entry are significant or at least difficult to assess. It is
a mistake to assume that entry is easy unless proved otherwise.
Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Anchoring Antitn Economics-A Lexicon, in
REvrAIuZNG ANrrRuST IN ITS SECOND CENTuRy, supra note 139, at 71.
The "Stiglerian" view is, of course, that barriers exist only when the entering firms
face costs that incumbent firms did not have to bear to establish their dominant positions.
See STIGLER, supra note 135, at 67-70.
For an excellent discussion of various views on how to define entry barriers, see
Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 47 (1982).
Bork also argues that predation is impossible if there are no significant re-entry barriers
facing the firm that is forced out of the market. See BoRK, supra note 135, at 149-54.
However, reentry barriers are typically present and significant. See Ordover & Willig,
supra note 7, at 12 n.15 (stating that such barriers include depreciation of assets, dispersal
of work force, discontinued advertising, and unmaintained brand name).
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and rapidly, 23 6 making it difficult to establish or maintain a monopoly in
the computer industry.23 7 Microsoft is currently king of many markets, but
uneasy rests the crown given the dynamics of technological change.23 8
Many believe that it was new technology, not government antitrust
enforcement, that broke IBM's stranglehold on the computer world and
that rapid technological change will ultimately undo Microsoft's
stranglehold as well.23 9 Any analyst of antitrust issues in the computer
industry must keep this fact in mind. 240
236 The economic life of most software products is less than five years, and Microsoft
claims that all of its software products are subject to a major release or upgrade every one
to two years. See BAND & KATOH, supra note 107, at 286 n.6 (quoting Mr. Gaudette of
Microsoft).
237 Dean Arthur recently cited the revolution in the computer industry as a "dramatic
recent example of Schumpeter's 'perennial gale of creative destruction' that can 'in the long
run enforce behavior very similar to the perfect competitive pattern.'" Arthur, supra note
222, at 27-28 n.125 (referencing JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPrTALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY (Harper Colophon 1975)).23 8 See Don Clark, Computer Conferees Hear PCr Could Go with Buggy Whips,
WALL ST. 1., Oct. 3, 1995, at B6 (stating that many attendees of computer conference
believe that technological changes will render many current Microsoft advantages
competitively irrelevant); Evan Ramstad, Microsoft Is King-For Now, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Sept. 4, 1995, at C3 ("While no one is suggesting that Microsoft will be
insignificant in the future, the chance exists that it will lose the mantle of leadership just as
IBM, Digital Equipment, and Wang did when technology shifted under them.").
239 See Steve Lohr, Ground Rules for the Great Global Connection, N.Y. TIMES, May
7, 1995, at E2; see also Charles F. Rule, Remarks Before 22d New England Antitrust
Conf. 14-15 (1988), cited in Irving Scher, Single-Firm Conduct: The Government's and
Antitrust Section's Views, 59 ANrTRUST L.J 527, 529-30 (1990) (arguing that the
marketplace and technological advances, more than antitrust laws, will serve to inhibit
monopoly and to encourage competition).
240 Certainly, given the rapidly evolving world of computers, the fact that Microsoft
has a dominant position today does not mean that it will enjoy such luxury tomorrow:
No industry in history has ever been subjected to the breakneck rate of change as the
modem computer industry. Time and again, when a company seemed on the brink of
winning total control of its industry segment-IBM, and earlier Apple, in personal
computers, Lotus in spread sheets, DEC in mini-computers-it pitches into the mud the
next day.
Charles R. Morris, A Foolish Legal Battle Against Microsoft, SEATTLE TIMEs, Feb. 27,
1995, at B5.
While this consideration militates against strict scrutiny of the computer industry for
possible antitrust violations, it does not justify overlooking blatantly unfair monopolizing
conduct. Indeed, because the computer industry is so important and rapidly growing,
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Those who are suspicious of the benefits of antitrust law argue that it is
easy for small companies to pop up with major innovations to tackle giants
such as Microsoft. However, many others argue that in the software
industry the halcyon days of yore-when small, quirky firms could develop
an innovative new product and quickly make a huge splash as Microsoft
once did-are largely gone, thanks in substantial part to Microsoft and its
business practices. 241 Microsoft has been accused of using vaporware and
other anticompetitive tactics to tame Schumpeter's process of "creative
destruction" by raising entry barriers to preserve its dominant position
against new competition, thereby reducing social welfare.242 Once market
dominance is attained, it tends to erode only slowly. 243 Thus far, at least,
predictions regarding Microsoft's imminent demise have missed the mark
rather badly. 244
prudent antitrust enforcement can do more good there than in other industries. See Donald
I. Baker, Section 2 Enforcement-The View from the Trench, 41 ANrrrausT J. 613, 614
(1972) (The costs of governmental antitrust enforcement can be justified "in a giant,
growing industry like computers, but... not... in a highly localized monopoly
situation.").
241 See G. Pascal Zachary, Consolidation Sweeps the Software Industry: Small Firms
1nperiled, WALL ST. 1., Mar. 23, 1994, at Al.
242 See Baseman et al., supra note 89, at 267.
243 See Shepherd, Theories, supra note 139, at 44; see also Jeremy C. Stein, Waves of
Creative Deftruction.. Customer Bases and the Dynamics of Innovation, NBER WORKING
PAPER No. 4782, at 1, 2 (1994) (explaining that "[Imlany companies niaintain their market
shares in given product areas for a very long time in large part because of established
'customer bases' which often serve to dramatically reduce the long-run average level of
innovation, but which, if overturned, can lead to new waves of innovation").
244 See, e.g., Joseph A. Pantoja, Note, Desirable Economic Cooperation Among High-
Technology Industries: A Look at Telephone and Cable, 1994 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 617,
642 (predicting, inaccurately, that a 1991 IBM/Apple/Motorola alliance would break
Microsoft's domination of the market for personal computer software).
Most particularly, many have predicted that the current revolution sparked by the
Internet would seriously undermine the "Wintel" standard for PCs. See Amy Cortese, The
Software Revolution, Bus. WK., Dec. 4, 1995, at 78 (noting that the Web is a serious threat
to Microsoft's ability to impose its own technological standards). However, Microsoft has so
totally refocused its efforts toward dominating the Internet, see Joshua Cooper Ramo,
Winner Take All, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 56, that the question is now being asked is not
whether the Internet will kill Microsoft, but whether Microsoft will soon dominate the
Internet. See Kathy Rebello, Inside Microsoft, Bus. WK., July 15, 1996, at 56; Bart Ziegler
& Don Clark, Microsoft Gives Away Control Over Its ActiveX Technology, AusTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Oct. 7, 1996, at D6 (quoting industry analyst John McCarthy as saying, "I've
come around to the belief that the Internet is not the death of Microsoft-it's Microsoft's
salvation."). The most recent figures available at this writing show that in its most recent
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ii. Entry Barriers in High-Tech Industries
There are several sources of entry barriers in high-tech industries.
First, the initial investment to develop software or new computer hardware
can be huge, creating a barrier to entry. 245 These fixed costs are largely
sunk. Therefore, these costs are extremely influential to the calculations of
would-be entrants. 246
Second, some recent literature points out that when scale economies are
substantial, "no matter how high the pre-entry price, new entrants will
avoid a market in which the minimum efficient scale of production is large
relative to the size of the market." 247 Such economies can occur not only in
production, but also in areas such as advertising and promotion
expenditures. 248 There is evidence that economies of scale are, in fact,
quarter Microsoft's earnings were $650 million, a staggering 52% higher than a year
earlier. See John Markoff, Microsoft Has 52% Net Rise: Sees Expansion in Core Areas,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1996, at Dl. In other words, Microsoft shows no signs of being a
company about to be overwhelmed by the forces of creative destruction.
245 See Baseman et al., supra note 89, at 270 (Fixed costs of developing operating
system "are enormous... [and] also largely sunk."); Roger D. Blair & Amanda K.
Esquibel, The Microsoft Muddle: A Caveat, 40 ANTITRUST BuLL. 257, 259 (1995) ("In
computer software production, nearly all of the costs are incurred in the design stage.");
Hanna, supra note 7, at 429 ("IThe production of software involves significant economies
of scale that may preclude entry by competitors who lack sufficient capital reserves.").
246 See Harbord & Hoehn, supra note 139, at 415. Additionally, by gaining a
credible reputation for predation, an incumbent can raise capital costs to potential new
entrants. Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 139, at 231.
247 Baker, supra note 138, at 652 (citing several studies). The reasoning behind this
conclusion is relatively simple. When there are substantial scale economies, a new entrant
must enter at a large scale to keep its marginal costs competitive with those of the existing
firms. This new large scale entry will inevitably depress the market price, making it difficult
for the new entrant to recover its sunk costs. See also Harbord & Hoehne, supra note 139,
at 416 ("[Elconomies of scale, together with some sunk costs, can constitute a barrier to
entry that allows long-run supranormal profits not based on superior efficiency.");
Shepherd, Illogic, supra note 232, at 238 ("[Elconomies of scale.., can breed both high
market shares and high barriers to entry and exit .... ").
Among the studies which support Baker's statements are: Joseph Farrell, How Effective
Is Potential Competition?, 9 ECON. LmrERS 67 (1986); Steven C. Salop, Measuring Ease
of Entry, 31 ANTrrRUST BULL. 551 (1986); Schwartz & Reynolds, supra note 227, at 488;
Stiglitz, Technological Change, supra note 165, at 883.
24 8 See KIM B. ROTZOLL & JAMES E. HABFNER, ADVERTISING IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 77 (1986) ("Economies of scale in advertising can occur because there is a
threshold of awareness that advertising must cross."); Spence, supra note 140, at 14.
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important for software companies in many areas, including advertising,
distribution, and customer support. 249
Third, although economies of scale are exogenously determined, levels
of advertising, product differentiation, and research and development are
endogenously determined, opening the door for investments driven by a
strategy of entry deterrence. 25 0 If firms make irreversible investments in
such things as brand proliferation, 25 1 reputation building,25 2 and
249 See Michael Meyer, Hysteria in qberspace, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 1994, at 64
(discussing Microsofts huge Windows market and the importance of economies of scale);
Barbara Darrow & Deborah Gage, And Then There Were Three-Huge Buyout Plan Pits
Novell Against Microsoft, Lotus in the Applications Business, COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS,
Mar. 28, 1994, at 1 (quoting Roger McNamee, general partner of Integral Capital Partners,
as saying that "[t]he critical success factors in the [software] business are marketing,
distribution and customer support, all of which benefit from economies of scale"); Dratler,
supra note 119, at 723 (noting economies of scale in computer industry); Michael Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECoN. PERSPECTIVES 93, 101
(1994) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition] ("In many software
markets... economies of scale give rise to imperfect competition."); Programmers, Artists
and Factores-The Software Publishing Model, COMPUrER INDus. REP., Dec. 11, 1992, at
8 ("The largest software companies realize great marketing and distribution economies of
scale."). Indeed, a wave of consolidations in the software industry stems from competitors'
attempts to compete with Microsoft's stature. See Junu Bryan Kim, Fighting Giants with
'Sim'-ple Ideas, ADVERTISINGAOE, May 16, 1994, at 14S (stating that the software industry
has turned from "one solely based on innovation to one partly based on economies of scale,
including marketing mass").
However, there is also evidence that advertising generally does not lead to economies
of scale, and this remains a very controversial area. See ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & DAVID
S. SAURMAN, ADVERTisiNG AND THE MARKEr PROCESS 92-93 (1988); RICHARD
SCHMALENSEE, THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 231 (1972) ("[S]tudies provide no firm
evidence supporting the existence, let alone the importance of economies of scale in
advertising.").25 0 See generally SUTTON, supra note 141, at 26.
251 See Schmalensee, Breakfast Cereal, supra note 161, at 316; SUTTON, supra note
141, at 22.252 See Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering
Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 349, 360 (1982) [hereinafter Schmalensee, Product
Differentiation] (arguing that pioneering brands enjoy a first mover advantage that inevitably
disadvantages later entrants).
The impact of firm reputation is further enhanced in markets for systems, such as
computer hardware and software. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note
249, at 107 ("In systems markets, even more so than in other markets, firms with
established reputations, well-known brand names, and readily visible access to capital have
competitive advantages.").
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advertising, 253 they can erect entry barriers that will make it difficult for
new entrants to compete. Although the role of advertising as an entry
barrier is quite controversial, 25 4 and advertising can be critical to the
introduction of new products, 25 5 it is important to remember that
253 Many believe that excessive advertising by a dominant firm is especially likely to
erect barriers to entry. See, e.g., JoE BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW CoMPETrroN: THm
CHARAcrER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACrURING INDusRIus 114-44 (1956); WILLAM
CoMANoR & THOMAS WILSON, ADVERTISING AND MARKEr PowER 41-64 (1974); Jeffrey
A. Klafter, Note, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.: The Predisdosure
Requirement-A New Remedy for Predatory Marketing of Product Innovations, 10
RUTGERS-CAMDEN LJ. 395, 425 n.211 (1978-1979) (citing multiple sources); Robert
Pitofsly, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 661, 665 (1977); SuTToN, supra note 141, at 313.
Stiglitz argues that the theory of perfect contestability falls with the introduction of
almost any element of sunk costs, including advertising. See Stiglitz, Technological Change,
supra note 165, at 889-90, 926 (1987) ("[W]hen there is strong ex post competition even
small sunk costs act as effective entry barriers.").
Courts also struggle with the issue, but many accept that advertising can constitute an
entry barrier. See, e.g., Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 100 (5th
Cir. 1988) ("Advertising that creates barriers to entry in a market constitutes predatory
behavior of the type the antitrust laws are designed to prevent."); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979) ("A monopolist is not forbidden to
publicize its product unless the extent of this activity is so unwarranted by competitive
exigencies as to constitute an entry barrier.").
254 Many commentators dispute the notion that advertising can act as an entry barrier.
See, e.g., EKELUND & SAuRMAN, supra note 249, at 85; JJ. LAMBIN, ADVERTISING,
COMPErTON, AND MARKTrr CoNDuCr 117 (1976).
The more general question regarding the correlation between advertising levels and
market concentration is similarly controversial with many conflicting studies having been
published. See generally RoTZOLL & HAEFNER, supra note 248, at 79 (noting disparate
results of several studies); SCHMALENSEE, supra note 249, at 220 (same).
Comanor and Wilson clearly believe that advertising can increase concentration. See
William S. Comanor & Thomas A. Wilson, Advertising and Competition: A Survey, 17 J.
ECON. LFERATURE 453, 473 (1979) ("Mhe primary conclusion to be drawn from the
empirical literature is that heavy advertising does contribute to high levels of market power
in some industries."). They nonetheless qualify their policy recommendations: "To the
extent that consumer information is increased in the same process that monopoly power is
attained, we may be unwilling to adopt specific policy measures directed against the latter
for fear of adversely affecting the former." Id. Because fraudulent vaporware
announcements do not increase consumer information, Comanor and Wilson have no reason
to worry about injury to consumer welfare in this context.
255 See Thomas T. Nagle, Do Advertising-Profitability Studies Really Show that
Advertising Creates a Barrier to Entry?, 24 J.L. & ECON. 333, 349 (1981) (concluding that
advertising lowers rather than raises barriers); Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, Note, The Risk of
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advertising costs are much greater, perhaps twice as much, 25 6 for the
entrant to attempt to introduce a product than for the incumbent to maintain
a current product's position. 25 7 This cost differential gives the incumbent a
large advantage in this critical area, even if economies of scale are
absent.258
By such means incumbents can also convince potential entrants that
entry will lead to a competitive marketplace with low post-entry prices
even if the incumbent's pre-entry prices are high. Thus, "firms, through
their own efforts, can deter entry and protect market power." 25 9
Chill: A Cost of the Standards Governing the Regulation of False Advertising Under Section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 339, 376 (1991). Product differentiation has also
been touted as lowering entry barriers. Arthur, supra note 222, at 35 n.162.
256 See 1.0. Peckham, Can We Relate Advertising Dollars to Market Share
Objectives?, in How MUCH TO SPEND FOR ADVERTISING? 30 (M.A. McNiven ed., 1969)
(recommending that, as a rule of thumb, the new brand should be advertised at twice the
rate necessary to maintain an incumbent brand), cited in ROTHSCHILD, supra note 172, at
619-20.
257 See S. WATSON DuNN & ARNOLD M. BARBAN, ADVERTISING: ITS ROLE IN
MODERN MARKETING 319 (1986) (noting that it costs more to launch a new product than to
maintain an old one); Dan Horsky & Leonard S. Simon, Advertising and the ififi&on of
New Products, 2MARKETINGSCIENCE, Winter 1983, at 1, 15. ("IThe firm should advertise
heavily in the initial periods, informing all innovators early about the existence of a new
product."); ICHBIAH & KNEPPER, supra note 14, at 209 (noting "importance of marketing in
general and promotion in particular in determining the rate at which a new product or
process gains market acceptance"); W. Duncan Reekie, Some Problems Associated with the
Marketing of Ethical Pharnaceutical Products, 19 J. INDus. EcON. 33 (Nov. 1970); C.H.
SANDAGE ET AL., ADVERTISING THEORY AND PRACrICE 487 (10th ed. 1979) ("The
introduction of a new product generally requires heavier advertising."); DON E. SCHULTZ,
STRATEGIC ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS 252 (3d ed. 1990) ("[Elstablished products require
only maintenance advertising schedules... [which] can be much less expensive than a
campaign designed to introduce the brand and initiate first-time trial."); SUTToN, supra note
141, at 313-14.
Additionally, because of its special characteristics and strategic possibilities, it is a
mistake to treat advertising as simply another cost of production that is the same for entrants
as incumbents. Mensch & Freeman, supra note 162, at 348-49.
258 For many products, advertising expenditures in excess of revenues must be
incurred to have a realistic chance of successful introduction. See WILLIAM H. BOHLEN,
ADVERTISING 454 (2d ed. 1984) ("The expected payout [to establish a new product] may be
such that profits from the product may take several years to equal the initial investment in
advertising."); SANDAGE ET AL., supra note 257, at 125 ("Building brand awareness,
inducing trial and gaining distribution in retail outlets require heavy advertising and
promotion expenditures-expenditures so great that it is not uncommon for them to exceed
income, thereby resulting in a loss the first year.").
259 Baker, supra note 138, at 652.
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Fourth, while there are typically few entry barriers in markets for
homogenous goods, this is not the case for heterogeneous goods with
varying consumer preferences. The same constraints, discussed earlier, that
minimize the ability of deceived customers to punish their deceivers by
switching to another company's products serve as entry barriers for new
firms. For example, in the computer industry, an installed base advantage
often arises for the dominant firm. 260 Any operating system such as DR-
DOS or IBM's OS/2 that Microsoft pushes out of the market, for example,
is unlikely to regain significant market share due to network
externalities. 261
Once a consumer has chosen a Microsoft operating system and
purchased software designed for that system, the consumer will have
substantial reason not to switch to an alternative operating system, even if
it is proven to be technically superior. 262 Because of the benefits flowing
from standardization, "if consumers expect a seller [such as Microsoft] to
be dominant, then consumers will be willing to pay more for the firm's
product, and it will, in fact, be dominant." 263 Standardization and attendant
260 See joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REv. 940-41 (1986) (stating that
large installed base may constitute a barrier to entry).
261 See Hanna, supra note 7, at 444. Network externalities arise, of course, where the
value of a product increases with the number of customers. See BAND & KATOH, supra note
107, at 40.2 62 Many observers attribute the success of Microsoft's operating systems software to
these factors rather than to their superiority as products. Lohr, Business to Swift, supra note
191, at E3.
[Ihere is a logic to why some products become industry standards even when they are
not necessarily superior to alternatives. Initially, the product may have benefited from
more aggressive marketing or missteps by rivals. Later, the advantages of being ahead
snowball, insuring that consumers flock to the leader.
Microsoft's Windows, which was introduced in 1985, has certainly been a beneficiary
of that logic. Microsoft sold its software far more successfully than Apple to companies,
the big growth market for personal computers until recently. As its dominance grew,
Microsoft's operating system became the standard that more and more software
applications, from word processing to E-mail, were written to run on, which in turn
attracted more users. A major advantage to using Windows was that "everybody else
was"-inferior or not, it became the common language of computing.
Id.
263 Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 425, 439 (1985); see also Besen & Farrell, supra
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network externalities, many believe, can create "excess inertia" and
thereby trap an industry in an obsolete or inferior technology. 264
The same is true of applications software markets. 265 The major cost of
software to businesses is the cost of training employees to use the
software.266 Once employees have been trained on a particular company's
brand of software, a problem of excess inertia arises which will deter
companies from switching to newer, even superior, products. 267 The same
applies to consumers.
Since individual consumers and other firms need to invest time and
money in acquiring skills specific to the industry standard (e.g., learning
how to use Microsoft Windows), they get "locked in." As switching
note 188, at 119 ("When buyers expect network benefits from one firm's product that other
firms cannot provide, a large discrepancy in value is created which the fortunate firm may
be able to extract as profit."); Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 249, at 94
("[S]ystems that are expected to be popular-and thus have widely available components-
will be more popular for that very reason."); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology
Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 824 (1986) ("[A]
given product is more attractive the larger is the in-place base of consumers using that
product.... ."); David J. Teece, Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust, 62
AN=rrRUST LJ. 465, 474 (1994) ("[O]nce the installed base achieves critical mass, both
core and complement producers join the bandwagon, often driving the rapid adoption of a
new design....").
264 See Besen & Farrell, supra note 188, at 118-19 ("Because buyers want
compatibility with the installed base, better products that arrive later may be unable to
displace poorer, but earlier standards."); Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization,
CoQpatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. EcoN. 70, 81 (1985); Joseph Kattan, Market
Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTrrRusT L.. 1, 6 (1993) [hereinafter
Kattan, Market Power] ("The existence of network externalities can, in turn, create a lock-
in effect because of the costs associated with abandoning the network. In addition to
abandoning the durable good itself, installed owners may have to abandon their sunk
investment in complementary assets, which may be either goods or technology-specific
training.").
265 One situation where sunk costs increase the consumer's cost of switching to a new
product exists where a durable good has a relatively low resale value. Obviously, computer
software fits that standard, so that "customers with sunk investment in software and
employee training may not abandon a computer standard in response to an unanticipated
small but significant price increase in the price of an operating system update." Kattan,
Market Power, supra note 264, at 11.
266 David Churbuck & Beth Freedman, Suits Against 1-2-3 Imitators May Have Wde
User I;pact, PC WK., Jan. 20, 1987, at 1, 6 (quoting Wayne Maples).
267 See Kattan, Market Power, supra note 264, at 6-7, 12; Menell, supra note 207, at
1070.
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systems means learning new skills, would-be entrants face a considerable
entry barrier. 268
This argument should not be overstated. While the market has some
rusty hinges, it is generally efficient. Obviously, businesses and consumers
often change applications software, and occasionally switch operating
systems software and even hardware. 269 Furthermore, very recent literature
poses a substantial attack upon the existence and implications of the theory
of network externalities. 270 Nonetheless, the interrelated phenomena of
268 See Thoroughly Modern Monopoly, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1995, at 76 (im contrast,
also cautioning trustbusters who may be mistaken in thinking they can improve upon the
decisions made by the market).
269 Wiley has made the point that "[a]dvancing technology can turn even physically
durable goods into economic perishables." John Shepard Wiley, Jr. et. al., The Leasing
Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693, 724 (1990).
270 See generally Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at 335-55; S.J. Liebowitz
& Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. EcoN. PERSP.
133 (1994) [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy]; S.L Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11 J.L. ECoN. & ORG. 205
(1995); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of
Antitrust Policy ?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TEcH. 283 (1996).
Lopatka and Page take arguments developed by Liebowitz and Margolis, Uncommon
Tragedy, and apply them directly to the Microsoft case. They make a very strong argument,
but it is not convincing in all its details. Among the points they make are the following:
First, they observe that increased production coupled with a decline in prices may
indicate only that technological advances have caused a reduction in prices, not that there
are economies of scale in a given market. See Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at
341. While this is true in the abstract, it does not overcome the specific evidence that there
are economies of scale in the operating systems and applications software markets.
Second, they note that "the assumption of inexhaustible scale economies may not be
warranted if the product is differentiated" because "[s]ome consumers may value certain
features of an operating system and other consumers value different features." Id. at 342.
Again, this proposition is accurate as far as it goes, but does not deny that many consumers
who value features of, say, the Macintosh GUI operating system more than the features of
Microsoft Windows will nonetheless rationally choose the latter product because of network
externalities (e.g., greater variety of software and greater ability to find compatible
systems). To repeat earlier evidence, ever since its introduction Macintosh has been rated
technically superior to any Microsoft product ever produced, yet Apple now has about 4%
of the operating systems market and Microsoft has about 90%.
Third, Lopatka and Page challenge what they perceive to be an important part of
network externalities literature-the notion "that markets can be tipped by trivial events, by
historic accident, so to speak." Id. at 342. They disagree with the conclusion that such
tipping, coupled with externalities, can lead to dominance in the market of inferior
technologies. See id. at 347. Their argument is very strong, supported by many examples of
where new technologies did displace old technologies (which does not negate the fact that
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absent network externalities, more new technologies might have displaced old technologies)
and by disputing various supposed examples of situations where inferior technologies came
to dominate the market (for example, the QWERTY typewriter keyboard). Even the
strongest proponents of network externality theory, Katz and Shapiro, admit that "it is
abundantly clear that many, new incompatible technologies are in fact successfully
introduced." Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 249, at 108. On the other
hand, there is substantial literature supporting the tipping phenomenon. See W. Brian
Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCIENTIFIc AMERICAN, Feb. 1, 1990, at 92, 94;
W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical
Events, 99 Eco. J. 116 (1989); Besen & Farrell, supra note 188, at 118. The very success
of the Microsoft operating system can be argued to have stemmed from a trivial event
which tipped the market-IBM's selection of Microsoft to provide the operating system for
its personal computers. As noted earlier, this decision had nothing to do with the merits or
efficiency of Microsoft, which didn't even have an operating system at the time.
Furthermore, a strong case can be made that Microsofts operating systems dominance is an
example of inferior technology dominating the market, for, as noted several times earlier,
most computer experts view the pre-Windows 95 operating systems of Microsoft-those that
came to dominate the world-as inferior to Apple's Macintosh, inferior to IBM's OS/2, and
inferior to Novell's DR-DOS. Therefore, Microsoft's "acceptance in the market may
merely reflect the absence of viable choice available to the consumer or an overwhelming
familiarity with the monopolist's product or service." Kapen, supra note 167, at 1067; John
Andrew Maher, Comment, Draining the Alcoa "Wishing Well"." The Section 2 Conduct
Requirement After Kodak and Calcomp, 48 FORDIAM L. REV. 291, 324 (1979); see also
Shepherd, Economic Analysis, supra note 232, at 927-28.
There is substantial evidence that the best product does not always win in the
marketplace. See Besen & Farrell, supra note 188, at 118 ("[An] inferior product may be
able to defeat a superior one if it is widely expected to do so."); Lohr, Business to the Swift,
supra note 191, at E3 (quoting Stanford University's Paul A. David as saying: "It's naive to
believe that [the most] efficient engineering solutions [always] win in the marketplace. That
view is not supported by the study of history."). There is always substantial evidence that
the dominant firm is not always the most efficient. See William G. Shepherd, Antitrust
Repelled, Ineffciency Endured: Lessons of IBM and General Motors for Future Antitrust
Policies, 39 AN~rrRUST BuLL. 203,204, 222 (1994) (arguing that performances of IBM and
General Motors debunk the "efficient-structure" hypothesis "that a firm can have a high
market share only if the firm attains superior performance"); Shepherd, Economic Analysis,
supra note 232, at 920, 927-28 (stating that market imperfections often allow dominance by
firms with only average or below average efficiency).
At the same time, there are many reasons to believe that "tipping" does not provide the
complete story, or anywhere near it, for Microsofts evolving dominance. See Daniel I.
Gifford, Microsoft Corporation, the Justice Departnent, and Antitrust Theory, 25 Sw. U.L.
REV. 621, 647-52 (1996).
Fourth, Lopatka and Page argue that even if there are tremendous economies of scale
and the operating systems market is a natural monopoly, the market should decide who the
monopolist will be (Microsoft or IBM, for example), and the market, aided by technological
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sunk costs, installed base,271 network externalities, 272 and related
concepts273 seem to combine logically to create the potential for significant
change, can turn natural monopolies into competitive markets. See Lopatka & Page,
Microsoft, supra note 7, at 349. Other things being equal, this proposition is also true. But if
the natural monopolist uses numerous anticompetitive strategies and tactics, such as
fraudulent vaporware marketing, to maintain its position, that technological change may not
overcome the monopoly. The example given by Lopatka and Page, long-distance
telecommunications service, brings to mind the fact that AT&T became a much more
efficient and competitive company after it was "de-monopolized" not by technological
change but by antitrust action. Professor Shepherd delights in reminding readers how well
AT&T has done since Judge Harold Greene massively restructured it in comparison to
IBM's relatively apathetic performance since the Reagan Justice Department dismissed the
IBM antitrust case in 1981. See Shepherd, Economic Analysis, supra note 232, at 932-36.
A minor point made by Lopatka and Page may be their most telling. Essentially, they
explain that when Microsoft issues a new version of its software (e.g., Windows 95), it
gives up, to some extent, its advantages grounded in the installed base/sunk costs/network
externalities triad. Consumers must give up their old Windows 3.1 to go to Windows 95,
and they must then learn the new system. "The Windows 3.1 user may find the difference
between learning [the new version of Windows] and learning a new system from scratch
negligible." Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at 350. This point is valid, although
one may generally assume that another iteration of Company A's previous product will be
easier to learn than Company B's competing product. Additionally, just as a matter of
consumer psychology, customers are more willing to accept a new "brand extension" than a
completely new product put out by a different company. See D. JOHN LODEN,
MEGABRANDS 9-10 (1992) ("Today's marketplace is openly hostile to most new products;
but it is extremely receptive to major brand-line extension[s].").
Finally, Lopatka and Page ignore substantial empirical evidence supporting the
network externalities theory. See, e.g., Neil Gandal, Competing Compatibility Standards
and Network Externalities in the PC Software Market, 77 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 599 (1995);
Neil Gandal, Hedonic Price Indexes for Spreadsheets and an Empirical Test for Network
Fternalities, 25 RAND I. ECON. 160 (1994); Shane M. Greenstein, Did Installed Base Give
an Incunbent Any (Measurable) Advantages in Federal Computer Procurement?, 24 RAND
1. ECON. 19 (1992). While academicians continue to debate these issues, businesspeople
have clearly rejected the arguments of Lopatka and Page. Instead, rightly or wrongly, they
have embraced the notions underlying the research of Professor Arthur and others that are
accepted in this Article. See G. Christian Hill et al., Bloody Price Wars and Strategic Errors
Hammer Tech, WALL ST. J., July 12, 1996, at Al.
271 The Supreme Court recognized the installed base factor in Easoman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992), when it noted that locked-in customers
"will tolerate some level of service-price increases before changing equipment brands." Id.
at 476.
272 See generally, BAND & KATOH, supra note 107, at 40-43 (explaining network
externalities and why restraining factors such as standards bodies and antitrust law which
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entry barriers, and this logic is supported by studies showing that
businesses strongly tend to buy the same brands of computers and software
over and over.274
Finally, as noted above,275 there is a substantial body of literature
arguing that it makes rational economic sense for a monopolist to predate
in a particular market in order to deter entrance in other markets where it
operates. 276 A company such as Microsoft that enjoys a widespread
historically work against monopolization of standards have not worked in the software
industry).273 Another related factor that impedes consumers' ability to switch products and
therefore enhances entry barriers is that of simple transaction costs, including the costs of
evaluating and acquiring the competing product. See Kattan, Market Power, supra note
264, at 11-12.
There may exist miscellaneous switching costs as well that differentiate products after
the purchase even though they may have been perfect substitutes for one another before the
purchase. See Paul Kiemperer, The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs, 18
RAND J. EON. 138 (1987); Paul Klemperer, Markets with Switching Costs, supra note 206.
Computer software is a perfect example.
274 One study shows that 80% of the time companies that buy new computers buy the
same brand they are replacing. See Severin Borenstein et al., The Economics of Customer
Lock-in and Market Power in the Service Business 7 (unpublished manuscript cited in
Kattan, Market Power, supra note 264, at 12-13 n.44). Another study indicates that the
installed base phenomenon gives incumbent manufacturers a measurable advantage in
federal computer procurement bidding contests. See Shane M. Greenstein, supra note 270,
at38.
275 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
2 76 See George A. Hay, A Confused Lawyer's Guide to the Predatory Pricing
literature, in STRATEGY, PREDATION, AND ANTrrRUST ANALYSIS 155, 160-61 (S. Salop
ed., 1981), explaining the mechanics of reputational predation:
It can be argued that it pays a firm to absorb losses even beyond what it could ever
expect to recoup in the market at hand, if by doing so this firm will establish a credible
threat to pursue the same policy in any market in which an entrant appears. If the threat
is truly credible, it need not be exercised beyond the first time, since future would-be
entrants will elect not to challenge the monopolist, figuring it is a hopeless cause. To
make this model work, requires only good information (i.e., the story of the predation
in the first market has to be communicated to the future would-be entrants), and some
nontrivial costs of entry and exit (so that unsuccessful entry attempts are not costless).
ld.; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 182-83 (1994) (using
game theory to explain rationality of reputation-based predation model); HovENKAMP,
supra note 104, at 306 (discussing "multiple-benefit predation"); SCHERER, supra note 162,
at 338; TIROLE, supra note 53, at 376-77; WLLI ASON, ANTrrRUST ECONOMICS, supra
note 139, at 342; Adams & Brock, Somnambulance, supra note 138, at 827, 859
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reputation as an aggressive competitor and operates in several markets
should be more able than most firms to succeed at strategic entry
deterrence through reputation predation. 277
The operating systems market seems to provide a vivid illustration of
the points made in this Section. IBM, one of the most powerful
corporations in the history of the world, sought to invade Microsoft's
domain with a competing system, OS/2, that was generally reviewed as
technically superior to any product that Microsoft had on the market at the
time (Windows and MS/DOS) or was even promising to put on the market
in the foreseeable future (Windows 95).278 Despite spending more than a
(explaining theory of reputation predation and giving specific examples); Baker, supra note
138, at 649 (citing numerous sources); Fox & Sullivan, supra note 235, at 74; George A.
Hay, The Economics of Predatory Pricing, 51 ANTrrRUST L.J. 361, 365 (1982) (discussing
predatory pricing based on the reputational effects of the predator firm); Balder von
Hohenbalken & Douglas S. West, Empirical Tests for Predatory Reputation, 19 CAN. I.
ECON. 160, 176-77 (1986) (presenting empirical study suggesting that under certain
conditions predation is a successful entry-deterring strategy); David M. Kreps & Robert
Wilson, Reputation and hIperfect Infornation, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 253, 275 (1982); Paul
Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON.
THEORY 280, 281, 303 (1982); B.S. Yamey, Predatory Price-Cutting: Notes and
Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129 (1970). See generally Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note
139.
Reputational effects can occur in both single market cases and multiple market cases. It
has been argued that such effects are most likely to occur when the predator's size comes
from selling closely related products in the national market, see SCHERER, supra note 162,
at 338, as does Microsoft.
Others remain critical of the reputational predation theory, in part because in the
context of price predation, it arguably would not work unless the predator actually had
lower costs than the potential entrant. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 138, at 1625;
Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies, supra note 13, at 282-83. However, in the nonprice
vaporware context, the predator need not have lower costs than the potential entrant to
benefit from reputational predation.
277 One final argument on entry barriers deserves attention. Judge Easterbrook argues
that if a predator does drive a small competitor out of business, a larger and better-financed
competitor could buy the assets of the small competitor and enter the market, preventing the
predator from reaping monopoly advantage over any long term. See Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies, supra note 13, at 271. Easterbrook makes this argument in explaining why
recoupment is unlikely to actually occur in a predatory pricing case. Because vaporware
marketing is not costly to the predator in the short run, and because any such larger and
better-financed competitor would face the same installed base/sunk costs/network
externalities barriers as the defunct small competitor, this argument carries less weight in
the vaporware context.
278 See supra note 108.
[Vol. 57:11631232
VAPORWARE
billion dollars, 279 IBM failed miserably. 280 There may be many lessons in
this story, but one of them is surely that, economic theorizing aside, it is
not easy to enter into new markets dominated by as fierce a competitor as
Microsoft even in the fluid high-tech arena.
4. Assessment of Any Overriding Efficiencies Identified by the
Putative Predator As Justifying the Behavior
Chicago School economists tend to argue that the newer nonprice
predation theories, such as predatory product innovation, predatory
investment, and predatory research and development, improperly condemn
these activities which generate much social good.281 It is widely believed
that efficient behavior should not be punished under the antitrust laws,
even if it damages competition. Indeed, experts in RRC theory readily
admit that RRC tactics are not necessarily illegal just because they injure
competitors. 28 2 Rather, "[plarticular attention must be given to the
potential efficiencies of alleged anticompetitive RRC activities." 283
Many legitimate reasons for preannouncing high-tech products were
discussed earlier in this Article.2 84 However, when, as in Scenario #1, a
large, high-tech company willfully misleads consumers, dealers, investors,
and others for the purpose of discouraging consumers from purchasing a
rival's products, there is no countervailing value to the competitive system.
279 IBM spent at least a billion dollars promoting OS/2. See Baseman et al., supra note
89, at 270. Yet, it runs on only 8% of United States home PCs and is about to suffer
substantial losses in its battle with Windows NT for the corporate market. See Bart Ziegler,
IBM's Rival OS/2 Focusing on Same Market Nicde Already Is Struggling, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 24, 1995, at B9.
280 See Laurence Zuckerman, supra note 108, at F1 (reporting that IBM CEO Louis
Gerstner apparently admitted "that IBM has failed in its multibillion-dollar attempt to
establish an alternative to Microsoft Corp.'s stranglehold on the software that runs personal
computers.").
281 See Arthur, supra note 222, at 42; Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 168, at 219
("[Ciritics argue that what the courts have called anticompetitive exclusionary conduct is in
fact efficient behavior that, if successful in increasing market shares, should be replicated by
competitors rather than prevented by courts.").
282 Antitrust law protects competition, but not individual competitors. See Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Great W. Directories v.
S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 74 F.3d 613, 615 (5th Cir. 1996).
283 Scheffman, supra note 179, at 205.
284 See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
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As Professor Cooper has noted, "It is extraordinarily hard to conjure up
the [legitimate] competitive advantages of deliberate fraud." 285
False advertising subverts efficiency. It misleads consumers and
thereby deforms the market, causing a misallocation of resources. 286 By
injuring legitimate competitors and giving market power to deceivers,
fraudulent vaporware marketing can injure even consumers who were not
misled. 28 7 It further damages the cause of efficiency by "lead[ing]
consumers to disregard valuable and truthful information and [to] rely on
more expensive, time-consuming product searches."288 In all these ways,
fraudulent vaporware marketing injures the process of fair competition. 289
In both the short run and the long run, it can cause reduced output. 290
285 Edward H. Cooper, Attenpts and Monopolizaion: A Mildly Expansionary Answer
to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MIcH. L. REV. 373, 416 (1974).
286 See Goldman, supra note 201, at 492-94; Schechter, Gullible Convener, supra
note 204, at 584; Roger Schechter, Letting the Right Hand Know What the Left Hand's
Doing: The Cash of the FTC's False Advertising and Antitrust Policies, 64 B.U. L. REV.
265, 323 (1984) [hereinafter Schechter, Left Hand] (pointing out that the FTC, by issuing
disparate orders to advertising competitors, can alter structure of the market).
287 See Craswell, supra note 196, at 686-87.
Deception can have significant impact on consumer welfare by affecting competition.
For example, deceptive advertising might differentiate one firm's products from those
of its competitors, thus giving the advertiser some form of market power and leading to
price increases that would injure all consumers, whether they were deceived or not.
Id.
2 88 Bums, Paradox, supra note 216, at 85 & n.157 (citing numerous sources);
Pitofsky, supra note 253, at 671 ("In markets where product claims are viewed with utter
suspicion, high price is adopted as an indication of quality and price competition and
product improvement become economically irrational.").
289 See BeVier, supra note 218, at 8 ("Whereas truthfid advertising facilitates
competition, false advertising impedes it.").
290 Judge Easterbrook believes that most exclusionary conduct is justified as efficient.
Regarding RRC, he argues that when it occurs, the price in the market will rise at once, and
total output will fall, but the predator's share of the output will rise. See Easterbrook, On
Identrfing, supra note 13, at 974. Therefore, Easterbrook argues, RRC activity can only be
proven by showing a decrease in total output. However, Krattenmaker and Salop point out
that (a) the "output" test proffered by Easterbrook fits industry-wide collusion cases, but has
little applicability to single firm monopoly cases, and (b) the test was designed to evaluate
vertical restraints and consequently would not apply to the horizontal vaporware case. See
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 168, at 283-84.
Easterbrook's output test has been roundly criticized elsewhere. See, e.g., Eleanor M.
Fox, The Modernization ofAntitrust: A New Equilibriun, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140, 1160-
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Thus, because false vaporware marketing generates no social
benefits, 291 condemning it raises none of the difficult questions
surrounding other alleged nonprice predation practices. 292 No efficiencies
can be persuasively claimed for fraudulent vaporware announcements, 293 so
this consideration should not protect the activity from antitrust scrutiny.
C. Analyzing Nonprice Predation Criticisms of Fraudulent
Vaporware Marketing Theory
As noted earlier, there are five relevant criticisms of the post-Chicago
theories of nonprice predation that should be considered as they relate to
fraudulent vaporware marketing.
1. Is Nonprice Predation Theory a Genuine Departure from
Current Analytical Approaches?
Some have argued that although nonprice predation models offer useful
insights into relevant issues, they do not really add much to traditional
62, 1172-74 (1981) (arguing that antitrust law should focus on preserving competitive
processes rather than locking the law into the artificial theoretical constructs of economists);
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, supra note 13, at 285.
Professor Gerla believes that false advertising, of which vaporware is a variety, does
indeed reduce output through demand shift. See Gerla, Federal Antitnist, supra note 171, at
1054-62. This belief seems accurate. At least during the time that the public is waiting
fruitlessly for the vaporware promise to be fulfilled, it will stop buying the competitor's
product, reducing demand and therefore output. The competitor will also incur extra
expenses in advertising to compete with its new vaporous rival, which will have the effect of
raising its prices and thereby further reducing demand and output. In the long run, the
predator, if successful in severely damaging its competitor, can raise prices and again
reduce output. See id. at 1062-63.
291 False advertising, such as fraudulent vaporware announcements, causes economic
loss. See Gerla, Federal Antithst, supra note 171, at 1030 ("False or misleading
information is a deadweight economic loss, causing injury without any offsetting economic
benefit."); E. Thomas Sullivan, On Nonprice Competition: An Economic and Marketing
Analysis, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 771, 791 & n.101 (1984).
292 Even Judge Bork believes that some activity, such as disturbing optimal patterns of
distribution, can constitute exclusion and predation. See BoRK, supra note 135, at 156.
However, he believes that such tactics are generally counterproductive when the predator
will incur substantial added costs. See id. However, vaporware marketing imposes no such
additional costs, at least in the short run.
293 See BeVier, supra note 218, at 14 ("False advertising... is unequivocally bad. It
increases uncertainty and impedes informed decision making.").
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analysis. 294 This Article accepts this criticism, for the ultimate argument
made here is not that fraudulent vaporware marketing can only be
recognized as an antitrust violation by application of an innovative new
nonprice predation theory. Rather, the argument made here is simply that
fraudulent vaporware marketing can constitute monopolizing behavior
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Whether this conclusion is
demonstrated via traditional analysis or via adoption of "new" nonprice
predation theory is irrelevant.
Although fraudulent vaporware marketing arguably fits squarely into
the mainstream of post-Chicago nonprice predation theory, this Article's
ultimate argument is strengthened by the fact that the practice also clearly
meets traditional tests for monopolizing conduct. Three examples should
make the point.
a. Professor Sullivan's "Jarring or Unnatural Test"
Similar, but not identical, definitions of monopolizing conduct have
traditionally been offered by antitrust law's leading commentators.
Professor Sullivan suggests a sort of "I know it when I see it" definition
for predatory practices.
According to Professor Sullivan's definition, predatory conduct will
usually display two identifying characteristics. First, there will be
something odd, something jarring or unnatural seeming about it. It will not
strike the informed observer as normal business conduct, as honestly
industrial. Second, it will be aimed at a target, at an identifiable competitor
or potential competitor, or at an identifiable group of them. 295
To take the second element first, as assumed in the hypothetical and as
allegedly practiced by Microsoft and others, fraudulent vaporware product
announcements are often aimed at a specific competitor or competitors who
have marketed or are introducing specific products. Thus, the second
element of Sullivan's test for anticompetitive or predatory conduct is easily
satisfied. 296
294 See, e.g., Timothy Brennan, Understanding "Raising Rivals' Costs," 33
ANTrrRuST BULL. 95, 113 (1988) ("RRC explains little that cannot already be understood
through careful application of the conventional and proven horizontal market paradigm in
antitrust analysis.").
295 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTrrRUST § 43, 111-12 (1977).
296 Examples include Microsoft's 1982 and 1983 vaporware announcements aimed at
blunting sales of VisiCorp's VisiOn software and its 1986 preannouncement to hold off
purchasers of Borland Corporation's Turbo Basic software. See supra notes 70-77, 84-86
and accompanying text.
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To examine the first element of the Sullivan test, it is obvious that
fraudulent vaporware marketing is a form of false advertising. Fraudulent
vaporware marketing does not, in Sullivan's words, "strike the informed
observer as normal business conduct, as honestly industrial." 297 Rather,
false advertising is simply unethical. 298
Although the evidence described earlier in this Article indicates that
fraudulent vaporware marketing is often used in high-tech industries, these
industries, thankfully, have not so completely lost their moral compass that
the practice is openly embraced. 299 Instead, fraudulent vaporware
marketing remains so jarring and unnatural that even its most infamous
practitioners deny that they ever engage in the practice even as they point
fingers at their competitors and moan that the practice is ubiquitous in the
industry. Indeed, a few industry groups have adopted codes of ethics in a
thus-far futile attempt to minimize the practice. 3 0 Only in response to
confidential surveys by academics have they admitted to the practice.
Application of the "jarring or unnatural" test focuses analysis of
fraudulent vaporware marketing upon the ethical and fairness aspects of
antitrust law.30 1 The practice is neither ethical nor fair. It is "jarring" and
297 SULLIVAN, supra note 295, § 43, at 111-12.
2 9 8 See 1A RUD)OLF CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 5.14, at 88-89 (4th ed. 1993) ("A seller who, by means of false advertising, obtains a
business contact which he can exploit, acquires an undeserved advantage over his more
ethical competitors."); RicHARD T. DE-GEORGE, BUSINESS ETHICS 277 (2d ed. 1986) ("If an
ad makes a false claim, which the advertiser knows to be false, for the purpose of
misleading, misinforming, or deceiving potential customers, then the ad is immoral.");
THOMAS M. GARRE'T & RcHARD J. KLONoSKI, BuSINESS ETmics 106 (2d ed. 1986)
(arguing that false advertising's distortion of market price paid by consumers is only one
reason to condemn it as immoral); Goldman, supra note 201, at 494 ("Society's moral and
ethical standards are diminished if false advertising is accepted as a standard business
practice.").
299 Unfortunately, some members of the industry have adopted the "everybody does
it" view of business ethics. For example, one Microsoft apologist has written that "[it's
hard to see how anyone can police 'vaporware' announcements; telling the truth has never
been a tradition in the software industry." Morris, supra note 240, at B5.
300 See infra note 371 and accompanying text. Vaporware concerns have also led
some computer societies to refuse to allow companies to demonstrate products that are not
already being shipped. See Jenkins, supra note 159, at 10.
301 Although economic analysis dominates antitrust law today, principles of fairness
and equity should not be totally ignored. See Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Anitrust:
What Fairness Means and Why It Matters, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 265, 283 (1994) ("Once the
law abandons its role of protecting the fairness and legitimacy of the competitive process,
that process becomes more prone to random acts of anticompetitive violence. Such a policy
discourages the entrepreneurial activity necessary to stoke the furnaces of the economy.").
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"unnatural" conduct aimed at specific competitors; it therefore satisfies
Sullivan's definition of monopolizing conduct.
b. Conduct Is Profit Maximizing Only If It Will Destroy Competition
Unfortunately, as Hovenkamp recently pointed out, "[n]o court has
articulated a general theory of what the rule of reason in monopolization
cases is, or how it should function." 302 He suggests that the closest thing
to a consensus exists around the notion that conduct is condemnable if it
must destroy competition to be profit maximizing. 30 3 This lens is different,
and arguably more rigorous, than the test suggested by Sullivan to evaluate
potentially monopolizing conduct, but it provides a standard that fraudulent
vaporware marketing seems to satisfy as well.
The fraudulent vaporware marketer certainly faces some damage to
long-term reputation when it does not fulfill its promises and predictions.
The practice would, therefore, likely be unprofitable if it did not benefit
the fraudulent marketer by damaging the competitive process. However,
for reasons that were discussed above, the reputational injury likely will
not be sufficiently severe to deter a strongly motivated monopolist or
would-be monopolist. Even the most rabid proponents of the notion that
the marketplace can discipline or correct false advertising admit that there
are limits to the market's ability to self-correct and to consumers' abilities
to protect themselves from deception. 30 4 Damage to competitors and the
competitive process can outweigh any damage to the predator's reputation,
thereby rendering the practice profitable and predatory under this
traditional definition.
302 HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, § 6.4a, at 248.
303 See id.
304 See Burns, supra note 216, at 75 n.121.
[E]ven advocates of [the] theory [that the consumer's conscious or unconscious
purchasing decisions act as a powerful self-help remedy that deters false
advertising] admit there are limits to the consumer's ability to protect himself,
particularly if the seller's interim profits from deception exceed its long-term costs
in loss of reputation or if the seller has few repeat customers.
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c. Conduct is Monopolizing If It Allows a Dominant Firm to Injure
Competitors Without Regard for Efficiency
"Exclusionary" acts are commonly viewed as those which allow a
dominant firm to injure competitors without regard to their efficiency.3 05
Indeed, the Supreme Court has used this test to define both exclusionary
behavior and predation, focusing the analysis upon the suspect conduct's
impact on consumers:
The question whether [defendant's] conduct may properly be characterized
as exclusionary cannot be answered by simply considering its effect on
[plaintiff competitors]. In addition, it is relevant to consider its impact on
consumers and whether it has impaired competition in an unnecessarily
restrictive way. If a firm has been "attempting to exclude rivals on some
basis other than efficiency," it is fair to characterize its behavior as
predatory. 306
This third way of defining illicit predatory conduct is consistent with
the notion, mentioned earlier, that antitrust law is meant to protect
competition, but not individual competitors.
The test is also clearly satisfied by fraudulent vaporware marketing,
which allows a dominant firm to injure smaller firms by disrupting efficient
market processes. Small, efficient firms can be first to the market with
innovative new products and yet see their competitive advantage
neutralized by a larger competitor's fraudulent vaporware announcement.
Large economic entities can use fraudulent vaporware marketing to protect
currently held monopoly positions, or to invade and dominate new markets
previously controlled by smaller companies.
So, even if nonprice predation theory adds nothing to traditional
approaches, the important point to remember is that fraudulent vaporware
marketing satisfies three complementary, but slightly different, traditional
tests for defining predatory conduct for purposes of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
305 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 7, 626b-626c.
306 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highland Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985),
(quoting BORK, supra note 135, at 138, and adopting the test suggested in AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 7, 626b-626c).
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2. Does the Proposed Theory of Liability Adequately Define Grounds
for Liability So As to Preclude Condemnation of Efficiency-
Enhancing Conduct?
As was explained in Part IV.B.4, fraudulent vaporware marketing is
undeniably inefficient. Because no efficiencies can be convincingly claimed
for fraudulent vaporware announcements, eliminating the practice will
surely improve the efficiency of the economy if it can be distinguished
from nonfraudulent marketing. This differentiation is not easily done, but
is feasible, as will be explained presently.30 7
3. Does Fraudulent Vaporware Marketing Hinge on the Existence
of Market Power?
Critics of nonprice predation in general often argue that such theories
hinge on the existence of market power.30 8 This dependence, they further
contend, limits the applicability of nonprice predation to a relatively small
set of circumstances.
Criticisms regarding viability of RRC tactics of the type discussed by
Krattenmaker and Salop, like criticisms of other nonprice predation
methods, do not generally apply to vaporware. For example, Brennan notes
that "[t]o raise rivals' costs, by definition one has to raise their input
prices," 3°9 which he suggests cannot be accomplished without acquiring
power over price in those markets except in unusual cases. But vaporware
raises the rivals' costs for promotion and advertising not by raising the
costs charged by the rivals' advertising firms (a prototypical example of the
type of RRC activity examined by Krattenmaker and Salop), but by forcing
the rivals to do a greater volume of advertising in order to sell their
product in the face of a vaporous competing product.310 The greatest
307 See infra notes 340-76 and accompanying text.
308 See, e.g., Snyder & Kauper, supra note 168, at 564.
309 Brennan, supra note 294, at 99.
3 10 Brennan addresses the related notion of raising rivals' costs by increased
advertising, conceding that (a) more advertising by one firm may render a rival's
advertising less effective; and (1) that to the extent advertising is treated as an input, when
the rival's advertising becomes less effective, its costs rise. However, Brennan argues that
"[ilf a firm's increased advertising... makes efforts by competitors less productive, it may
be because consumers prefer the results of these efforts." Id. at 102. Obviously, competitive
advantage stemming from effective truthful advertising is not usually objectionable even if it
raises rivals' costs; however, competitive advantage stemming from fraudulent vaporware
marketing remains objectionable.
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danger from fraudulent vaporware marketing arises when that tactic is used
by firms that dominate their markets. This is not surprising. However,
while predatory pricing and many forms of nonprice predation are
practicable only for firms with very large market shares, fraudulent
vaporware marketing can be used effectively by firms with much smaller
market shares. 311
On the other hand, when used by small firms, fraudulent vaporware
marketing can have some anticompetitive effects, but probably nothing
(especially in terms of sustained, long-term market power) that rises to the
level of a section 2 Sherman Act monopolizing or attempting-to-
monopolize violation, 312 because the Supreme Court requires a showing of
monopoly power in the former offense and a dangerous likelihood of
success in monopolizing in the latter. That requirement is why some acts
that are forbidden to monopolists or would-be monopolists with a realistic
chance of success are legal for the small fry.3 13
Keep in mind, however, that large firms have sometimes effectively
used vaporware marketing to enter a market in which they previously had
no market share and thereby trampled smaller, incumbent firms. 314
4. Are the Episodes of Conduct Described by the Theory So Rare As
to Be Insignificant for Competition Policy Purposes?
As detailed in Part II, there is ample evidence that fraudulent
vaporware marketing is widely used in high-tech marketing. The evidence
of a widespread phenomenon of vaporware marketing is much more
substantial than for other nonprice predation theories such as product
innovation and predatory investment strategies, where there are a few fairly
311 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, § 6.2b, at 245 (explaining that vexatious
litigation can be used by firms with smaller market power). Indeed, given its status,
Microsoft could likely announce that it planned to enter a new market with a "new
improved" product and substantially freeze the existing compedtion's sales, even if
Microsoft had a zero percent market share at the time of the announcement.
312 See Meehan & Lamer, supra note 224, at 195 ("One point of agreement between
the Chicago School and the new school is that single-firm conduct is not likely to restrict
competition unless there is preexisting monopoly power."); Oliver E. Williamson,
Delimiting Andrst, in REVrFALIZING ANTrrRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY, supra note 139,
at 229 ("High concentration coupled with high barriers to entry are needed" for strategic
predatory behavior to succeed.).
313 See Meehan & Lamer, supra note 224.
3 14 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
well-known asserted examples and elaborately plotted theories and
formulas, but no real evidence of a widespread real-world application.
Indeed, the problem for the theory may be not that it happens too
infrequently to be significant, but that it may happen too often to be
effective. A firm that becomes known for using vaporware marketing at
every turn will lose credibility and the tactic will eventually be rendered
ineffective. Certainly a Microsoft or an IBM has the reservoir of goodwill
and economic power to fail to deliver on vaporware promises fairly often
without suffering too much damage. But even firms of their economic heft
cannot continuously use fraudulent vaporware marketing with impunity.
However, by carefully restraining themselves, and using the tactic only
where it promises to make a difference in an important market, such firms
seemingly can gain great competitive advantage.
5. Can the Targets of Vaporware Readily Avail Themselves of
Counterstrategies to Defeat the Strategy Without the Need for
Antitrust Intervention?
Counterstrategies for victims of vaporware do not show much
potential. The normal reaction to a predatory vaporware announcement is
to respond with increased advertising of the target's product. This
increased expense is one of the facets of vaporware that raises the rival's
costs and thereby injures it. Often the increased advertising is not effective
anyway; sales flatten and revenues plunge.
A vaporware target can respond with its own vaporware
announcement. However, as noted above, such fraudulent marketing tactics
simply work more effectively for a large company like Microsoft or IBM
than for their smaller competitors. Smaller companies that engage in
vaporware are more likely to self-destruct like Wang or Osborne.
A vaporware target can respond by pointing out, again via increased
advertising budgets, that the vaporware promised by the predator may
never appear. But, as explained above, a clever vaporware predator who
has built up goodwill and used the technique only in especially important
market battles will be able to withstand such claims.
Due to imperfect information, the innocent competitor may believe that
the fraudulent vaporware marketer really does have a new product on the
cusp of being released and therefore may not realize that it is being
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predated against. It might not take any countermeasures at all in such
situations.315
For the above reasons, few effective counterstrategies for the firm
victimized by vaporware announcements made by a large competitor are
apparent.
In conclusion, fraudulent vaporware marketing meets the four major
criteria for discerning nonprice predatory acts. It also withstands the five
relevant criticisms. Fraudulent vaporware marketing of the kind
hypothesized in Scenario #1 is conduct potentially violative of section 2 of
the Sherman Act.
V. INNOCENT VAPORWARE MARKETING As ANTICOMPETrIVE,
EXCLUSIONARY, OR PREDATORY CONDUCT
If fraudulent vaporware marketing should be deemed sufficient to fulfill
the conduct element of a section 2 violation, what about an "innocent"
incident of vaporware marketing?
Scenario #2: Innocent Vaporware Marketing
Assume that a computer software maker has monopoly or near-
monopoly power in a given market. Assume further that a small competitor
in that market, say with a 5% market share, begins to market a new
product with features well beyond those of the dominant firm's current
product. Assume further that the dominant firm immediately issues a press
release and announces at a computer trade show that it is currently
developing and will market within three months a product that will do
everything that the small competitor's product will do. Finally, assume that
the dominant firm's officers believe in good faith that they can deliver on
the promise, but difficulties in programming defeat their plans. The new
product does not reach the market for a year and when it does it lacks
several of the features of the small competitor's product.
The incident of innocent vaporware marketing that is illustrated in this
hypothetical example raises an issue that is almost as interesting as that
raised by fraudulent vaporware marketing. It is also an important issue,
given that many commentators believe that there is insufficient evidence
315 See Robert H. Lande, Gdcago Takes It on the Cin: Inperfect Information Could Play
a Crudal Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANrrTRUST LJ. 193, 201 (1993) [hereinafter
Lande, OQ'n] (offering a similar argument in the context of predatory pricing).
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that Microsoft has not intended to fulfill its vaporware promises and that,
therefore, its announcements are no more than "aggressive marketing." 316
As noted earlier, all practitioners of vaporware pronounce their own good
intentions (as they denounce the intentions of their competitors).
A. Evaluating Innocent Vaporware Marketing
It can be plausibly argued that innocent vaporware marketing, like the
fraudulent marketing discussed in Part IV, can satisfy the conduct element
for a section 2 monopolization or attempt-to-monopolize violation. After
all, the damage to competitors (and to competition) is the same whether the
false announcement was fraudulent or well intentioned. The small software
maker whose sales are frozen in the wake of a Microsoft announcement
that it will introduce a competing product six months later will likely suffer
the same injury whether or not Microsoft believes its own announcement.
Furthermore, many believe that intent should be irrelevant in antitrust
law.317 Vaporware marketing is essentially deceptive advertising which is
punishable, at least under the Lanham Act, because of its falsity; the
advertiser's bona fides are largely irrelevant. 318
These arguments notwithstanding, the better view is that innocent
vaporware marketing does not satisfy the conduct requirement of a
section 2 violation. There are several reasons to draw this distinction.
First, an innocent vaporware announcement is not immoral and therefore is
not "abnormal or jarring" in the same sense as a fraudulent announcement.
It is, rather, a "normal business practice" that is commercially justified. As
was discussed at length in Part ll.B, such preannouncements, among other
functions, can serve to provide valuable information to dealers and
consumers about the availability and features of future products, can
stimulate and facilitate the development of complementary products by
other firms, and can induce investment into areas where it is needed and
will be well used. 319 The value of the information communicated by these
316 See Brit Hume, The Flaw in Judge's Rejection of Microsoft Settlement, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 27, 1995, at F20.3 17 See infra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
3 18 The common law did require bad intent for a false advertising claim. See W. PAGE
KmnTON ET AL., PRossER ANDK IETON ON THE LAWOFToRTs § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
The Lanham Act punishes false representations even in the absence of an intent to deceive
or knowledge of the falsity. See Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186,
189 (2d Cir. 1980); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3d Cir. 1976); FTC v.
Pharmtech Research, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 294, 301 (D.D.C. 1983).
319 See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
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preannouncements is obvious, especially to Bill Gates, who has argued:
"Microsoft's dissemination of information is entirely procompetitive: it
enables customers to make better-informed purchases and developers to
make better products." 320 Therefore, innocent vaporware announcements
are supported by a legitimate business justification, and such a justification
allows a defendant accused of attempted monopolization to avoid
liability.3 21
Second, an innocent announcement has profit-maximizing potential
beyond mere injury to competition. That is not to say that a well-
intentioned but ultimately unfulfilled vaporware announcement might not
be aimed at specific competitors, but it is also intended to create profit for
the announcer by conveying accurate and useful information to consumers,
suppliers, and others to pave the way for the announcer's planned product.
Fraudulently inaccurate vaporware announcements, on the other hand,
cannot create profits for the announcer except by unfairly injuring
competition.
Third, to apply a strict liability standard (or even a negligence
standard) to vaporware announcements runs too great a risk of stifling
legitimate commercial speech to be justified. 322 If courts mandated that
firms be strictly liable for their product preannouncements, vaporware
marketing (fraudulent and innocent) would be largely eliminated, but so
would an important source of valuable consumer information. 323
These distinctions are obviously difficult to draw. When IBM
preannounces by several months its disk-array drive system for storing data
on mainframe computers, causing a drop in the share price of the
32 0 Bill Gates, It's Feast, Not Famine, at the Software Table, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
1995, at F13.
321 See Multistate Legal Studies v. Harcourt Brace Publ'g, 63 F.3d 1540, 1550 (10th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 702 (1996).
322 See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 7, 738i, at 284.
[No liability should attach to statements that truly reflect the monopolist's expectations
about future quality or availability where that expectation is both actually held in good
faith and objectively reasonable. Such reasonable good faith statements about research,
development, and forthcoming production serve the social interest in maximizing the
relevant information available to buyers.
Ild.
323 Additionally, to punish companies for not meeting their promised released dates
would, in turn, punish consumers, for companies might simply ship the software no matter
how "buggy" it was. See Hawkins, High-Tech Mirages, supra note 42, at C1 (quoting
David Coursey, editor of P.C. Letter).
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comparatively small ($1 billion per year) leader in the industry, is the
injury to competition outweighed by the value of the information to the
consumers who have more time to choose among systems that cost
$400,000 or more each? 324 If IBM's announcement is fraudulent and IBM
has no good faith reason to believe that it can actually deliver the described
product when promised, the answer is clearly "no."
However, if IBM's announcement is a good faith and reasonably based
description of IBM's marketing plans, the contrary result appears more
reasonable. Consumers benefit by being able to choose between the small
competitor's product which is available today and IBM's product which
will likely be available at a preannounced future date. The consumer can
now make an informed decision weighing the benefits of early delivery of
the small competitor's product against the features of IBM's future
product.
Obviously, if the consumer has an immediate need, it will buy the
small competitor's product. If immediacy is not a problem and the
consumer has had prior favorable experiences with IBM products and
believes that IBM is a stable company that will be around to provide good
service for years to come, the consumer may well wait and choose the IBM
product. Consumers are the best judges of how to maximize their net
surplus if they are given accurate information. 325
If IBM delivers the promised product at the promised time, it is
difficult for the small competitor to complain about the fairness or legality
of the accurate preannouncement. 326 This state of affairs is simply fair
324 See Lohr, Product Prognostication, supra note 158, at F9 (describing IBM's
marketing approach to its disk-array system).
325 See Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at 356-57.
326 Nonetheless, it has been plausibly argued that even accurate product
preannouncements can constitute a section 2 violation. Farrell and Saloner argue that if an
installed base exists, as it is almost certain to in most segments of the computer industry,
then any transition to a new standard must be gradual. In such a milieu, the burdens of
making such a transition will fall disproportionately upon the early adopters of the new
standard. This situation creates reluctance to adopt the new standard, causing "excess
inertia." However, if the scale tips away from the installed base, there can also be "excess
momentum." Therefore, they conclude that a preannouncement can sometimes prevent a
"bandwagon effect" from coming into existence for existing technology, thereby "secur[ing]
the success of a new technology that is socially not worth adopting, and that would not have
been adopted absent the preannouncement." Farrell & Saloner, supra note 260, at 942.
They explain:
With a preannouncement, two effects favor the new technology. First, if some users
decide to wait for it, the network benefits when the new technology is introduced (and
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competition. The information increases efficiency, and courts are (and
adopted by those users) will be larger than otherwise. Second, the installed base on the
old technology will be reduced by the number of users who wait. In some cases, the
unique equilibrium without a preannouncement is that the new technology is not
adopted, while with a preannouncement it is adopted. Of course, the potential users
who decide to wait are indeed well-informed "arbiters of the product's quality" and
their welfare is increased, but they are not the only ones who matter. Their adoption of
the new technology affects both the users in the installed base and later adopters who
might have preferred the old technology to the new. Thus, the preannouncement may
reduce welfare.
kL at 942-43.
However, Landis and Rolfe argue that courts should make short shrift of any antitrust
claim based upon an accurate preannouncement:
Mhe welfare of consumers can be increased only by having additional correct
information that is relevant to their purchasing decisions. If competitors lose sales
because consumers prefer to postpone their purchases until the new (and presumably
more desirable) product becomes available, those lost sales are the result of competition
and the appropriate response by the competitor is to offer better products or lower
prices to induce consumers to buy from him. The practice creates no entry barriers
because it imposes no differential costs on would-be entrants.
Landis & Rolfe, supra note 7, at 140.
Lopatka and Page agree, concluding that "[given that information typically increases
efficiency, the only sensible rule is that predisclosure of accurate product information is
lawful per se." Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at 357.
Because an accurate product preannouncement is not technically an incident of
vaporware marketing, this issue lies beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, Landis &
Rolfe and Lopatka & Page seem to have the stronger position. It is bolstered by the
Supreme Court's decision in Professional Real Esaate Investors, Inc. v. Coluabia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993), in which the court held that meritorious litigation, even if
filed with anticompetitive intent, is not "sham litigation" and cannot provide the conduct
element for a section 2 violation. See id. at 60-61. Many lower courts had held that
meritorious litigation could still fit within the "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. See, e.g., Mach-Tronics Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1963);
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416,416 (10th Cir. 1952).
Lower courts seem to agree that accurate advertising cannot constitute illicit conduct
for section 2 Sherman Act purposes. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Pharm. Mfrs. v. Ayerst
Lab., 850 F.2d 904, 916 (2d Cir. 1988); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1979); General Communications Eng'g Inc. v. Motorola
Communications & Elecs., Inc., 421 F. Supp. 274, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (holding that
giving truthful information about a competitor's shortcomings should not create section 2
liability).
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should be) reluctant to impose antitrust liability upon actions that improve
market efficiency. 327
A closer case is presented if it turns out that IBM's good faith
announcement was overly optimistic because of unforeseen difficulties
encountered in producing the product. However, most consumers know
that development of high-tech products is difficult business and that
products are sometimes delivered late. It is not unreasonable to put the
burden on the consumer to incorporate that fact into the purchase decision.
(However, it remains unreasonable and inefficient to also make the
consumer account for the fact that the product preannouncement is a
fraudulent lie with no reasonable basis underlying it.)
A final reason to protect innocent vaporware marketing lies in the fact
that a company such as Microsoft that does not predisclose, at least on a
"need-to-know" basis, will also suffer complaints. 328 To the extent that
these complaints are made, companies are put in a Catch-22 situation329
regarding vaporware announcements. Consider, for example, Microsoft's
Windows 95. Not only is nonfraudulent preannounced information about
the system helpful to consumers and vendors, it is critical to companies
who would supply complementary products, such as applications software.
It is unfair to require Microsoft to preannounce its products and then to
punish Microsoft if its promises do not pan out. It is not unfair, on the
other hand, to require Microsoft to preannounce its products with the only
limitation being that it not blatantly lie.
3 27 See Lopatka & Page, Microsoft, supra note 7, at 357-58.
3 28 Indeed, some have even claimed that failure to disclose can itself be an antitrust
violation. However, the most influential cases in the area refuse to impose an antitrust duty
to predisclose upon an innovative competitor. See California Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM
Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that IBM's fUilure to disclose
information about its new products prior to their introduction did not unnecessarily exclude
or restrict competition); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281 (refusing to impose upon Kodak a
duty to predisclose innovations).
However, IBM did accept a predisclosure requirement as part of a settlement in an
antitrust case brought by the European Commission. See Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization
and Dominance in the United States and the European Community: Effciency, Opportunity,
and Fairness, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 981, 1014 (1986).
329 Lopatka and Page term this Catch-22 situation as placing Microsoft in "an
inescapable damned-if-you-do-damned-if-you-don't" situation. Lopatka & Page, Microsoft,
supra note 7, at 361.
1248 [Vol. 57:1163
VAPORWARE
B. The Role of Intent
Many argue that intent should be irrelevant in antitrust law,330 so the
notion of protecting well-intentioned vaporware announcements from
antitrust liability while punishing fraudulent announcements may be
controversial. But the Supreme Court has established that intent to
monopolize or to attain a monopoly is fundamental to section 2
violations. 331 And some forms of conduct already exist which may
constitute section 2 violations if done intentionally, but do not if done
innocently or negligently. 332 The proposed dichotomy, therefore, is
scarcely unique.
Proving the intent element is never easy, but American law is filled
with situations where it must, indeed, be established. Most criminal cases
and most intentional tort cases, for example, include the defendant's intent
as a key element of the prosecutor's or plaintiff's burden of proof. The
330 Although most courts embrace the intent element, it is very controversial and was
rejected by Judge Easterbrook. See A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, 881
F.2d 1396, 1401 (7th Cir. 1989). Many commentators believe that the intent element should
simply be abolished as impossible to determine or, perhaps, irrelevant. See, e.g., Demsetz,
supra note 235, at 54-55; Barry E. Hawk, Atenpts to Monopolize-Specific Intent as
Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1973); Matthew E.
Johnson, Comment, Mertorious Litigation As a Section 2 Volation-In Re Burlington
Northern, Inc. Broadens Noerr-Pennington's Sham Exception, 74 IOWA L. REV. 271, 281
(1988) (addressing specific context of predatory sham litigation).
331 The Supreme Court has clearly given intent an important role in section 2
jurisprudence. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. Many commentators also believe
that the intent element should retain an important role in section 2 litigation. See, e.g.,
Comanor & Frech, supra note 139, at 294.
332 For example, patent fraud can constitute monopolizing conduct, see Walker, Inc.
v. Food Mach., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77 (1965), but there is no section 2 violation if the
defendant was merely negligent, see Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 828
F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Similarly, sham litigation or petitioning can fulfill the conduct element of section 2
violations, and the Supreme Court recently established a two-part test for determining when
predatory sham litigation is occurring. One part of that test was a subjective motive element;
the other was an objective meritlessness requirement. See Professional Real Estate
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60-61 (1993). See generally
Scott D. Helsel, Note, Preventing Predatory Abuses in Litigation Between Business
Competitors: Focusing on a Litigant's Reasons for Initiating the Litigation to Ensure a
Balance Between the Constitutional Right to Petition and the Sherman Act's Guarantee of
Fair Competition in Business, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1135, 1163 (1995) (arguing that
even meritorious litigation, if actuated by predatory intent to punish rivals through the
process of litigation, should be actionable).
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need to determine intent, despite the attendant practical difficulties, is, as
just noted, well established in the specific area of antitrust law.333 Finders
of fact often deal with intent and motivation, 334 and the area is one "of jury
expertise. "335
As Justice Holmes wrote many years ago, the presence or absence of
intent in antitrust cases "may help the court to interpret facts and to predict
consequences." 336 The intent element assists courts in determining the
consequences of ambiguous conduct-conduct that is neither clearly
competitive (putting out a better product at a lower price) nor clearly
anticompetitive (blowing up a competitor's plant, to use Hovenkamp's
example). Every competitor hopes to prevail in the market, but the attempt-
to-monopolize offense requires a specific intent to prevail by "means that
are in some sense untoward." 337
In the high-tech setting, evidence that a vaporware announcement was
made fraudulently rather than innocently sends a strong signal that the
means used were "untoward." It signals that the information contained in
33 3 See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
225 (1993) (making the parties' "respective incentives and will" a key element of predatory
pricing analysis); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir.
1982) ("[W]e are not prepared to rule that the difficulty of distinguishing lawful from
unlawful purpose in litigation between competitors is so acute that such litigation can never
be considered an actionable restraint of trade .... ").
Ia fairness, it should be noted that the trend over the past 20 years or so in Supreme
Court vertical and horizontal restraint analysis has been to focus more on economic effects
and less on intent. See generally FTC v. Indiana Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986);
Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985);
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). However, it is also fair to note that the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Eastnan Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451 (1992) may indicate that "the tide [toward use of economic theories] is ebbing
and that courts are interested in reconsidering the legal significance of what economic
theory has to offer" antitrust law. Wise, supra note 148, at 715.
334 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Distributor Terinations Pursuant to Conspiracies Among
a Supplier and Complaining Distributors: A Suggested Antitrust Analysis, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 297, 314 n.80 (1982).335 Harry S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should Make
Cases, 12 J. CoRP. L. 1, 15 (1986).
336 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918).
337 Cooper, supra note 18, at 395 (citing numerous cases). Every driver in the
Indianapolis 500 race wants to win, but only one will. So, the intent to prevail over
competitors is insufficient to indicate an attempt to monopolize. See Mount Lebanon
Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 453, 461-62 (W.D. Pa. 1968), affid, 417
F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1969). However, an intent to prevail in the race by putting sugar in the
fuel tanks of competitors might well be sufficient to indicate an attempt to monopolize.
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the announcement is more likely to injure consumers than to inform them,
more likely to deform the market than to improve its efficiency. The
consequences of an intentionally misleading vaporware statement will
typically be destructive to the process of fair competition. A good faith
vaporware statement, on the other hand, carries at least a reasonable
promise of enlightening consumers, alerting retailers and suppliers, and
enhancing efficiency in numerous ways. The lower courts seem to agree
that good faith vaporware announcements should be protected by concerns
for efficiency and First Amendment commercial speech rights.338
C. Distinguishing Fraudulent Vaporware Marketing from Innocent
Vaporware Marketing
If innocent vaporware marketing should be protected from antitrust
scrutiny, yet fraudulent vaporware advertising should be condemned, the
difficult question arises of how to fashion a rule that distinguishes between
the two in order to avoid the dreaded "false positives"-finding antitrust
violations where only efficient, fair competitive conduct occurred. 339 The
rule should avoid unduly discouraging innovation, inhibiting the efficient
flow of useful commercial information, and stifling legitimate
competition. 340
338 See, e.g., MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1128 (7th Cir. 1983)
(accepting Areeda and Turner's view that while knowingly false vaporware statements can
generate antitrust liability, good faith expressions of future plans cannot); Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that absent
actual deception, advertising of new product is not anticompetitive); ILC Peripherals
Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 442 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd per curiam
sub non. Memorex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding product
preannouncement inactionable absent knowing falsehood); Ronson Patents Corp. v.
Sparklets Devices, 112 F. Supp. 676, 676 (E.D. Mo. 1953) (finding no antitrust liability
even though consumer response to apparently good faith product preannouncement caused
announcer to decide not to market the product); cf Solargen Elec. Motor Car Corp. v.
American Motors Corp., 530 F. Supp. 22, 26 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid, 697 F.2d 297
(2d Cir. 1982) (apparently holding that allegation of even a "knowing" exaggeration of
product potential did not support antitrust claim).
339 Even BeVier, one of the leading proponents of limiting regulation of false
advertising, would still punish fraudulent false advertising, implying that she believes it
possible and necessary to distinguish between inadvertent misstatements and those that are
intentionally made. See BeVier, supra note 218, at 2-3 & n.10.
340 See Dennis, supra note 200, at 592-93 ("The sensitive legal problem is to structure
a legal rule that catches truly anticompetitive conduct without creating disincentives to
innovate.-).
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In Ordover and Willig's controversial article about predatory pricing
and their new theory of predatory product innovation, 341 they also
discussed vaporware marketing. Although they recognized that companies
can use fraudulent vaporware marketing as an effective anticompetitive
tool, they concluded that because there are also legitimate reasons for
product preannouncements, "any timing of a product preannouncement
should be presumed legal ... [because] it [is] impossible to fashion an
implementable test for anticompetitive product preannouncements." 342 This
conclusion was somewhat ironic given that their tests for determining when
predatory pricing or predatory product innovation had occurred were so
sophisticated and complex as to arguably be beyond the practical abilities
of most courts to implement through known litigation processes. 343
Nonetheless, their general point is well taken.
1. Borrowing a Standard from Securities Law
Still, a workable rule already exists in securities law and can be applied
in these section 2 vaporware cases. A vaporware announcement points to
the future and is analogous to financial projections and other forward-
looking statements made by public companies to investors. The SEC has
promulgated rules pursuant to both the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934
Securities Exchange Act in order to establish safe harbors for such
forward-looking statements. For example, Rule 175 of the 1933 Act
provides, in part, that a projection "shall not be deemed a fraudulent
Although he recognizes the difficulty in drawing this distinction, Professor Dennis
agrees with the conclusion of this Article that if plaintiffs can prove that false advertising by
monopolists or would-be monopolists was intentionally misleading, it should be actionable.
However, simple miscalculations should not be actionable because to make them so would
unduly discourage innovation. See id. at 593-94.
341 Ordover & Willig, supra note 7, at 8; see also Robert E. Bartkus, Note, Innovation
Conmpeddon." Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1976) (examining Telex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975)).
The theory has been heavily criticized. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 138, at 1167-
70; Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1121
(1983).
3 42 Ordover & Willig, supra note 7, at 53.
343 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 104, § 6.51o1, at 255 ("[No comprehensible legal
rule can weigh all the relevant variables in a predatory pricing case ... ."); Hughes, supra
note 301, at 288 n.62 (arguing that legal tests for predatory pricing have become so
complex as to be "nearly always beyond the capacities of the litigation process").
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statement... unless it is shown that the statement was made or reaffirmed
without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith." 344
As applied by the courts in securities law cases, the doctrine has
evolved that a projection or other forward-looking statement, such as a
vaporware announcement, contains three implicit factual assertions: (a) that
the statement is genuinely believed, (b) that there is a reasonable basis for
the belief, and (c) that the speaker is not aware of any undisclosed facts
tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement. 345
This standard is perfectly reasonable,346 and it is suitable for section 2
Sherman Act purposes. As it turns out, the standard already has a
substantial track record in securities litigation arising from vaporware
marketing. Investors as well as consumers can be fooled by vaporware
announcements. When vaporware promises are not realized, investors are
often hurt when the stock price of the high-tech company drops. Investors
often respond by filing section 10(b), 347 Rule 10b-5 3 48 class action fraud
suits against the announcing company. For example, Apple Computer Co.
was hit with a $100 million jury verdict arising out of a vaporware
announcement, 349 though the company was fortunate enough to later settle
the case out of court for only $16 million.350 Numerous companies,
including Microsoft, 351 have found themselves the target of such lawsuits
based on vaporware announcements. 352
344 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1994). Rule 3b-6(a) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act is
comparable. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(a) (1994).
345 See In re Apple Computer See. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 1989); Marx
v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1974).
346 This standard is not quantitative, but need not be viewed as any more subjective or
vague than standards that do purport to be so. As Professor Jacobs has recently argued
persuasively, economists are to a large extent fooling only themselves in denying the
subjectivity of their analysis. See Michael S. Jacobs, An Essay on the Normative
Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219, 265 (1995) [hereinafter Jacobs,
&1sy]. Even the most well-established "scientific" test in antitrust law-the Areeda-Tumer
cost-based test for predation-has recently been shown to be inherently ambiguous and
likely inferior to an intent-based approach such as the one suggested here. See Timothy P.
Ross, Predation, Cost-Based Tests and Predatory Intent, 5 J. LEGAL ECON. 35, 42 (1995).
347 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
348 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
349 See Ken Siegman, Apple Verdict Stuns Lavyers, S.F. CHRON., June 1, 1991, at
B1. 3 50 See Victoria Slind-Flor, Spoils ofApple, NAT'LL.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at 2.
351 Microsoft was sued in 1989 after its stock price fell more than 13% following an
announcement of one of the delays in its word-processing software. A little more than a
year later, Microsoft settled the suit for a relatively meager $1.5 million. See Paul Andrews,
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Because section 10(b) is an intent-based statute,353 courts in the
securities law cases have long been drawing exactly the same distinction
proposed here. Fraudulent vaporware marketing can be the basis for 1934
Act securities fraud liability; innocent vaporware marketing cannot.
2. Applying the Standard
So, in order to establish actionable fraudulent vaporware marketing
(and to distinguish the challenged action from innocent and protected
vaporware marketing), plaintiffs in section 2 cases should have the burden
of proof to establish what must be proven in securities fraud suits, namely
that the defendant (a) did not really believe the announcement when it was
made, (b) had no reasonable basis to believe the announcement when it was
made,354 or (c) was aware at the time the announcement was made of
Microsoft Slowdown-Financial oef Downplays Prospects, SEATTLE TIMEs, July 19,
1992, at C1.352 See, e.g., Vosgerichian v. Commodore Int'l, 832 F. Supp. 909, 909 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (reporting investors' suit filed after defendant's stock price fell when a marketed
product did not perform as vaporware announcements had promised); Bharucha v. Reuters
Holdings PLC, 810 F. Supp. 37, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (reporting investors' suit filed when
touted product's release date was delayed six months); In re Storage Tech. Corp. Sec.
Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1368 (D. Colo. 1992) (reporting investors' suit filed when
vaporware announcements concealed production problems); Berliner v. Lotus Dev. Corp.,
783 F. Supp. 708, 709 (D. Mass. 1992) (reporting investors' suit claiming that defendant's
software was not released as scheduled); Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598,
600 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (reporting investors' suit alleging that defendant fed unduly optimistic
reports about its new MiServer product line to financial analysts); Massaro v. Vernitron
Corp., 559 F. Supp. 1068, 1070-71 (D. Mass. 1983) (reporting investors' suit filed when
company could not live up to its promise of quickly delivering new product). See generally
Prentice & Langmore, supra note 24; Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money
Do the Monitouing: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class
Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2082 (1995).
Although there are several such cases on the books, a recent study indicates that
vaporware claims make up only about 6% of reported section 10(b), Rule 10b-5
settlements. See Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Gass-Action Lawsuits: A Descriptive
Study, CSFLA Working Paper #96-016, Vol. 7, May 9, 1996.
353 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that
"scienter," defined as a mental state embracing "intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,"
is a necessary element of a lOb-5 cause of action). For a discussion of court applications of
the scienter requirement in 10b-5 vaporware cases, see Prentice & Langmore, supra note
24, at 40-46.
354 The reasonable basis standard also exists already in the context of false advertising.
Because vaporware marketing is a form of false advertising, the analogy is easily made.
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specific facts that contradicted the announcement. This rule places a heavy,
yet fair burden upon plaintiffs. 355
Such intent can be objectively inferred from anticompetitive conduct 356
or discovered in more subjective form in the memos and statements of
company officials. 357
3. Avoiding "False Positives"
Other theories of predatory activity, such as Ordover and Willig's
theory of predatory innovation, 358 have been criticized as potentially
chilling innovation.35 9 Fortunately, allowing antitrust actions based on
FTC advertising regulations require that advertisers have a "reasonable basis" for their
claims prior to making them. See In re Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 64 (1972). The standard
is an objective one, applied on a case-by-case basis. See id
355 Yet another factor raising the burden of proof for plaintiffs is the requirement of
causation. Defendants in vaporware antitrust cases might well make effective use of a
defense analogous to the "truth-on-the-market" defense in securities fraud law.
In a truth-on-the-market case, a corporate defendant guilty of a fraudulent statement
argues, essentially: "Yeah, we lied, but no one believed us." The defendant can establish
this defense by pointing to well-circulated press accounts contradicting the company's
claims and to a market price which did not react to the company's announcement. This
defense has been used successfully in securities fraud cases based on vaporware
announcements. See, e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 512-16
(7th Cir. 1989); In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 1989).
See generally Prentice & Langmore, supra note 24, at 50-52.
There is already evidence that the public is growing increasingly distrustful of product
preannouncements, so it is conceivable that an antitrust defendant might be able to
realistically claim: "Yes, we lied about our product in order to injure our competitors, but
the consumers simply did not believe us."
356 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1993); Multiflex,
Inc. v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 992 (5th Cir. 1983). For example, other
anticompetitive tactics simultaneously aimed at the same competitor targeted by a
vaporware announcement provide circumstantial evidence of intent.
3 57 As noted earlier, supra note 129, "locker room" statements and other rhetorical
flourishes of company officials must not be given undue weight. Nonetheless, statements of
an intent to put competitors out of business can provide evidence of specific intent to obtain
a monopoly. See, e.g., Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d
639, 647 (10th Cir. 1987); see also James F. Rill, Future Antitnst Division Enforcement of
Section 2, 59 ANTrrRUST LJ. 535, 539 (1991) (stating that while "generalized statements of
zeal" should not be accorded much weight, "explanations of the actual purpose of disputed
conduct must be taken very seriously").
358 See Ordover & Willig, supra note 7, at 8.
359 See, e.g., Burns, Paradox, supra note 216, at 69-70 (citing numerous sources).
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fraudulent vaporware poses minimal danger to innovative activity, 360
because nothing in the theory prevents or discourages companies from
investing in plants, equipment, research and development, and the like. A
more vigorous application of antitrust law in this area is likely to stimulate,
rather than inhibit, innovative activity. Domination of high-tech markets by
a few firms using unfair tactics, even as mundane as false advertising, is
likely to stifle innovation361 that seems to spring more from small firms in
highly competitive markets than from large firms with dominating market
shares. 362 By blocking the abuse of monopoly power to advance the profit
seeker's purposes, antitrust law can direct that monopolist's energies into
more productive and innovative channels. 363
It might be argued, however, that rendering fraudulent vaporware
announcements actionable, while not discouraging innovation, might
unduly chill the dissemination of useful commercial information. This
concern is less serious, but still worthy of attention because of the
omnipresent worry of economists that an antitrust cause of action may lead
to too many "false positives" to justify imposing liability upon even a
clearly fraudulent anticompetitive practice. The "false positives" problem
need not be too worrisome here, for several reasons.
First, as noted, plaintiffs in these cases must carry a hefty burden of
proof.364 In order to prevail in such a case, the plaintiff must carry the
360 Indeed, virtually none of the strong criticisms lodged by Sidak against Ordover and
Willig's predatory innovation theory has any application to a predatory vaporware
marketing theory. See generally Sidak, supra note 341.
361 Firms which gain market domination through innovation have a tendency to abuse
that power, stifling subsequent innovation. See Eleanor M. Fox, Don't Let Antitrust Become
Obsolete, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1995, at 19.
3 62 See Fox & Sullivan, supra note 235, at 72; F.M. Scherer, Antitrust, Efficiency &
Progress, in REVTALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY, supra note 139, at 130, 148
("[It is fairly certain that giant monopolistic enterprises are not superior engines of
technological progress. By striving to maintain a diversity of competitors and keeping entry
barriers from being raised unnecessarily, antitrust is at least pointing in the right
direction.").
3 63 See William L Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust. Source of Dynanic and
Static Inefficiencies?, in ANTrrRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETrrivENsS, supra note 13, at
83, 90 (also stressing that competitors can damage competition by unfounded use of antitrust
litigation).
3 64 See Gerla, Federal Antitrt, supra note 171, at 1087 (suggesting that use of
antitrust law to curb flse advertising as a competitive gambit need not discourage
dissemination of truthful information because a section 2 plaintiff has such a high burden of
proof); Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 172, at 18 (noting how rise of rule of reason
since 1977 has increased antitrust plaintiffs' burdens and reduced the number of cases filed);
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burden of proof to establish, at a minimum, (a) that defendant possessed
monopoly power; (b) that defendant had the requisite intent (general for
monopolization offense, specific for attempt to monopolize); (c) that
defendant's acts caused plaintiff's loss; (d) that there are entry and reentry
barriers; and (e) that defendant made false vaporware statements without
(i) good faith or (ii) reasonable basis that were aimed at one or more
specific competitors.
Because doctrine is being borrowed from securities law, section 2
vaporware plaintiffs will probably face development of a defense arising in
analogous securities law cases called the "bespeaks caution doctrine,"
which recognizes that no company can deliver on all its promises so there
should not be securities liability based on "fraud by hindsight." 365 The
doctrine protects properly qualified predictions from liability based simply
on the fact that they did not ultimately occur as projected. 36 6 It does so,
importantly, at the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage.367 A
review of recent cases shows that the securities law safe harbors and the
bespeaks caution doctrine combine to provide defendants with very
substantial protection from frivolous claims.368 Congress was sufficiently
Ordover & Willig, supra note 7, at 50-51 (also arguing that danger of excessive antitrust
litigation by competitors is limited by high burden of proof on plaintiffs).
Others have also strongly argued that allowing competitors to sue for false advertising,
presumably such as vaporware marketing, under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act will not
have ill effects. See, e.g., Gerla, Federal Antitrust, supra note 171, at 1087; Goldman,
supra note 201, at 508-14 (allowing such suits will not unduly chill truthful speech, raise
enforcement costs, or encourage RRC suits). The problem should be even farther
diminished in the antitrust context because a Sherman Act plaintiff has so much more to
prove (especially intent and knowledge of falsity) than does a Lanham Act plaintiff. See
Burns, Paradox, supra note 216, at 82 & n.144.
365 See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) ("There is no
'fraud by hindsight.'").
366 See Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040 (6th Cir. 1991);
Isquith v. Middle South Utils., Inc., 847 F.2d 186, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1988).
367 See Dennis 1. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Cout Defines Scope of Bespeaks
Caution Doctrine, N.Y. L., Nov. 18, 1993, at 5 ("The [bespeaks caution] doctrine is
particularly significant in that it has been used to terminate securities fraud litigation before
it is permitted to go to a jury on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment."); Christian
S. Herzeca, How Much Disclosure is Enough? Evolving Law Raises Questions, N.Y. LJ.,
Dec. 6, 1993, at 13 (noting that defendants can use the bespeaks caution doctrine
"aggressively to support an early motion to dismiss if the prospectus at issue contains any
significant level of risk disclosure").
368 Any reasonable reading of recent cases demonstrates that the Rule 175 and 3b-6
safe harbors, coupled with the bespeaks caution doctrine, have been the basis for nearly
innumerable dismissals and summary judgments in securities fraud cases. See, e.g.,
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pleased with the doctrine to codify it in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995.369
A plaintiff who overcomes the bespeaks caution doctrine and proves
additionally that false vaporware announcements were not believed by the
defendant, had no reasonable basis, or were contradicted by facts known to
defendant will truly have earned the conclusion that the conduct element of
a section 2 monopolization or attempt to monopolize offense has been
established.
Second, a few prudent precautions regarding vaporware can further
insulate a high-tech company from section 2 liability. Prentice and
Langmore have suggested a regime by which high-tech companies can
virtually eliminate inaccurate vaporware announcements. 370 The details of
Saltzberg v. TM Sterling/Austin Assoc., Ltd., 45 F.3d 399, 400 (11th Cir. 1995); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Donald I. Trump
Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371-72 (3d Cir. 1993); Krim v. Banctexas Group, Inc., 989
F.2d 1435, 1446-49 (5th Cir. 1993); Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243, 245 (8th
Cir. 1991); Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1040-42 (6th Cir. 1991); In
re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 507, 515 (9th Cir. 1991); I. Meyer Pincus &
Assoc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1991); Romani v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (Ist Cir. 1991); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d
Cir. 1986); Bentley v. Legent Corp., 849 F. Supp. 429, 433 (E.D. Va. 1994); Cione v.
Gorr, 843 F. Supp. 1199, 1203-05 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Renz v. Schreiber, 832 F. Supp.
766, 779-83 (D.NJ. 1993); Barrios v. Paco Pharm. Serv., Inc., 816 F. Supp. 243, 250
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Integrated Resources Real Estate Sec. Litig., 815 F. Supp. 620, 672
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); Ferber v. Travelers Corp., 802 F. Supp. 698, 711 (D. Conn. 1992);
Porter v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 41, 57 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Adler v.
Berg Harmon Assoc., 790 F. Supp. 1222, 1230 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Harner v. Prudential
Sec. Inc., 785 F. Supp. 626, 641 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Haggerty v. Comstock Gold Co., 765
F. Supp. 111, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Hayden v. Feldman, 753 F. Supp. 116, 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Friedman v. Arizona World Nurseries Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 521, 539-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Ruff v. Genesis Holding Corp., 728 F. Supp. 225, 228-29 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); In re National Smelting, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 152, 171 (D.NJ. 1989); O'Brien v.
National Property Analysts Partners, 719 F. Supp. 222, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Alizac
Partners v. Rospatch Corp., 712 F. Supp. 599, 608-09 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Nichols v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309, 1327 (M.D. Tenn. 1989);
Schwartz v. Novo Indus. A/S, 658 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
369 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
370 Prentice and Langmore suggest, among other things, that firms (a) inform their
employees of the potential legal liability that can arise from inaccurate vaporware
statements; (b) create Disclosure Compliance Committees to identify important information
and coordinate public disclosures; and (c) take steps to reduce the gap between vaporware
announcements and results by eliminating unnecessary publication of projections, avoiding
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that regime need not be repeated here, but if widely implemented, such a
program would drastically reduce the amount of vaporware marketing and
dramatically improve the accuracy and reliability of high-tech marketing
communications, to the great benefit of consumers and the industry alike.
Third, even without adopting the system suggested by Prentice and
Langmore, companies could easily avoid antitrust liability by following the
suggestion of Stewart Alsop, editor of InfoWorld, and eliminate (or at least
selectively reduce) the making of public vaporware announcements. They
could make disclosures only to key customers or rival software designers
privately under stringent nondisclosure contracts.3 71 In this way, the
greatest benefits of product preannouncements could be preserved without
misleading the market as a whole.
Other companies, for whose products advance notice is unnecessary,
could in an abundance of caution follow the recommendations of the
Software Business Practices Committee that they not publicly preannounce
products until (a) planning, designing, coding, and preliminary testing have
occurred; (b) beta testing has begun; and (c) the products will be available
within a "normal" period of time.372
Some companies, including Lotus and IBM, have at times in the past
even adopted "no preannouncement" policies without disastrous
consequences .373
unfounded optimism in making forecasts, and being alert to internal facts that contradict the
company's public pronouncements. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 24, at 62-73.
371 See Flynn, supra note 33, at D4.
3 72 See Jeffrey P. Papows, A Call for Ethics: The Computer Industry Must Agree On
and Enforce Stringent Standards for Business Practices, COMPUrER GRAPiucs WORLD,
Mar. 1991, at 116.
3 73 See Ed Bride & Mike Bucken, Lotus Celebrates, Contemplates: Firm Promises to
Stop Hyping Vaporware, SoFTwARE MAGAZINE, July 1988, at 21. Lotus Development
Corporation adopted a no-vaporware policy after several months of negative publicity for
not living up to product preannouncements. See id.
IBM's Buck Rodgers described in detail that company's post-antitrust policy regarding
vaporware:
It is IBM practice not to disclose, discuss or sell IBM products before their
announcement. For IBM to reveal anything about unannounced products-whether
equipment, programs, or services--to a prospect or customer could be viewed by a
competitor as unfair. In addition, pre-announcenent disclosure could reach other
customers and impact sales of IBM's existing product line, or jeopardize IBM copyright
or patent positions. Besides, it is always possible for technical difficulties during product
development to result in cancellation or postponement of the new product.
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Given the extremely high burden of proof upon plaintiffs and the
protective steps that potential defendant companies could take to insulate
themselves from liability, the chance of too many false positives occurring
and unduly discouraging innovation and competition seems very slight.374
Realistically, the potential for too many false positives becomes even less
likely in light of the fact that current antitrust theory is shaped largely by
Chicago School economists, and the federal bench is currently occupied
largely by judges who are conservative on antitrust issues. 375
Commercial speech is a hardy breed376 and is unlikely to be unduly
chilled by recognizing a cause of action for fraudulent vaporware
marketing. What is likely is that companies will be more cautious and more
truthful about their product preannouncements, producing more reliable
and useful information for the marketplace. The total volume of
information flowing to the market may decline, but the volume of accurate
and useful information will almost surely increase. If the standards of
accuracy for product preannouncements are raised, the amount of
vaporware should diminish, thereby creating an atmosphere where accurate
advertising will receive more credence from consumers than it currently
does, improving efficiency.
Nondisclosure also means that an IBM representative may not attempt to delay a
customer decision to order competitive equipment by hinting that a new IBM product is
under development. (There are exceptions to the nondisclosure rule, as in the case of
national interest, or when a user works with IBM to develop new products, programs,
or services. For such cases, there are careful procedures which must be closely
followed.)
F.G. "BucK" RODGERS, THE]BM WAY 225 (1986).
374 A related concern deals with the time and expense of litigating antitrust cases.
Professor Shepherd points out, however, that "well-managed section 2 treatments can be
much swifter than has been supposed." Shepherd, Economic Analysis, supra note 232, at
933 (1990).
375 See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Sunmtary Judgment, Motions to Disnm and Other
Exwaples of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J 1065, 1104-61
(1986) (demonstrating increasingly liberal use by courts of summary techniques for
disposing of antitrust suits). See generally William E. Kovacic, Reagan's Judicial
Appointees and Antitrt in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 49 (1991) (indicating that
current federal judges are not receptive to expanding antitrust liability); Steven C. Salop &
Lawrence L. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust Litigation, 74 GFo. LJ. 1001,
1002-04 (1986) (demonstrating decline in antitrust litigation).
376 See Central Hudson Gas. & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6
(1980); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Through success and excess, Microsoft may single-handedly revive
antitrust law in the United States. 377 Its conduct has, at the very least,
raised a fascinating issue regarding the antitrust implications of vaporware
marketing strategies.
There is strong evidence that many high-tech companies play the
vaporware game in order to "freeze the market" for competitors' goods.378
When the game is played by Microsoft, or any other firm with market
power, it can have the effect of stifling fair competition. 379 When
377 In addition to the investigation and consent decree described in Part It, the
Department of Justice has launched several other investigations or suits against Microsoft.
To sample just four:
* The Department of Justice investigated and ultimately derailed Microsoft's proposed
merger with Intuit. See G. Christian HIll et al., Microsoft Drops Bid for Intuit-A Victory for
Antitust Agency, WALL ST. ., May 22, 1995, at Al. The attempted merger was
Microsof's bid to expand its considerable software applications influence into the personal-
finance software market by acquiring Intuit's Quicken (75% market share) to replace its
own Microsoft Money (4% market share). See Deborah Gage, Inquiry into Intuit Deal
Grows-Justice Department Talks to More Companies, COMPUTER RESELLER NaWS, Dec.
12, 1994, at 3.
* The government investigated Microsoft's bundling of applications software with
Windows 95. See Richard Brandt, Still Messin' with Bill, Bus. WK., Mar. 13, 1995, at 44.
Specifically, the Department of Justice considered whether to force Microsoft to remove
software from the Windows 95 package that allows users to tap into the new Microsoft
Network on-line service. It appeared for a while that the Department might delay the
August 24, 1995 introduction of Windows 95, but that did not occur. Still, the government
made it clear that the probe would continue after the Windows 95 release date. See Claudia
MacLachlan, Microsoft Investigators Press Ahead, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at Al.
* The Justice Department also investigated on antitrust grounds Microsoft's practice of
requiring computer makers who license Windows 95 to promise not to bring patent
infringement suits against Microsoft or other licensees. See Viveca Novak, U.S. Probes
Microsoft Licensing Pacts Prohibiting Windows 95 Patent Suits, WALL ST. J., June 12,
1995, at B3.
e Finally, the Justice Department reportedly looked into Windows 95's tendency to
disrupt rival products' Internet links and to destroy rivals' Net-connecting programs. See
Jared Sandberg & G. Christian Ell, Microsoft Probe Spurs Subpoenas Tied to Internet,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 1995, atA3.
378 See Johnston & Betts, supra note 60, at 2 (quoting Mitchell Kertzman, CEO of
Microsoft competitor Powersoft Corporation).
379 See Elmer-Dewitt, Tripping, supra note 7, at 31. As noted earlier, conduct which
may be perfectly legal in other contexts for other competitors may be illegal when
performed by monopolists with the intent of smothering competition. See United States v.
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fraudulent vaporware marketing enables Microsoft or any other high-tech
company to unfairly obtain or retain monopoly power, vaporware
marketing transcends false advertising and unfair trade practice concerns
and becomes a potential Sherman Act violation. 380
Fraudulent vaporware marketing not only satisfies traditional tests for
predatory behavior under section 2 of the Sherman Act, but also fits
comfortably within the mainstream of recent theoretical advances in
nonprice predation theory. Fraudulent vaporware marketing is comparable
to other recently articulated forms of nonprice predation, such as raising
rivals' costs (RRC) and predatory product innovation, that have arguably
received Supreme Court approval. 381 However, fraudulent vaporware
marketing should be less controversial than these other forms of nonprice
predation because, inter alia: (a) there is much more evidence that it is an
existing and frequently used anticompetitive tool; (b) it is much less easily
justified on moral or business purpose and efficiency grounds; and (c) the
potential disadvantages of recognizing it as actionable under section 2
(e.g., false positives and discouraging legitimate competition) are much
less likely to occur.382
On the other hand, innocent vaporware announcements made in good
faith and with reasonable belief, even if issued for strategic purposes, carry
too much potential for efficiency benefits to warrant antitrust censure.
Fortunately, reasonable means for distinguishing between fraudulent and
innocent vaporware announcements are available.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 100 (1948); MCI Communications v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081,
1148-49 (7th Cir. 1983).3 80 It is certainly not unusual that an activity which constitutes one type of legal wrong
(false advertising or unfair competition) can also constitute an antitrust wrong. See 1 1.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKs AND UNFA]R COMPETrrON § 1:14, at 32 (2d ed. 1984)
("Overlap between the categories of antitrust and unfair competition should be no more (nor
less) confusing than overlaps which exist in every lawsuit between the standard legal
pigeonholes such as torts, contracts, and property.").
381 See Jacobs, Essay, supra note 346, at 264 (concluding that the Supreme Court
implicitly accepted several key assumptions of the post-Chicago view in Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992)); Lande, Chin, supra note 315, at 197
(agreeing that Kodak seems to accept many post-Chicago assumptions advanced in this
Article, including that consumers can be exploited by imperfect information).
382 The issues raised in this Article are not of mere academic interest. Not long
before this issue went to press, Microsoft was sued by Caldera, Inc. for, among other
alleged antitrust violations, its vaporware statements that arguably led to the decline of
DR-DOS. See Lisa Carricaburu, Software David Slings Lawsuit at Goliath Microsoft,
SALT LAKE CrrY TRiB., July 25, 1996, at Dl.
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